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Erschienen in:
Correlated Extra-Reductions Defeat Blinded Regular Exponentiation Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Cache Attacks Enable Bulk Key Recovery on the Cloud

verfasst von : Mehmet Sinan İnci, Berk Gulmezoglu, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar

Erschienen in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2016

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Cloud services keep gaining popularity despite the security concerns. While non-sensitive data is easily trusted to cloud, security critical data and applications are not. The main concern with the cloud is the shared resources like the CPU, memory and even the network adapter that provide subtle side-channels to malicious parties. We argue that these side-channels indeed leak fine grained, sensitive information and enable key recovery attacks on the cloud. Even further, as a quick scan in one of the Amazon EC2 regions shows, high percentage – 55 % – of users run outdated, leakage prone libraries leaving them vulnerable to mass surveillance.
The most commonly exploited leakage in the shared resource systems stem from the cache and the memory. High resolution and the stability of these channels allow the attacker to extract fine grained information. In this work, we employ the Prime and Probe attack to retrieve an RSA secret key from a co-located instance. To speed up the attack, we reverse engineer the cache slice selection algorithm for the Intel Xeon E5-2670 v2 that is used in our cloud instances. Finally we employ noise reduction to deduce the RSA private key from the monitored traces. By processing the noisy data we obtain the complete 2048-bit RSA key used during the decryption.

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Vorheriges Kapitel CacheBleed: A Timing Attack on OpenSSL Constant Time RSA
Nächstes Kapitel Strong Machine Learning Attack Against PUFs with No Mathematical Model
Fußnoten
1
The co-location test has to be implemented carefully, since the heavy usage of hugepages may yield into performance degradation. In fact, while trying to achieve a quadruple co-location Amazon EC2 stopped our VMs due to performance issues. For a more detailed explanation, see [25].
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Cache Attacks Enable Bulk Key Recovery on the Cloud
verfasst von
Mehmet Sinan İnci
Berk Gulmezoglu
Gorka Irazoqui
Thomas Eisenbarth
Berk Sunar
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2016

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-53139-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-53140-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_18

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