6. Conclusion: Technological Change, Institutions and Labor in Developing Contexts

See law no. 5542, article 4.

Earlier studies on Turkey suggest that when a coalition partner dominates decision-making processes on economic policy, it adopts a more exclusionary position to the detriment of other coalition partners’ constituencies (Kemahlioglu 2008).

Existing studies on the impact of party systems on development in semi-peripheral contexts offers further insights that support this observation. Though most of these scholars derive their conclusions from cross-national comparative analysis, their findings reveal that partisan competition plays a notable role in economic policy-making under externally induced challenges (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Frye 2002). For example, looking at post-communist countries, Frye finds that political polarization between ex-communists and anti-communists had a devastating effect on capitalist economic growth in these countries (Frye 2002: 309).

For example, Schneider and Soskice (2009) argue that the concept of Hierarchized Market Economies, where firms and big conglomerates dominate decision-making on economic development processes, best characterizes capitalist development in Latin American countries. They suggest that the roots of this business penetration into politics lie in the electoral system (Majoritarian for presidential elections and proportional representation for the legislature). However, this account misses a few important points. First, it assumes that politicians are always susceptible to external pressures from businesses, and tacitly act in favor of big conglomerate interests without opposing them. Yet, existing studies (e.g. Dominguez 1996; Gibson 1997; Corrales 2000; Murillo 2001, 2002, 2009; Calvo and Murillo 2004) reveal that this is not always the case and show that politicians and partisan choices of the actors create significant biases, which are influential in setting the course of market reforms. Second, the same electoral institutions yield very different outcomes at the subnational level: local politicians are not always easily influenced by powerful business actors—as the case of Cordoba reveals. In other words, firms are not always able to buy local politicians. Finally, the concept of hierarchical market economies does not pay enough attention to historical legacies that shape contemporary trajectories of capitalist development. For an extended critique on this point, see Schrank 2009.

See Nichols and Sugur (2004) for a comparison of production processes across the automobile and white-goods industry, based on cases from Turkey.

For a study on how curricula at a vocational school in Kocaeli were updated, see Aytac and Deniz (2005). The governors in both provinces have increasingly taken direct initiative to start vocational education and apprentice training programs within the past decade. See “[Tekirdag’da] Mesleki Egitim Kurslari Basliyor” (Vocational Education Programs Take a Start in Tekirdag), Devrim, 18 March 2010, accessed at http://​www.​devrimgazetesi.​com.​tr/​haberdetay.​asp?​ID=​4966; “Issizlige Kocaeli Modeli” (Kocaeli Model Against Unemployment) Gebze Gazetesi, http://​www.​gebzegazetesi.​com/​haber_​detay.​asp?​haberID=​2848&​haber-issizlige-kocaeli-modeli, accessed on 1 April 2010.

Particularly in the textile manufacturing, even though the processes of spinning, weaving and finishing are relatively complex and capital intensive (Cammett 2007: 27), workers’ proposal systems are much less in use, because workers are required to concentrate more on speed and rapid completion of a garment. For an overview of production in a textile factory shopfloor based in the USA, see Collins 2003.

In contrast to textiles, apparel production is labor-intensive, relying on low wage labor, requires minimal start-up capital and few specialized skills (Cammett 2007: 27–28).

For example Liz Claiborne is a typical case of an apparel firm with off-shore factories worldwide: in a sense, it is a global apparel firm without a single chimney in the USA. See Collins 2003.

In a research on textile workers in Istanbul Eraydin and Erendil (1999) find that “on average women employed in the Istanbul clothing industry are young (54% were below the age of 25) and poorly educated (64% reported that they had not proceeded beyond primary school)” (Eraydin and Erendil 1999: 264).

See Jale Ozgenturk, “Turkiye’de Krizler Hep Ayni…Konusulanlar da” (In Turkey Crises are All the Same… And the conversations), Referans, 22 November 2008. Accessible at http://​www.​referansgazetesi​.​com/​haber.​aspx?​YZR_​KOD=​38&​HBR_​KOD=​111135.

It should be noted that Itzigsohn (2000) draws a distinction between two major types where economic actors in the informal sector avoid regulations. First dimension refers to shying away from registration and taxation. Second dimension of informality includes producers that evade labor market regulations such as minimum wage, social security, job and employment security and provision of retirement benefits (Itzigsohn 2000: 11). My use of the term “informal sector” covers both, but particularly refers to the producers that fall in the latter category, because the second dimension is a clear indication of how these firms/producers extract surplus labor value in production, which is a major point of distinction from the techniques used for the same purpose in the formal sector.

Some researchers (Henley et al. 2009) argue that not everyone who falls under the informal sector are subject to insecure work conditions, which may also allow workers better employment opportunities through self-employment and choice over hours of work (see for example Cohen and House 1996; Maloney 2004; Marcoullier et al. 1997; Saavedra and Chong, 1999).

Itzigsohn argues that the variation in informal production across semi-peripheral economies is largely shaped by “regulatory regimes,” which refer to the general institutional context in which markets are regulated. According to this argument, “it is not the amount of state intervention that matters but the general institutional context in which market regulation takes place” (Itzigsohn 2000: 83). My explanation does not disregard variation in the historical evolution of regulatory regimes but complements this explanation by pointing out how the political organization of power can indeed play a significant role at times of game-changing technological innovations.

For example, Heller (2000) finds that in Kerala, India, the long-term legacy of social mobilization and organized social movements enabled labor unions to push for political and economic inclusion, where organized class interests and strong state institutions led to the institutionalization of class conflicts and class compromises across agrarian and industrial sectors (Heller 2000: 3). According to Heller, following this political and economic inclusion under a democratic framework, the social mobilization of subordinate classes in the face of capitalist development challenges served as a key engine of development.

Moreover, the dominant position of union leadership over the rank-and-file in TURKMETAL generated significant problems at times of worker lay-offs. In particular, the workers who lost their jobs protested the union leadership for their undemocratic practices and sued the company for turning a blind eye to their mistreatment. This reveals that overlapping partisan preferences at the top, which includes politicians, business organizations and union leaders may not always yield outcomes favorable to democratic participation for the rank-and-file. Interview #40, Labor Lawyer, 1 November 2007, Bursa, Turkey. Other experts also highlight problems generated by the autarchic governance structure in Turkmetal. Interview#37, Sociologist, September 2007, Eskisehir, Turkey and Interview #29, Sociologist, 8 October 2007, Cardiff, UK.

Interview #34, 5 August 2008, Córdoba, Argentina; and Interview#56, 1 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. An official at CIM also noted that the cooperation with local government on vocational training has increased steadily after 2002. Interview #24, 17 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina. In an interview, the representative of SMATA-Córdoba also highlighted growing cooperation with the local government on training. Interview#5, 27 June 2008 and 3 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

Interview #28, Argentina, 30 July 2008, Córdoba, Argentina.

See “Produccion Córdoba” Informe de Gestion: 2003–2007, Córdoba: Ministerio de Produccion y Trabajo.