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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

A Unified Approach to Constructing Black-Box UC Protocols in Trusted Setup Models

verfasst von : Susumu Kiyoshima, Huijia Lin, Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam

Erschienen in: Theory of Cryptography

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present a unified framework for obtaining black-box constructions of Universal Composable (UC) protocol in trusted setup models. Our result is analogous to the unified framework of Lin, Pass, and Venkitasubramaniam [STOC’09, Asiacrypt’12] that, however, only yields non-black-box constructions of UC protocols. Our unified framework shows that to obtain black-box constructions of UC protocols, it suffices to implement a special purpose commitment scheme that is, in particular, concurrently extractable using a given trusted setup. Using our framework, we improve black-box constructions in the common reference string and tamper-proof hardware token models by weakening the underlying computational and setup assumptions.

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In the tamper-proof hardware model, parties are assumed to have tamper-proof hardware tokens that only provide input/output (i.e. black-box) access to the token holder.

As described in Sect. 2.1, in the binding game with \(\mathcal {T}\), R, and \(C^*\), R can interact with the trusted setup \(\mathcal {T}\) using an identity \(\mathsf {ID}_R\) chosen by \(C^*\), and \(C^*\) can interact with \(\mathcal {T}\) directly according to \(\mathcal {T}\)’s code, or indirectly as any parties with identities different from \(\mathsf {ID}_R\). Similarly, in the hiding game with \(\mathcal {T}\), C, and \(R^*\), C can interact with the trusted setup \(\mathcal {T}\) using an identity \(\mathsf {ID}_C\) chosen by \(R^*\), and \(R^*\) can interact with \(\mathcal {T}\) directly according to \(\mathcal {T}\)’s code, or indirectly as any parties with identities different from \(\mathsf {ID}_C\).

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Titel: A Unified Approach to Constructing Black-Box UC Protocols in Trusted Setup Models
verfasst von: Susumu Kiyoshima
Huijia Lin
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Theory of Cryptography
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70499-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-70500-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_26

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