2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs
verfasst von : Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Santiago Zanella Béguelin
Erschienen in: Static Analysis
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Provable security [6] is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for all adversary
$\mathcal{A}$
against the cryptographic construction
$\mathcal{S}$
, there exists an adversary
$\mathcal{B}$
against a security assumption
$\mathcal{H}$
, such that if
$\mathcal{A}$
has a high probability of breaking the scheme
$\mathcal{S}$
in time
t
, then
$\mathcal{B}$
has a high probability of breaking the assumption
$\mathcal{H}$
in time
t
′ (defined as a function of
t
).