4. Analysts’ Comments on Deforestation

For a further discussion on the political role of the army, see Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); and G. McGuire and B. Hering, “The Indonesian Army: Harbingers of Progress or Reactionary Predators?” in Christine Doran (ed.), Indonesian Politics: A Reader (North Queensland: James Cook University, 1987).

Soeharto was elected in 1993 for a sixth 5-year presidential term. Key figures in the new cabinet are discussed in Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), April 1, 1993. For an overview of Soeharto’s rule, see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Soeharto (London: Routledge, 1993).

For a discussion of central and local government, see Colin, Mac Andrews (Ed.), Central Government and Local Government in Indonesia (Oxford University Press, 1986).

For a further discussion on the relationship between patrons and clients on economic development--> in Indonesia, see Richard Robinson, “Toward Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military--> Bureaucratic State,” Indonesia, No. 25, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, (April 1978); and also Robinson, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney and London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

These companies were backed by Chinese and foreign funds based on many resources. See Robinson, Indonesia, No. 25 (April 1978), pp. 28–31; Samego, Bila Abri Berbisnis? (When Military--> Conduct Business?), Bandung: Mizan Press, 1997.

In the early 1970s, ITCI-->’s major shareholders included the most powerful generals of the New Order. According to Hurst, ITCI’s concession was in effect a “pay-off from Soeharto for the loyalty of Indonesia’s military--> elite.” Hurst, Rainforest--> Politics, pp. 34.

While Jamaker--> Company actively ran this timber concession, many Jamaker apparatus performed illegal logging, cutting, and cooperated with sawmill owners in Sabah to export the logs to Malaysia at the end of the 1980s. The bad management of Jamaker in terms of logging practices was widely reported to the Department of Forestry-->. During the reformation era, under the presidency of Habibie-->, the Minister of Forestry strictly banned the Jamaker operation based on SK.No.376/Kpts/1999, and the delegation of authority for timber concessions was passed to State Forestry Corporation One (Perhutani--> Satu). Perhutani then started operations in East Kalimantan--> (Nunukan district) in July 1999 (interview with Perhutani official, August 10, 2001).

For a further discussion on the background of Apkindo, see “Indonesia: Plywood--> Exports Tumble due to Declining Prices,” Jakarta Post (12 August 1995); and also in The Jakarta Post (3 July 1995) on the issue of Apkindo to help government in marketing.

Prayogo’s memo in 1991 to Soeharto illustrates their close relationship. In this memo, Prayogo requested Soeharto to encourage the forestry minister, Hasjrul Harahap, to “facilitate the paperwork and financing for an industrial-tree plantation in South Sumatera.” According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Soeharto responded by jotting a note to Hasjrul on the memo that “he should fulfill all of Prayogo’s requests.” For a further discussion on a critical account of Barito Pacific--> Timber, see SKEPHI, Setiakawan: A Call for International Solidarity on Indonesian Tropical Forest Issues, No. 10 (January–June 1993).

For a further discussion of the role of international finance in promoting environmental degradation, see “Mainstream Solutions,” Ecologist, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July–August 1992), pp. 165–194.

The role of the World Bank--> in the construction of “Kedung Ombo” Dam in Grobogan Boyolali, Central Java is very significant. This hydroelectric dam, 5,898 ha in area, was constructed in 1985 and holds reserve of 725 million m³ of water, servicing an irrigation system of 37,500 ha and create new rice fields of almost 10,000 ha and also electrical energy of 22.5 MW. This project totaled US$ 283.1 million. The World Bank contributed US$ 156 million, and the remainder came from the Indonesian government and a loan from Exim Bank of Japan-->. However, the critical program for 5,390 heads of families will be removed to the outer islands. Muko-Muko, Bengkulu-->, and Irian Jaya were elected as main target areas and thousands of hectares of forestland were cleared. For a discussion on this matter, see, Nusantara, G. Hakim (ed.), Atas Nama Pembangunan: Bank Dunia dan Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia (On behalf of Development: World Bank and Human Rights in Indonesia), Jakarta: Elsam-->, 1995.

For a further discussion on the environmental consequences, see Todd K Martens, “Ending Tropical Deforestation-->: What Is the Proper Role for the World Bank-->?”Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1989), pp. 489, 493 (cited in Pacific Affairs 1993–1994: 516).

There is a strong correlation between deforestation--> among tropical countries and paying debts to developed countries, see, William B. Wood, “Tropical Deforestation-->: Balancing Regional Development demands and Global Environmental Concerns”, “Global Environmental Change” Vol. 1, No. 1, December 1990, pp. 23–26.

Cited in Dauvergne, “Pacific Affairs,” 1993–1994, Vol. 66, No.4, pp. 516, and a further discussion, see Ivan L. Head, On A Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: International Development Research Center, 1991, pp. 104–105).

Kon pane (composite panel) most of which are discarded after being used just once, are often pointed to as one of the world’s greatest examples of wasteful consumption. In the 1980s, about one-third of Japanese tropical hardwood imported from Southeast Asia was used for kon-pane (cited in “Pacific Affairs,” 1993–1994: 516). The utilization of Kan pane as disposable Japanese construction panels for molding concrete.

For a further discussion on pattern of transmigration in the New Order, see, Colchester, Marcus, “Banking on Disaster: International Support for Transmigration,” in Ecologist, Vo. 16, No. 2/3, 1986, pp. 61–67. In terms of Western governments’ aid for the transmigration program, for example, the Netherlands Government has been closely involved in transmigration through multilateral lending and grants, but also bilaterally. On a bilateral basis alone, the Netherlands government has provided 29.6 million Dutch gulden (DG) to upgrade transmigration settlements in Bengkulu--> and to provide “technical aid” to the projects. And a further 3.0 million (GD) has been allocated for the construction of roads and for building three bridges for the Kuro Tidor Transmigration project.

The name of Papua was substituted from Irian JayaProvince and it is formally used in the Abdurrachman Wahid Government (October 20, 1999–July 23, 2001).

See World Bank--> report 1999 on Oil Palm Plantation in many provinces in Indonesia; see also, CIC Consulting Group, Jakarta, 1997.

For a further discussion on oil palm, see Moll, H.A.J. (1987), The Economics of Oil Palm, Netherlands, Pudoc Wageningen Press, pp. 144; and also Mahmud, Anuwar, “The Oil Palm Industry,” Occasional paper 1, PORIM, Kuala Lumpur. For a further information on oil palm development in 1990s and the role of Malaysia as the leading oil palm producer, see Glassburner and Poffenberger in “Bulletin of Indonesian Economics,” (1983), vol. XIX, No. 3, December, pp. 22.

Kompas News Paper, 15 September 2011.

Cited in Lash (2000), and for discussion, see Kartodihardjo, H and Supriono (1999),“The Impact of Sectoral Development on Natural Forest: The Case of Timber and Tree Crop Plantations in Indonesia.” Draft report for the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor.

In a different calculation on the budget spent, based on another source, the government budget reached almost Rp. 5–8 billion. This budget was taken from reforestation funds and nonbudget allocation. This calculation is based on 1.4 million ha × US$2,200 per ha, and an exchange rate of US$1 for Rp. 9,800–10,000 in 1998. See Haryanto, Ignatius (Eds.) (1998), Reformasi Tanpa Perubahan: Kehutanan Pasca Soeharto, Bogor (Reformation without Changes: Forestry Sector Post Soeharto Regime), Latin Press, p. 41.

The Mega-Rice Project, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia: An Appeal for Intervention to the International Community,” 1998. Briefing dossier compiled by SKEPHI Support Office in Europe, Amsterdam.