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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Banco Delta Asia and DPRK’s First Nuclear Test

verfasst von : Mi-yeon Hur

Erschienen in: The Six-Party Talks on North Korea

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

The Bush administration’s freezing of North Korean bank accounts in Macau’s Banco Delta Asia and North Korea’s provocative course of action of testing nuclear device in 2006 are brought into the analytical framework to investigate whether they need to be understood as a continuation or a substantial shift of foreign policy which led to structural changes. The analysis focuses on role-makings of the United States and North Korea, as active role enactments to reconstruct the social structure of the SPT, and critically assesses the social structure built through role collaboration between China and South Korea prior to North Korea’s nuclear test.

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Vorheriges Kapitel North Korea’s Second Nuclear Crisis and Inception of the SPT

Nächstes Kapitel Bush’s Policy Shift and February 13 Action Plan

Pyongyang agreed to abandon all nuclear development programs and return to the NPT and restore IAEA safeguards in exchange for US-provided light water reactors. The original text is available at http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/September_19_2005_Joint_Statement.doc/file_view .

Glenn Kessler, “Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort,” Washington Post, (7 January 2004). John W. Lewis who led the group for the unofficial visit to North Korea also questioned if the dispute over North Korea’s uranium-enrichment programs was caused by “miscommunication” between the United States and the DPRK in 2002, which was furiously denied by Adam Ereli, US State Department spokesperson (Butler 2004).

At the third round of the SPT, the United States and the DPRK unveiled their proposals. Both of the states called theirs “bold and flexible.” The United States suggested if the DPRK would stop and disclose all their nuclear activities within a preparatory period of three months, then the United States would consider resuming economic aid and energy supply. However, the DPRK argued it could only freeze for the reward as the first step toward eventual dismantlement of its nuclear program.

David Sanger, “Visitors See North Korea Nuclear Capacity,” New York Times, (11 January 2004). The delegation was led by John W. Lewis, a Stanford University professor emeritus, accompanied by former State Department official Jack Pritchard, the senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation Siegfried Hecker, and two staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See CISAC News, “John Lewis leads delegation to North Korea,” (3 February 2004).

“An Update on North Korean Nuclear Developments,” Siegfried S. Hecker Written Testimony, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, (21 January 2004).

Ibid.

Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Aides Says U.S. Is Obstacle in Korean Talks,” New York Times, p. A-3, (2 September 2003).

Chosun Ilbo, “Bush Meets with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon,” (3 March 2004).

Kanako Takahara, “Nation Waits as Koizumi Jets to Pyongyang,” Japan Times, (22 May 2004).

Washington Post Editorial, “Wrong Lesson,” (14 January 2004).

For instance, the United States dropped its previous objections to recognizing the North’s right to even a peaceful nuclear capacity, agreeing to respect this right in the September 2005 Joint Statement and increasing its willingness to meet with North Korean negotiators bilaterally within the SPT.

Business Week, “Bush Dusts off Bill’s Pyongyang Playbook,” (19 September 2005).

New York Times, “Q&A: North Korea nuclear talks,” (19 September 2005).

Kyodo News, “Revised Draft Refers to Possible Building of Proposed Reactor: Russia,” (16 September 2005).

The Guardian, “North Korea: We Have Nuclear Weapons to Defend from US,” (10 February 2005). On 10 February 2005, North Korea publicly acknowledged for the first time that it has nuclear weapons. Pyongyang asserted that it needed the nuclear weapons for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s hostile policy toward North Korea.

Author’s interview with Lee Jong-seok, the former Minister of Unification and chairman of National Security Council (January 2014). He said it was decided at the high-level strategic meeting on 12 September, a day before it sent its delegation to Beijing for the fourth round of the SPT.

Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, “U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open,” The New York Times, (20 September 2005).

Ibid.

Q&A with Christopher Hill: In Defense of Diplomacy, Denver Post, (29 November 2014).

The Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, (19 September 2005). http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm .

Kim Jong-dae’s “2005, disputes over peace regime between Chung Dong-young and Ban Ki-moon (2005 년 정동영과 반기문의 평화체제 논쟁),” D&D Focus, (January 2010). The article revealed that the South Korean Foreign Ministry led by Minister Ban Ki-moon strongly opposed the inclusion of a separate forum on negotiations for a permanent peace settlement, as they believed it was North Korea’s strategy to undermine the rationale for the existence of the US Force in South Korea. In the midst of the fourth round of the talks, the Roh government needed to send off an official to monitor if Ban Ki-moon was not blocking the inclusion of a peace treaty and ensure the issue of peace regime was addressed in the September 19 Joint Statement.

The Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, (19 September 2005). http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm .

Pyongyang’s view of “appropriate time” for a North Korea light water reactor was “now,” Washington’s “the distant future”, or, actually, “never” (McCormack 2008: 15).

Philip P. Pan, “N. Korea Arms Talks End with Little Progress,” Washington Post, p. A-26, (12 November 2005).

Since the beginning of Bush’s second term, Condoleezza Rice appeared to become more pragmatic, often sharply departing from the Bush administration’s dominated policy discussions which were usually ideologically driven. Ms. Rice along with her counselor Philip D. Zelikow reportedly proposed new diplomatic initiatives of offering a permanent peace treaty to North Korea in early 2006. President Roh Moo-hyun was entertained by Ms. Rice’s suggestion with a hope to realize his vision of the regional community of peace and co-prosperity. However, the peace treaty proposal was not taken seriously by either the Bush administration or the North. See Helene Cooper and David Sanger’s “Rice’s Counselor Gives Advice Others May Not Want to Hear,” New York Times, (28 October 2006); Kim Jong-dae’s “2005 년 정동영과 반기문의 평화체제 논쟁 (2005, disputes over peace regime between Chung Dong-young and Ban Ki-moon),” D&D Focus, (January 2010).

The Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Vice President were all known to be critical of Christopher Hill’s pragmatic approach toward North Korea, leading his critics to give him nickname “Kim Jong-Hill” (Chinoy 2009: 261).

Glenn Kessler, “Rice Says Policy on N. Korea Is a Team Effort,” Washington Post, (30 May 2008).

Glenn Kessler, “What That Accord Really Says,” Washington Post, (25 September 2005), p. B-2.

A light water reactor was a “bitter pill” to swallow for the conservatives, because it echoed the Agreed Framework signed by the Clinton administration in 1994 which was harshly criticized by the GOP. NSC and the Defense Department were concerned that the State Department was exercising too much control over the negotiations (Gross 2007).

Jay Solomon and Neil King Jr., “Nuclear Talks Are Said to Proceed, As Macau Frees Frozen Accounts,” Wall Street Journal Online, (12 April 2007).

Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 181, (20 September 2005).

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, US Department of the Treasury, Notice of Finding, “Finding That Banco Delta Asia SARL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money-Laundering Concern.”

Daily NK, “North Korea Splits No. 38 and 39 Departments Up Again,” (February 2011).

U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Prepared Remarks by Stuart Levey Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,” (8 September 2006).

Juan Zarate, “Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare,” Washington Post, (28 September 2013).

The keynote address from an information meeting hosted by the European Business Association, Pyongyang (4 May 2006).

Ibid. It has been argued that the US Treasury ban against BDA was not only destabilizing the bank itself but also intimidating the international banking system by damaging the legitimate business. See David Lague and Donald Greenless’ “Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia Hit North Korea Where It Hurt,” International Herald Tribune, (18 January 2007).

As around 20 financial institutions in countries such as China, Japan, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Singapore suspended transactions with North Korea after the BDA, lifting the freeze on its account at the BDA would mean that it could resume its financial transactions with those institutions (Kim Y., 2011b: 129).

Under the September 19 Joint Statement, North Korea was expected to receive 500,000 tons of oil worth US$200 million on a yearly basis from the United States, US$1 billion worth of electricity, and US$900 million worth of rice along with US$40 million worth of fertilizer from South Korea.

Donald Greenlees and David Lague, “The Money Trail That Linked North Korea to Macao,” The New York Times, (11 April 2007).

Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, (23 July 2006).

Ibid.

Kevin G. Hall, “U.S. Counterfeiting Charges against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence,” McClatchy Newspapers, (10 January 2008).

Peter Lee at Asia Times also explained in his article “China in America’s Sanctions Crosshair” that “BDA sent all of its cash deposits for independent inspection by Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank (HSBC) before sending them off the Federal Reserve for credit, and no counterfeits had been detected since 1994” (24 June 2010).

Klaus Bender, the author of the book Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing which covers the BDA matter, said the phony $100 bills were not normal counterfeits but “illegal parallel print of a genuine note,” which supports the argument by the Swiss police agency. See Bender’s commentary, “Mystery of the Supernotes” for the detailed explanation on the complexity of making counterfeits. In addition, Adam Zagorin and Bill Powell at Time magazine unintentionally exposed a few errors in the Treasury’s financial warfare against North Korea, reporting “U.S. officials say they don’t believe the North Koreans produced the equipment to print such high-quality counterfeit bills. If that’s the case, where did they get it from? No U.S. agency interviewed for this story, including Treasury, State and the Secret Service, could say. U.S. sources also say they do not know where in North Korea the notes are produced.” See their article, “The Tony Soprano of North Korea,” Time, (12 July 2007).

On 15 September, four days before the Joint Statement, the Treasury Department publicly designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as the “primary money laundering concern,” and on 20 September, a day after the Joint Statement was signed, “the Treasury Department the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Treasury imposed special measures against BDA which prohibited U.S. institutions or agencies from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts on behalf of BDA and required covered financial institutions to exercise due diligence to ensure that no correspondent account was being used indirectly to provide services to BDA” (Nikitin et al. 2010: 13).

IAI was mainly managed by State Department’s Office of Korean Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs with reporting responsibilities to the Treasury Department, Department of Justice, Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been working undercover for years to curtail Pyongyang’s illicit activities. See Stephen Mihm’s “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, (23 July 2006); Christian Caryl’s “Pocketbook Policing,” Newsweek, 9 April 2006.

Caixin, “美国财政部的无声战役 (Silent Battle of the U.S. Treasury),” (23 June 2014). Available at: http://international.caixin.com/2014-06-23/100693741.html .

Jay Solomon and Gordon Fairclough, “North Korea’s Counterfeit Goods Targeted,” Wall Street Journal, (1 June 2005).

China Matters, “Two Lost Years,” (19 July 2007). http://chinamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2007_07_01_archive.html .

The Treasury, without freezing North Korean assets by itself, was able to freeze North Korean financial activity with a domestic proposed regulation of Section 311 by impelling the private sectors—banks—to isolate North Korea. The ripple effects of the Treasury’s regulatory action were far beyond what even the Treasury would have expected.

BBC News, “US Says N. Korea ‘Criminal Regime,” (17 December 2005). The quote is from remarks by Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to South Korea.

Jay Solomon and Neil King Jr., “How U.S. Used a Bank To Punish North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Online, (12 April 2007).

The US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on 18 April 2007. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hearing-north-korea%E2%80%99s-criminal-activities-financing-regime

Donald Greenlees and David Lague, “The money trail that linked North Korea to Macao,” New York Times, (11 April 2007).

Brad Babson, a retired World Bank expert on East Asia, said “because the North Korean leadership placed so many of their foreign exchange eggs in the BDA basket, the sanctions on BDA that prompted the closure of these accounts have had an unusually effective impact … It is not just the amount of funds tied up that matters, it is the disruption of their system for transferring foreign exchange for meeting critical needs of the regime.” Similar pressure was executed on Iran by the Treasury without as much success, because “the size of Iranian oil exports and Iran’s deeper integration into the international financial system made it much more difficult to isolate.” See David Lague and Donald Greenless’ “Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where it hurt,” New York Times, (18 January 2007).

Kevin G. Hall at McClatchy reported in his article that “an independent audit of BDA shows that the Treasury may have had an unstated motive in trying to blacklist it – blocking vital gold sales. One of BDA’s most important activities was to handle its (North Korea’s) gold sales, a key source of hard currency earnings. Of the 50 North Korea-linked entities with accounts at BDA, six were involved in trading gold bullion, Ernst & Young found.” See Hall’s “Gold Sales May Have Spurred Macau Bank’s Blacklisting,” (17 April 2007). The Christian Science Monitor (January 2007) described that though the North’s central bank was on the list of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), which is essential for refiners to sell their products in London, the major buyers of gold, large banks, did not dare to accept delivery from North Korea or North Korean companies subject to the Treasury’s sanctions, which forced the North to dispose of its gold at a less desirable price. Bertil Linter at Asia Times found the North Korea’s sale of gold and silver to Thailand grew from virtually zero to $40 million in 2006. For further details, see Linter’s “North Korea’s Golden Path to Security,” (18 January 2007).

The Treasury’s financial sanctions against BDA greatly affected North Korea’s ability to earn foreign currency, which resulted in limiting the North’s urgently needed imports of food and fuel. See Rudiger Frank’s “The Political Economy of Sanctions against North Korea,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3. (2006).

Financial Times China, “中国对美国制裁澳门汇业银行 “深表遗憾 (China’s Deep Regrets at U.S. Sanctions on Macau Bank), (16 March 2007).

Chris Buckley, “Rift over U.S. Bank Move Ahead of Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, (15 March 2007).

KCNA, “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation Signed between DPRK and China,” (28 October 2005).

Japan Ministry of Justice, “There was no substantial progress in the fifth round of Six Party Talks after the visit to North Korea by Hu Jintao,” Focal Issues of International Public Security in 2005. Available from http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia01-03.html . China’s officially recorded investment in North Korea recorded $130 million by the first half of 2006, jumping from $8.9 million in 2004. See Byung-kwang Park’s “China-North Korea Economic Relations during the Hu Jintao Era,” Study of International Issues, Vol. 9, No. 1, (spring 2009).

Inter-Korean economic exchange exceeded $875 million in 2005, growing almost 60 percent in one year, New York Times, “Reunification is on the march,” (9 February 2006).

KCNA, “DPRK FM Spokesman Urges U.S. to Lift Financial Sanctions against It,” (December 2, 2005).

DVO [Far East Department], “Memorandum about Sino-Korean Relations,” (7 March 1967), AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24.

Besides securing autonomy of the regime, Jonathan Pollack (2010) adds Kim Il-sung deemed nuclear weapons programs as a means to counter South Korea’s growing power and to support the leadership transition in the North.

“It elevated KPA-related institutions over the party and the government, and provided KPA-related institutions with the best opportunities to gain approval to take action, even in areas not connected to the military. This also meant that military-related institutions had the capacity and the cover to engage in black market activities and to supply foreign-made goods to North Korea’s domestic economy, both through legitimate and through black market channels” (Snyder 2009a: 43).

Interview with Dr. Iimura Tomoki at Japan Institute of International Affairs, (November 2013).

By putting forward the military in both external and internal affairs, the military strategy overpowered economic logic and hindered economic development. See Jihwan Hwang’s “Getting Out of the Military-First Dilemmas: In Search of North Korea’s Coevolution Military Strategy,” EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 17, (June 2011).

Hankyoreh, “US expert questions ‘provocation-negotiation-reward’ cycle of N. Korea,” (20 January 2014).

Ibid.

Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, “What North Korea Really Wants,” Washington Post, (27 January 2007).

Ibid.

Besides securing autonomy of the regime, Jonathan Pollack (2010) adds Kim Il-sung deemed nuclear weapons programs as a means to support the leadership transition in the North.

Selig Harrison, “North Korea and the United States,” Washington Post, (10 June 2005).

Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Declares itself a Nuclear Power,” Washington Post, (10 February 2005).

KCNA, “DPRK’s Stand on Six-Party Talks Reclarified, (3 March 2005). The DPRK asked that the United States should take sincere attitude, renounce its hostile policy against the DPRK, clarify its political willingness to coexist with the DPRK through practical actions, and rebuild the groundwork of the talks.

KCNA, “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period,” (11 February 2005).

Ibid.

Joel Brinkley, “North Korea Said to Reject China’s Bid on Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, (9 April 2005); Dong-a Ilbo, “N. Korea Yelling to Seek Equal Footing in Talks,” (23 March 2009).

David Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” New York Times, (21 April 2003). “Just days before President Bush approved the opening of negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program, Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld circulated to key members of the administration a Pentagon memorandum proposing a radically different approach: the United States, the memo argued, should team up with China to press for the ouster of North Korea’s leadership.”

David Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” New York Times, (21 April 2003).

Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Declares Itself a Nuclear Power: Pyongyang Indicates It Will Withdraw Indefinitely from Six Nation Disarmament Talks,” Washington Post, (10 February 2005).

Kyodo News, “Sources Say DPRK Official Indicates ‘Flexible’ Stance on US’ Sanctions,” (3 February 2006).

Mr. Han even suggested at the informal meeting with the Columbia University professor that the North could open an account at one of the American banks which would make easier for Washington to monitor transactions (Chinoy 2009: 268).

Korea Times, “North Korea’s Counterfeiting in a Dilemma,” (9 April 2006).

Dana Priest and Anthony Faiola, “North Korea Tests Long-Range Missile,” Washington Post, (5 July 2006).

KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches,” (6 July 2006).

Ibid.

KCNA, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” (9 October 2006).

Plutonium is not found in significant quantities in nature. To produce sufficient quantities of fissile material, uranium needs to be processed in a nuclear reactor. Reactors built for the purpose of producing weapon-grade plutonium (Pu-239) are known to be less efficient for electricity production, which means North Korea is suspected of operating Korea’s 5MW gas-graphite reactor in Yongbyon complex exclusively for producing weapon-grade plutonium. Meanwhile, light water reactors (LWRs)—the prevalent reactor designed for electricity—are not conducive to producing weapon-grade plutonium, though the United States has been unwilling to provide sufficient support to build LWRs due to proliferation concern.

South Korea estimated the yield was 0.45–0.8 kilotons (kt); Russia, 5–15 kt; France, 0.5–1 kt; Japan Institute of Seismology and Volcanology, 0.5–3.0 kt; the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, less than 1 kt (Johnston 2006).

Some Chinese experts evaluated the explosion yield of less than 1 kt was still a success, if North Korea aimed for 4 kt, considering the “fizzle yield” by pre-detonation. See Zhang Hui’s “Revisiting North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 119–130, (Summer 2007).

Dafna Linzer, “Low Yield of Blast Surprises Analysts,” Washington Post, (10 October 2006).

As North Korea’ second nuclear test in May 2009 resulted in the explosion yield of approximately a few kilotons, much stronger than the 2006 test, it is fair to assume the North Korean government never intended for such a small yield of the nuclear device for its first test in 2006, which presumably failed to meet its expected yield due to a design failure.

This is also known as “existential deterrence,” when deterrence is largely dependent on creating “first-strike uncertainty.” See Freedman’s “Does Deterrence Have a Future,” Arms Control Association, (October 2000).

Hayes and Bruce (2010) explain in their article, “Nuclear Competition and Korean Nationalism” that “Deterrence aims to stop an adversary from doing something that they intend to do, either immediately or in a generic manner, while compellence aims to force an adversary to act differently, again, either immediately or in some generic manner.” See page 34. Rober Gallucci, the chief negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Framework under the Clinton administration, said that the test was a “red flare” for everyone. See David Sanger’s “North Korea Deal: Outside Pressures Broke Korean Deadlock,” Spiegel International, (14 February 2007).

At the US-China-DPRK trilateral meeting in October 2006, North Korea proposed to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor if the United States would resolve the BDA issues. See Rice’s No Higher Honor (p. 571).

Cheong Wook-sik, “북한 핵실험, 중국 겨냥했을 수도” (North Korea’s Nuclear Test, Possibly Targeting China)” Pressian, (30 April 2013).

100

Cao Mei, “Who Did North Korea’s Nuclear Test Target?,” Huaxia Weekly, (25 October 2006).

101

Anthony Faiola and Maureen Fan, “North Korea’s Political, Economic Gamble,” Washington Post Foreign Service, (10 October 2006).

102

Anthony Faiola and Maureen Fan, “North Korea’s Political, Economic Gamble,” Washington Post, (10 October 2006).

103

Russia OSC Report, “Putin Says DPRK Nuclear Test Occurred due to Dead-end Situation,” (16 November 2006).

104

John O’Neil and Choe Sang-hun, “China Shows Willingness to Punish North Korea for Test,” New York Times, (10 October 2006).

105

“Statement of the Government of the Republic of Korea on the North Korean Nuclear Test,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (9 October 2006). http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20&sp=/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp%3FtypeID=12%26boardid=302%26seqno=297688.

106

Trade sanctions have a more disruptive effect because they block a whole range of goods and technology classified as “dual-use” whose civilian use could potentially be adapted for military purposes; it prohibits imports of materials that are essential for its economic development. See Rudiger Frank’s “The political economy of sanctions against North Korea,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3. (2006).

107

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Titel: Banco Delta Asia and DPRK’s First Nuclear Test
verfasst von: Mi-yeon Hur
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: The Six-Party Talks on North Korea
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-7112-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-10-7113-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7113-3_3

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