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Erschienen in:

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. Conclusions

verfasst von : Magnus G. Schoeller

Erschienen in: Leadership in the Eurozone

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter concludes by answering the book’s research questions and summarizing its main argument. Moreover, it points to promising avenues for future research and reflects on the broader theoretical and empirical implications of the book.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Evaluating Leadership: The Hard Case of the Eurozone

This is even true for mere coordination problems. Take the example of traffic coordination: if there were no ex-ante rule determining on which side of the road to drive, traffic participants would have different preferences on whether to take the right or the left side. This would result in traffic chaos. In such a situation, in which all actors have a common goal (smoothly running traffic) but diverging preferences on how to reach it (left or right side), a leader deciding for one side would be highly welcome. By contrast, if for some reason (e.g. coincidence, pre-existing rules etc.) all road users shared the same preference for one side ex ante, there would be no traffic chaos and no leader would be needed.

Where there is more than one leadership offer, the book’s model suggests that the most powerful candidate’s offer will succeed.

Matthijs (2016) follows a similar logic, though.

This demonstrates that leadership is an issue-specific phenomenon.

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Titel: Conclusions
verfasst von: Magnus G. Schoeller
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Leadership in the Eurozone
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12703-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-12704-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12704-6_7

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