2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Achieving Constant Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge
verfasst von : Omkant Pandey
Erschienen in: Theory of Cryptography
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Recently there has been a huge emphasis on constructing cryptographic protocols that maintain their security guarantees even in the presence of side channel attacks. Such attacks exploit the physical characteristics of a cryptographic device to learn useful information about the internal state of the device. Designing protocols that deliver meaningful security even in the presence of such leakage attacks is a challenging task.
The recent work of Garg, Jain, and Sahai formulates a meaningful notion of zero-knowledge in presence of leakage; and provides a construction which satisfies a weaker variant of this notion called (1 +
ε
)-leakage-resilient-zero-knowledge, for every constant
ε
> 0. In this weaker variant, roughly speaking, if the verifier learns ℓ bits of leakage during the interaction, then the simulator is allowed to access (1 +
ε
)·ℓ bits of leakage. The round complexity of their protocol is
$\lceil \frac{n}{\epsilon}\rceil$
.
In this work, we present the first construction of leakage-resilient zero-knowledge satisfying the ideal requirement of
ε
= 0. While our focus is on a feasibility result for
ε
= 0, our construction also enjoys a constant number of rounds. At the heart of our construction is a new “public-coin preamble” which allows the simulator to recover arbitrary information from a (cheating) verifier in a “straight line.” We use non-black-box simulation techniques to accomplish this goal.