22.1 Introduction
22.2 Economic Instruments for Groundwater Management: Approaches and Challenges
22.2.1 The Information Problem
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On the first level, the agency decides to rely on aggregate information which provides a proxy for the overall groundwater abstraction – for instance the measurement of groundwater table levels. A decline of water table (adjusted considering climatic conditions) indicates an increase of water abstraction and can trigger temporary bans on irrigation, for instance. Sophisticated groundwater models can also be used to assess total abstraction with better accuracy.
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The second level consists of identifying and locating all abstraction points and users. This can be done in a deterministic way (through field surveys for instance) or based on self-declaration.
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This information can be improved (third level) by collecting technical information on the characteristics of the wells (pump capacity), on irrigated areas and type of crops grown by farmers and on the type of irrigation system used (drip or furrow irrigation). Rough estimates of individual abstraction can then be derived from this information.
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The fourth level of information is when water use is fully metered, the agency knowing who uses how much water in which place at different periods of the year.
22.2.1.1 Current Policies
22.2.1.2 Alternative Policy Options Based on Incentives
22.2.2 Instruments for Groundwater Abstraction Control
22.2.2.1 Command and Control
22.2.2.2 Abstraction Tax Systems
22.2.2.3 Payment
22.2.2.4 Tradable Abstraction Water Rights
22.2.2.5 Persuasion
22.3 From Command and Control to Self-Regulation: The Case of France
22.3.1 Legal and Institutional Framework
22.3.2 Economic Instruments in Place
Uses | Normal rate (€/m3) | Water scarcity zone (€/m3) |
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Irrigation (except by gravitary) | 0.036 | 0.072 |
Gravitary irrigation | 0.005 | 0.01 |
Potable use | 0.072 | 0.144 |
Industrial cooling (with more than 99 % of water restitution) | 0.005 | 0.01 |
Canal alimentation | 0.0003 | 0.003 |
Other economic uses | 0.054 | 0.108 |
22.3.3 Issues and Problems
22.3.4 Options for Future Policy
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Pursuing decentralizationThe first policy approach consists of pursuing decentralization. It requires strengthening the legal status and the internal capacity of newly established GWUAs to setup and implement their own groundwater regulation. GWUAs would become more involved in conflict resolution, for instance through establishing a “groundwater tribunal” composed of elected farmers and government representatives and who would arbitrate conflicts and charge penalties on offending farmers. GWUAs would also need to design their own rules for allocating water among their members and facilitating (monetary or non-monetary) exchanges between their members, in search of flexibility and efficiency. Contract-based instruments may play a significant role in decentralized management. For instance, Figureau et al. (2015) have proposed a “pooling agreement” through which farmers would agree to mutualize their quotas, in search of greater flexibility. The contract is favorable to the agents as a team relative to the standard penalty system provided that the team does not exceed the targeted abstraction level, but unfavorable to the team if the target is exceeded. Participating in a group remains a voluntary decision and not all farmers are expected to engage in these types of agreements.As shown by the abundant literature on common pool resources, the main advantage of decentralized groundwater management is that rules are likely to be adapted to the local context. In France, this would respond to a real demand from farmers, as shown by the above-mentioned recent farm survey (Chap. 11) in five very different French counties. It highlights that farmers have highly diverging views concerning which criteria should be used to share water and how frequently allocation should be revised. For instance, while fruit farmers in the west (Tarn et Garonne) are asking for 15–20 years of water use concessions, cereal and vegetable growers in the north (Aisne county) would like allocation to be revised every year.
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Strengthening administrative regulationThe second approach involves strengthening direct administrative regulation, with systematic registration of abstraction points, the issuance of pumping permits, and the awarding and enforcement of individual volumetric quotas. Water quotas are granted for a duration compatible with irrigation investments (e.g. 15 years) and have the status of concessions as practised under the Spanish law. Beneficiaries of concessions must report detailed information to government agencies on where they use water and for which crop, using an internet-based geographic information system similar to what is currently required by the Common Agriculture Policy subsidies. Automated reading meters such as those used in the drinking water sector help solve the information problem. The enforcement problem is dealt with by the use of sophisticated remote-sensing technology coupled to field inspections. A fine, proportional to the excess water used, is applied in case of non-compliance. One of the drawbacks of this policy approach is the lack of flexibility: newcomers (young farmers) are unable to obtain a concession until another farmer relinquishes a license – possibly providing incentives for farmers to drill illegal wells or to engage in informal water trading. Water use efficiency is obviously another issue. And enforcement is likely to be problematic in a context where scarce financial resources are allocated to government agencies in charge of water and environmental policies.
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Using incentive-based economic instrumentsThe third model gives more importance to incentive-based economic instruments, which can be implemented by the State or within GWUAs. Several tools have been proposed and tested experimentally by French economists.
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The establishment of markets where water quotas could be traded has been advocated since the early 2000s (Strosser and Montginoul 2001) and more recently evaluated through consultation with farmers in different regions (Rinaudo et al. 2012, 2014). Creating markets would not require many institutional changes if water abstraction is properly capped (as suggested in the second approach) and they could even operate without privatizing water, based on a concession system as currently is happening in Spain.
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Lenouvel et al. (2011) tested an instrument combining an ambient tax with a contract. The ambient tax is indexed according to groundwater level, and it is charged to all farmers of the area. Farmers are offered the option to sign a contract with the GW basin agency in which they commit to provide true information to the agency concerning the location of their wells, irrigated fields, and volume pumped, and to facilitate the control of this information. These farmers are exempt from the ambient tax. The information they provide is verified using remote sensing and field inspections.
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Figureau et al. (2015) have proposed combining payments and fines. Farmers exceeding their quota pay an increasing block fine for the extra volume pumped. The sum of the fines collected is then shared between those farmers who use less than their entitlement, the received amount being proportional to the water saving effort made. This instrument, which is expected to meet water and budget balance simultaneously, is currently being tested through experiments with farmers.
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22.3.5 Social Expectations
22.4 From Command and Control to Markets: Examples from the High Plains Aquifer, USA
22.4.1 Background on Groundwater Management in the United States
22.4.2 Introduction to the High Plains Aquifer Region
22.4.3 Transferable Schemes for Groundwater Pumping Rights
22.4.4 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Nebraska
22.4.5 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Kansas
22.4.6 Innovations in Groundwater Management: Texas
22.5 From Command and Control to Markets: Examples from Chile
22.5.1 Legal and Institutional Framework (an Historical Perspective and Recent Evolution)
22.5.2 Economic Mechanisms/Instruments in Place
22.5.3 Issues and Problems
22.6 Conclusions
Chile | France | USA – high plains aquifer | |
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Level of aquifer regulation | A national policy locally translated | A national policy locally translated | No federal policy regulation. May be some state oversight. Groundwater regulation at local level, which can differ from one State to another |
Groundwater areas | Free (70 % of aquifers), under restriction (~50 aquifers), under prohibition (2 aquifers) | 89 % of aquifers reputed in good status (Vial et al. 2010) | Most aquifers with no restrictions, but a growing number of active management areas Three types of problems: aquifer depletion, damages to transboundary surface water resources or to ecosystems |
Water rights | Ancient (1855) water-use rights –WUR- based on maximal consumptive levels. Constitutionally protected. No “use it or lose it” clause | No water right. Only yearly and revocable water abstraction authorizations. Presently, definition of an upper limit to water abstraction per groundwater basin to be shared between users | Generally no or very few limits on groundwater use. In some regions, water rights defined with or without water meters. Kansas: appropriative rights; other States: generally correlative rights |
Groundwater withdrawals’ management | Water markets authorized since 1981. Active only in scarcity areas, when there exist high-valued water uses and low transactions costs | A fee paid to Water Agency. Creation of water users’ associations charged to share global water quota. No water market | A variety of mechanisms including no restrictions, well moratoria, limits on irrigated acreage, limits on pumping, water markets |
Water users’ associations | Compulsory in scarcity areas since 1983 | Compulsory in scarcity areas since 2014 | Yes, in some areas |
Problems | No conjunctive ground and surface water management and more generally no coordination between sectoral policies Lack of information on groundwater dynamics Few WUA (2) and lack of monitoring in other cases Water markets lead an unsustainable increase of water consumption | Levels of water fees not incentive Law enforcement Water allocation efficiency A perceived unfair allocation | Generally there are few restrictions on groundwater use Generally, no conjunctive ground and surface water management Extended litigation is often a prerequisite for management changes |