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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

25. Accession to TPP: Veto Power and “Opt-Out” Option

verfasst von : Shintaro Hamanaka

Erschienen in: Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law Rule-Making

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

One of the most important policy questions relating to the future impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the global and regional economy is whether other countries in the region, particularly China, will join the partnership. While several commentators have made some observations regarding the future prospects of TPP expansion, little scholarly analysis has been conducted. To go beyond the speculation of a certain country’s accession to TPP, we first attempt to generalize the issue before moving on to a specific question. We conduct a comparative analysis of a large number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) for a better understanding of the parameters of RTAs that are critical for membership expansion. This general framework enables us to conduct a systematic examination of specific membership expansion cases, such as China’s membership in TPP. The paper also proposes a necessary “accession practice” that truly facilitates new members’ participation to TPP and RTAs in general.

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Fußnoten
1
Baldwin and Low (2009).
 
2
While there are studies on the accession to institutions (Kelley 2004), those focusing on accession to RTAs are limited. Hamanaka (2012) found that South–South RTAs based on the Enabling Clause tend to have an accession clause.
 
3
Hamanaka (2014a).
 
4
Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) Database of WTO. Available at: http://​rtais.​wto.​org/​UI/​PublicMaintainRT​AHome.​aspx.
 
5
Ruggie (1992).
 
6
Capie and Evans (2002) 39.
 
7
Krauss and Pempel (2007).
 
8
Capie and Evans (2002) 40.
 
9
Ruggie (1992) 571.
 
10
It is not entirely clear whether withdrawal of membership from RTAs shall be notified to WTO, although one could argue that withdrawal is a serious modification of an RTA. In reality, no notification regarding withdrawal is included in RTA-IS. Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania withdrew their membership in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and UK withdrew membership from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tanzania withdrew membership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
 
11
For example, one condition to become a member of European Union is that the applicant should be a European country, while ‘European’ is undefined.
 
12
In addition to the 11 subsidiary RTAs listed in the Appendix 16, there are 9 subsidiary RTAs: Andean Community FTA, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), CIS FTA, Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA). Note that both CIS and CIS FTA are separately notified to the WTO.
 
13
Lao PDR has been a member since 1975, although it has not submitted a concession schedule.
 
14
Block and Herrup (1994).
 
15
Miller (1996), Zahralddin-Aravena (1997).
 
16
Block and Herrup (1994).
 
17
Gantz (2003).
 
18
Haas (1993).
 
19
From the US perspective, a ‘weak’ side agreement on labor and the environment was the result of its failed negotiations. Mexico was of the view that the imposition of labor standards by the agreement was a violation of national sovereignty. See Pomeroy (1995).
 
20
The US–Chile FTA was concluded after 14 rounds of negotiations since 2000.
 
21
Salazar (2005).
 
22
Chia and Pangestu (2005).
 
23
Brunei Darussalam decided to join the P3 negotiations in April 2005, which led to the enlargement of negotiations into P4. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP) was signed by the P4 countries in July 2005 and came into force in May 2006.
 
24
Kolsky Lewis (2011).
 
25
The TPSEP has an accession clause (Article 20.6) and is open to any APEC member and other states.
 
26
If the expansion of TPSEP were to be pursued, the US would have been a party to be admitted by P4 countries, and the US can approve other countries’ participation only after its accession. If a new agreement were to be pursued, all eight parties would be the negotiating parties on an equal footing.
 
29
James (2010).
 
30
Gao (2012).
 
31
Hamanaka (2014b).
 
32
One possible difference can be found regarding the establishment of a working group for APEC and non-APEC parties. See Footnote 33 for details.
 
33
Owing to the stipulation in para 3(a), the establishment of a working group for non-APEC members requires agreement by all parties (the ‘no objection within seven days’ rule does not seem to be applicable to the establishment of working group for non-APEC members).
 
34
Eighty-five per cent of the combined gross domestic product of the original signatories in 2013 is necessary for the Agreement to come into force. Only the US and Japan have a GDP share higher than 15%.
 
35
Elms and Lim (2012).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Accession to TPP: Veto Power and “Opt-Out” Option
verfasst von
Shintaro Hamanaka
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6731-0_25

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