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2021 | Buch

Introduction Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

Competing Interest Groups and Lobbying in the Construction of the European Banking Union

verfasst von: Dr. Giuseppe Montalbano

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

This book investigates the role of banking interest groups and lobbying in the making of the European Banking Union. Facing the politicization of financial regulation in the wake of the crisis, core players of the European banking industry managed to adapt and re-orient their lobbying resources and strategies to influence the reform process. This work advances an original Critical IPE approach, which combines structural power, the collective agency of key socio-economic groups and the issue salience as critical determinants to explain corporate influence in policy-making. The explanatory framework is applied to a comprehensive analysis, tracing the Banking Union’s development within the broader context of the EU post-crisis banking regulation. An in-depth scrutiny of the interest groups’ preferences, coalitions and attainments is thus provided on the pillars of the Banking Union, covering banking supervision, resolution, deposit insurance, as well as the reform of the banks’ prudential requirements and the failed project of an EU banking structural reform.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Part I

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical puzzle, the approach, and the main arguments of the book, as well as its structure and contents. What has been the role of the banking industry in the regulatory overhaul after the global financial crisis? This book investigates the interests and influence of the banking industry in the post-crisis regulatory reform of the EU banking governance and the overall design of the Banking Union. While endowed with fundamental structural and lobbying resources to advance their preferences in the reform process, the banking industry had to face a politicized regulatory environment, requiring a re-orientation of their strategies and goals. This chapter then summarizes the main arguments and hypotheses, together with the plan of the case studies analyzed in the book.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 2. A Critical Transnationalist ApproachCritical transnationalist approach to the European Financial Governance
Abstract
This chapter introduces an original critical IPE (International Political Economy) theoretical framework in the analysis of the EU interest groups’ lobbying. First, it offers a review of the literature on the EU post-crisis financial regulation and corporate influence, discussing its merits and shortcomings. A critical transnationalist approach is thus outlined, built on the Neo-Gramscian literature. Structure and agency both shape the emergence of conflicting transnational coalitions of socio-economic interest groups and policy-makers. Structural determinants, lobbying resources, and political factors are linked together in a three-tier analytical framework to assess the leading public-private coalitions and their influence capabilities at the EU level. Thus, an explanatory mechanism is hypothesized, according to which high policy salience conditions interest groups’ adaptation and lobbying strategies, while competition dynamics shape their coalition-making at the European or domestic levels.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 3. The Banking Industry in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis
Abstract
This chapter defines the structural, organizational, and issue salience dimensions of our analytical framework in the context of global financial turmoil and the ensuing Eurozone crisis. It provides the essential coordinates for analyzing the case studies, by elucidating the overall structural conditions, competitive patterns, lobbying resources, and public issue salience of banking regulation. The first section reconstructs the main competitive challenges faced by the European banks during and after the crisis. Then, this chapter maps the corporate and non-corporate interest groups in banking regulation, together with their organizational characters and resources. The last section shows the increase in public salience of issues related to banking regulation, as defining the politicized context in which the post-crisis reform process took place.
Giuseppe Montalbano

Part II

Frontmatter
Chapter 4. The Supranationalization of Banking Supervision in Europe
Abstract
This chapter reconstructs the banking industry positions, coalition making, and influence in the reform of banking supervision, from the creation of the European Banking Authority to the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. It is argued here that the European cross-border banks rode the wave of the post-crisis reform agenda to push for a supranationalized framework in banking supervision. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, large banks strategically adapted their lobbying efforts to support the construction of a single supervisory system as both responding to their long-term demands and deepening the Economic and Monetary Union integration. A broad banking coalition sustained the proposal for a unique, though differentiated, system to cover all the Eurozone banks, which proved to be acceptable even by the German government and its domestic-oriented institutions.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 5. The Crisis Managementcrisis management Framework and the Single Resolution MechanismSingle Resolution Mechanism
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the creation of the EU crisis management framework, from the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive to the ensuing establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism and Fund. Contrary to the Banking Union’s initial project, it soon appeared clear that the Single Supervisory Mechanism would not represent the very premise for a common backstop and burden-sharing arrangement capable of reaching the ambitious aim to break the bank-sovereign doom loop. A crisis management model based on the bail-in principle and the prevention of moral hazard soon emerged as the second pillar of the Banking Union, meeting the demands of the banks headquartered in the Eurozone potential creditor countries, as well as the core interests of cross-border banks, to the detriment of euro-periphery’s institutions.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 6. The Unbacked Backstop: The European Deposit Insurance Scheme
Abstract
This chapter deals with the harmonization of the deposit guarantee schemes and the plans for a pan-European deposit insurance system as the third pillar of the Banking Union still unachieved at the time of writing. In this case, the diverging banks’ risk profiles and deposit guarantee models along domestic lines structurally prevented the European banking industry from speaking with one voice. The European banking industry, including the cross-border banks, fragmented along domestic lines and aligned with respective governments. Thus, compact domestic public-private coalitions emerged, exacerbating the debate’s polarization along a Eurozone core-periphery divide. Powerful banking interests in core States, foremost Germany, succeeded in blocking the negotiations and bringing the reform project in a prolonged deadlock.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 7. The Reform of the Prudential Framework and the Single Rule Book
Abstract
This chapter traces the banking industry’s role in the reform of the EU’s prudential requirements as the basis of a single European rule book for banks underpinning the Banking Union, from the Regulation and Directive on capital requirements (CRR and CRD IV), up to their recent revisions under the “Banking Package.” The European banking industry united the efforts to water down the introduction of harsher rules, framing their opposition by pointing at the supposedly consequential reduction in lending to the business sectors. Under a high political salience, the banking industry was defeated in several key demands, with significant capital and liquidity burdens in the new framework. However, cross-border banks obtained a highly harmonized framework, responding to their core interests, while managing to water down, some of the prospected stricter provisions.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 8. The Forgotten Pillar: On the Rise and Fall of the Banking Structural Reform
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the reform on the separation of deposit-taking from variously trading-related activities. The reform project questioned a grounding pillar of the modern “market-based” banking system, representing a fundamental threat to the European financial industry. Moreover, the issue attracted a relevant degree of salience in the European public opinion and mobilization from Civil Society groups, becoming a sensible question for the national and European policy-makers. On the other hand, the competitive threats resulting from such a proposal united the European banking industry into a transnational and compact lobbying coalition. The industry pressures brought to a prolonged stalemate in the negotiations, while the decline in issue salience allowed the banking industry to obtain one of its major successes, with the final withdrawal of the proposal.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Chapter 9. Conclusions
Abstract
The final chapter summarizes the book’s main findings and outlines the general approach in banking regulation emerging from the post-crisis reform process. The overall regulatory and institutional architecture here scrutinized reflects a mediation between the core demands of European transnational banks and the German/Northern bloc of domestic banks. Rather than being severed, the Banking Union reshaped the bank-State doom loop. The EU post-crisis reform and the Banking Union reflect a new “market-enhancing” regulatory approach, strengthening market discipline in a new cross-border competitive playing field. The post-crisis banking governance can thus be led back to an ordo-liberal approach, in which the public powers and the centrality of binding regulatory institutions are functional to establish the market rule as a fundamental principle of the economic and social system.
Giuseppe Montalbano
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Competing Interest Groups and Lobbying in the Construction of the European Banking Union
verfasst von
Dr. Giuseppe Montalbano
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-65425-2
Print ISBN
978-3-030-65424-5
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65425-2

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