11. Causal/Informational Theories of Mental Content

This entry looks at information-based causal theories of mental content. Causal theories appeal to causal conditions that exist between a representation (such as a thought or belief) and the part of the world represented (the content of the thought or belief). According to informational theories, mental states acquire their content by standing in appropriate informational and causal relations to objects (and properties) in the world. Very crudely, thoughts of dogs are about dogs (and mean dog) because information about dogs causes the thoughts that our minds use to keep track of dogs. This article explains some of the leading informational and causal theories of mental content—their twists, turns, refinements, and some of their leading criticisms (This article is a very focused history starting with Grice, Stampe, Dretske, and Fodor. There are many other important thinkers not discussed only for lack of space, not import. However, this is the history that started for me with my first graduate course at Wisconsin with Dennis Stampe just prior to his landmark paper. I later worked closely with Fred Dretske during the writing of his 1981 book and even later met and studied briefly with Jerry Fodor. I am grateful to Dretske, Fodor, and Stampe for their help over the years. I also thank Alfons Schuster for his patience, and an unidentified referee for quite useful advice.).