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Erschienen in:

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

13. Complexity in Regulation

verfasst von : Andrew Haldane, Tobias Neumann

Erschienen in: The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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Abstract

This chapter explores how banking regulation has become ever more complex, evolving from a number of simple metrics into one highly complex ratio defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It specifically discusses each of the fault lines discovered in the Basel accord during the Financial Crisis in turn. The discussion looks at the aftermath of the crisis and posits what might be done in the future to avoid systemic crises.

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Titel: Complexity in Regulation
verfasst von: Andrew Haldane
Tobias Neumann
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Buch: The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-52143-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-52144-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52144-6_13