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Erschienen in:
2010 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Are Security Experts Useful? Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Network Security Games with Limited Information
verfasst von : Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang
Erschienen in: Computer Security – ESORICS 2010
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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A common assumption in security research is that more individual expertise unambiguously leads to a more secure overall network. We present a game-theoretic model in which this common assumption does not hold. Our findings indicate that expert users can be not only invaluable contributors, but also free-riders, defectors, and narcissistic opportunists. A direct application is that user education needs to highlight the cooperative nature of security, and foster the community sense, in particular, of higher skilled computer users.
As a technical contribution, this paper represents, to our knowledge, the first formal study to quantitatively assess the impact of different degrees of information security expertise on the overall security of a network.