2. Corporatist Representation Via People’s Congress: An Aspect on the State–Society Relationship in Contemporary China

On explanation of decentralization in China, see Landry (2008); see also Leslie Shieh’s chapter of this volume, which illustrates the decentralization of state service from central to local levels; On the separation of state and society, the emergence of civil society, and the rising up of societal forces in China, see Pei (1995), White (1993), Brook and Frolic (1997), Ding (2001), Gilley and Diamond (2008), McCormick and Unger (1996), Guo (2003), Falkenheim (1987), Burton (1990), Goldman and MacFarquhar (1999), Goldman and Perry (2002).

Another dimension of the diversification of societal forces in current China is displayed by Shieh in another chapter of this volume via introduction of the transfer of welfare responsibilities from the state to the society. Besides, the term “society” here refers to the general idea of society, not to civil society in particular, although it is also commonly used of such.

To understand these two interrelated questions better, please refer to the full version of the author’s LL.M. thesis, for further explanations with application of the paradigm of “who does what to whom, and how” (Qian 2009: 3–7). The state elites here mostly refer to the Party leadership.

For example, one of the most classic definitions refers to Schmitter’s (1974).

For the requirement of anonymity, interviewees will be generally referred to as “officials”, “deputies” and “constituents”. Interviews will be referred to as follow, e.g. “interview of officials in County A CLPCSC (18 March, 2009)”.

Previous researches on the NPC see: Yu (1964), Green (1964), Bridgham (1965), Solinger (1982), O'Brien (1988, 1990), Shi (1993), Dowdle (1997), Tanner (1994: 56–93, 1999a: 100–128, b: 231–252), Xia (1998, 2000a), Lai 2001; On PLPCs and, generally, on LPCs, see: Lin (1992‐1993), O’Brien (1994), O’Brien and Luehrmann (1998), MacFarquhar (1998), Xia (2008, 2000b); On CLPCs in part, see: Cho (2009), Oscar (2005), Chen (1999: 183–227); On levels of government below the CLPC and on grassroots PCs, see: Manion (2000).

For the spectrum of state corporatism, see Fig. 5.2 below.

Further explanations on linkages between Schmitter’s classical definitional framework of Corporatism (1974) and my extension of it to representative institutions, please refer to three hypotheses verified in Qian (2009):

Hypothesis One: Semi-competitive elections are, in practice, approaching to non-competitive elections;

Hypothesis Two: Functional representation predominates over territorial representation;

Hypothesis Three: People’s Deputies are approximately equal to leaders of associational interest groups (39–44).

A further explanation on the research object, see Qian (2009: 26–29).

It is necessary to introduce the concept of the “Party-state” here, which indicates the Party still remain the “absolute power center” of the Chinese state, and dominates both symbolic interest representation and substantial policy-making from/to the society, and thus the state–society relationship in China is closely related to/fundamentally dependant on the Party–PC relationship (Xia 2008: 20; Xia “The Communist Party of China and the ‘Party-State’”).

Wu further demonstrates the separation of the Party from the government (2005).

On the “core of leadership” principle, see CCP Constitution 2007: Article 46; “Three represents theory”, see CCP Constitution 2007: “the party must always represent the requirements of the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China” (the general program). Besides, the gap problem between “law in books” and “law in action” is common in China.

See CCP Constitution (2007):

A leading Party members' group may be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit. The group plays the role of the core of leadership. Its main tasks are: to see to it that the Party's line, principles and policies are implemented, to discuss and decide on matters of major importance in its unit, to do well in cadre management, to rally the non-Party cadres and the masses in fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Party and the state and to guide the work of the Party organization of the unit and those directly under it (Article 46).

Normatively, Democratic Centralism means “The minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire membership of the Party to the Central Committee” (CCP Constitution 2007: Article 10). See also, Constitution 2004: Article 3.

Theoretically, Democratic Centralism means “to concentrate power in the top leader and give the Party control over the government and military, according to which the regimes also enforce bans on political activity outside the Party, established controls over the media and civil society, and advocated transformational goals through economic policy, mass mobilization, and use of propaganda” (Goldman and Esarey 2008: 53).

Interview of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (5 April, 2009 ).

Personnel decisions of the LPCSCs are all made via organizational departments of Party committees at the corresponding or higher levels. This is common in all sorts of governmental and semi-governmental institutions nationwide, not limited to the system of PC.

Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March, 2009).

When asked what are major responsibilities of the CLPCSC are, they all replied more or less the same: “the top task of the CLPC is to assist the government in economic development under the leadership of the Party”, and also gave examples about supervisory plans in 2008: when the Party was concerned about environmental protection, then the CLPCSC organized deputies to examine the implementation of environmental protection laws; when the Party laid stress on ethnic minorities, the CLPCSC organized laws/policies implementation activities related to protections of ethnic minorities.

Interview of officials in Committee of Law of Zhejiang PLPCSC (9 March 2009).

In all 31 PLPCs in China, the Party Secretaries co-hold the Directorate of the PLPCSC in 25 PLPCs (except four directly managed municipalities and Xinjiang and Tibet; Hong Kong and Macau are not included). See National People’s Congress Website. [online]. http://​www.​npc.​gov.​cn/​npc/​xinwen/​dfrd/​dfrd.​htm (Consulted 1 March 2009).

Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (23 March 2009).

See also He (2005), Qian (2009) (Table 2 A comparison of education level of staff at three levels of LPCs in Zhejiang Province).

See Electoral Law: Article 2, 30, 36; Organic Law: Article 5, 6.

It is a combination of observations and readings of primary and secondary materials, which is based on interviews of officials in County B CLPCSC (7 March 2009) about the electoral process of County B in the 2006–2007 election and that of County C CLPCSC (22 March 2009), as well as on their work reports [translated by author]; due to length limitation, here only displays key observations from this CLPC election; for a fuller description, see Qian (2009: 72–80); for other descriptions on the processes of direct election, see Cai (2002), Chen (1999: Chap. 3), McCormick (1990: Chap. 4), Jacobs (1991), Zhu (2006).

The rationalities of selecting this type of election also need explanations as follows:

Elections in PCs include: (1) direct elections of PDs to CLPCs and TLPCs; (2) indirect elections of PDs to MLPCs, PLPCs and the NPC; (3) indirect elections of members from PDs of PCs to PCSCs and (4) indirect elections of heads of the government, judiciary and procuratorate by PDs at corresponding levels. Here the main focus lies on the direct election of PDs to CLPCs, because this type of election is considered most difficult to manipulate. With even a lower degree of competitiveness (25–50 % more candidates in indirect elections, as opposed to 33–100 % more in direct elections (Electoral Law: Article 30) and a much smaller population to deal with (i.e. only a certain number of PDs to be taken care of instead of the whole constituency), indirect elections of PDs to SCs and to higher level PCs are much easier to manipulate and, thus, are also predominantly arranged by the Party. Furthermore, the elections of heads to the government, judiciary and procuratorate, often with only one candidate for each position, are basically non-competitive [Interview of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (6 April 2009) and County B CLPCSC (10 March 2009); Organic Law (1979): Article 20].

Major responsibilities of an Election Committee include: (1) make rules and plans for the election; (2) draw electoral boundaries and determine the number of seats per electorate; (3) publicize and mobilize for the election; (4) conduct the registration and qualification examinations of voters; (5) collect nominations and finalize lists of formal candidates; and (6) resolute disputes arising from the election (Qian 2009: 72–80).

Interviews of officials in CLPCSCs in County A, B and C (March 2009). This is backed up by Cai (2003) and Jacobs:

Among people’s congress members in local people’s congresses at various levels, there must be people chosen from various fields. Among the congress members in the various local people’s congress at the county and higher levels, workers, peasants, intellectuals, state employees, the People’s Liberation Army, minority nationalities, the various political parties and patriotic personages, returned Overseas Chinese and Taiwanese compatriots must have congress members in suitable numbers. Among congress members, women must have a certain proportion (1991).

Some clarifications here are necessary.

First, ostensibly, the nominations are open to all, but nominations in practice are strictly limited to both joint nominators and some “non-Party” organizations. Priorities are given to officially proved nominees, like those from the Party or Party chartered mass organizations.

On restrictions on nomination for “joint nominators” and “non-Party” organizations, see also Li (2006a).

In addition, quota distribution is another limitation on what types of independent candidates can run for certain seats. For example, if, according to quota allocation in practical electoral procedures, “a woman of relatively high education background with no party affiliation” is required in this electorate, then nominees who fall short of these criteria are not able to become formal candidates (Interviews of CLPCSCs in County A, B and C (March 2009)). Cases of jointly nominated nominees denied qualification for candidacy based on this restriction are also found in Cabestan (2006).

Further, even if joint voters’ nominees successfully overcome these obstacles and appear on the nominees’ name list, “discussion and consultation” (xieshang yunniang 协商酝酿) between the EC and groups of nominators create another substantial barrier for them to become a formal candidate. Legally, when consensuses of “discussion and consultation” failed, “preliminary elections” shall be initiated (Electoral Law: Article 30–31), but, in practice, this procedure is often bypassed, and the EC “harmoniously” finalizes the list of candidates according to a series of occupational, territorial, gender-based, ethnic and other quota requirements of the election (Cai 2002: 75–77; Chen and Zhong 2002).

As Cabestan states, “Primaries (yuxuan,预选) will continue to take place until the 2004 revision (the fourth one) comes into effect (see below), but these are rather murky procedures” (2006); And Nathan also indicates local people’s congress elections so far “have not turned into competitive campaigns owing to tight Party control” (1997: 235).

See Electoral Law: Article 33.

See above in the section of “Institutional Limitations”; CCP constitution 2007: Article 3–5.

Interview of officials in CLPCSC in County A (18 March 2009).

See Organic Law 2004: Article 19. Annual plans of deputies’ activities and annual plans of supervisory activities are made by the Party Committee within the PSSCs, which are common at all levels of PCs.

Interviews of officials in CLPCSC in County A and County B (March 2009).

A great number of “independent-candidates” has emerged in recent years, as Li Fan put,

Since July 1st this year, many general elections have begun all around China and will continue until the end of 2007. Wuhan and Shenzhen were the first cities we knew that conducted such elections. Both cities had their elections in September; both witnessed a number of independent candidates (candidates nominated by joint endorsement of voters instead of official endorsement by the government) in the urban voting districts. In Wuhan, where there had been no independent candidate s in 2003, there were over 20 independent candidates this year (2006a).

See also Fewsmith (2004), Liu (2003), Li (2006b).

However, much smaller numbers have successfully “jumped out of the ballot box”, such as: Wang Liang, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, 2003; Yao Lifa, Qianjiang City, Hubei Province; Xu Zhiyong, Haidian District, Beijing City, etc. The most famous case of successfully elected “self-nominated” PD is Yao Lifa, which I made a case study (Qian 2009: 81–83); for a more detailed account of Yao, see Zhu (2006), Fewsmith (2004), Pomfret (2002).

“Jump[ing] out of the ballot box” means a few independent "write-in" candidates (unapproved by the authorities and thus not included on the list of candidates) run for election to local congresses and finally win the seat (Qian 2009: 84–85). Generally speaking, “the partial liberalization of the political environment and the pluralisation of interests within society have encouraged more and more independent candidates to try their luck” (Cabestan 2006). Technically speaking, the “write-in” article in the Electoral Law makes it possible for any “independent candidate” to be elected, if there are enough voters who do not circle any of the names of formal candidates but write down another name on the ballot. Therefore, although most “independent candidates” lost due to manipulations, there are exceptional winners (Electoral Law: Article 37).

However, on the one hand, as O’Brien’s warns, we need to be very careful not to generalize from these rare cases (2009). On the other hand, even though candidates can “jump out of the ballot box”, they cannot jump out of the Party’s control. The Party Committee and the CLPC either absorb them by education and inducements, or marginalize them in Deputies’ activities so as to mute their publicity, or even make them “disappear” by coercive approaches, such as “persuading to resign”, if they keep actively getting into the forbidden zone and touching the nerves of the leadership (Qian 2009: 85–86 (a case study); Zhu 2006).

A recent article from the “south-wind-window” magazine (nanfengchuang 南风窗) titled “Ten Years of ‘Independent Candidates’” also describes statuses of several famous PDs elected as independent candidates, in which we can easily identify those who are subsidized, those who are marginalized, and those who are punished: Xu Zhiyong, Zen Jianyu and Lu Banglie are punished; Yao Lifa is marginalized (he never won an election again after 1998) and punished (especially in 2011, the author added); Huang Songhai, Sima Nan, Nie Hainiang and Wang Niang have all been subsidized (Zhang 2009); see also a related introduction of these successful “self-nominated” PDs: Fewsmith (2004), Yao Lifa (2007).

Discrimination against peasants’ political participation was institutionalized in written law clauses. Rural populations are unfavourably represented at all levels of People’s Congresses. Initially, deputies from rural areas represent four times constituents in CLPCs of their urban counterparts do, five times in PLPCs, and eight times in the NPC (Electoral Law 1953). Later, the gap of unequal representation between urban and rural populations shortened to 1: 4 in the 1995 Electoral Law amendments. Until the most recent amendment of Electoral Law passed in 2011 the unequal vote between rural and urban citizens finally evens, but this long tradition of discriminatory representation of peasants has already grown for half a century.

Cabestan observes, “At every level, the CCP in fact applies representation principles that privilege not only national minorities, women and returned overseas Chinese but also urban dwellers over rural residents. […] Firstly, the list of candidates in the 35 constituencies must include enough minority people so that every ethnic minority is represented by at least one delegate. Overall they are supposed to represent at least 12 % of the delegates (13.91 % in 2003). Secondly, a growing proportion of women should be included, although actually this commitment was not respected in 2003 (20.24 % of women as opposed to 21.81 % in 1998). Thirdly, although the gap between rural and urban representation narrowed in the 1990 s (one deputy for 880,000 rural residents and one for 220,000 urban dwellers in 1998 as opposed to a one to eight ratio before 1995), it increased again in 2003 (one delegate for 960,000 rural residents and one for 240,000 urban dwellers). But the best-represented "constituency" remains the PLA, which is estimated to number 2.3 million people. This still provides 268 delegates, a ratio amounting to one deputy for every 8,582 soldiers, as opposed to an average of one deputy for every 435,511 citizens and one deputy for every 1.08 million women! Hong Kong (36 deputies for 7 million inhabitants), Macao (12 deputies for 450,000 inhabitants) and Taiwan (13 deputies for about 33,000 Taiwanese residing on the mainland, as distinct from the Taiwanese business people or Taishang,台商) are also over-represented” (2006).

As indicated in Table 4.1, quotas seem to be equally distributed and generally represent all elements in society. However, those are not as “representative” as they seem to be. On the one hand, percentages of PDs for social sectors are mismatched with the actual percentages of the population. On the other hand, these social segments are authoritatively selected by the state based on certain policy goals, but many other social groups are not included in this quota arrangement.

During my interviews, I also found several other interesting manipulations by electoral organizers. For example, when calculating the composition statuses of PDs, they distribute registration forms to all PDs to collect personal information. Some local cadres in Township governments and Party secretaries in Village Committees prefer to fill in the blank “which type of PDs are you” with “cadre”. However, electoral officers always persuade them to change it to “peasant”.

Interview of officials in County A and C (March 2009).

There is always a small “secret” contact booklet containing detailed personal information of PDs. I obtained this one from County B CLPCSC via personal connections.

The 2010 amendment of the Electoral Law, see Electoral Law revision key to equal rights By Zhu Zhe (China Daily) www.​chinadaily.​com.​cn/​cndy/​2010-03/​05/​content_​9540263.​htm.

It happened in both Zhejiang and Jiangsu PLPCSC.

Interviews of officials in Zhejiang PLPCSC (7 April 2009).

“Innocent maidens” are most wanted, as they meet four criteria at one time, as all PCs intend to make a more “representative” deputies composition to meet the “official guidelines”.

Inclusion of the emerging and powerful business sector into the current regime of state elites is also mentioned in Adam MacDonald’s chapter of this volume.

Interviews of deputies in CLPCSC in County A and C (March 2009).

Another recent example provided and analyzed by Professor Zhang Qianfan (2011) about an arranged replacement of one elected female peasant PD Zhao Fangqun(赵芳群)with one male businessman Zhao Kaifang(赵开方)in Shaodong (邵东县) CLPC in Hunan Province (湖南省) is also very illustrative.

There is a special procedure of arresting PD. See Deputy Law 1992: Article 30.

Proposals and suggestions during the plenary session have to go through the Presidium; letters and visits from the public go through the PCSC, and PDs’ activities organized by the PCSC. See O’Brien (2002: 218).

http://​www.​npc.​gov.​cn/​npc/​xinwen/​newwxzl.​htm (consulted 12 November, 2009).

See further, Qian (2009: 114–115); see the full story, Cho (2009: 32–36).

Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March 2009): During the CLPC plenary session of County C in 2009, the Presidium received 33 “motions” and 247 “suggestions”. Of these 33 motions, 25 are concerned with local construction, 3 with environmental protection, 2 with public transportation, 2 with intangible cultural heritage, and 1 with peasants. Of the 247 suggestions, 71 are about industry, 41 are about city construction, 39 are about agriculture, 32 are about finance, business and tourism, 26 are about education and culture, 22 are about environmental protection, 16 are about public administration, 14 are about labour issues, and 19 are on other topics. As shown in Table 4.5, industry- and commerce-related proposals consist of more than half of all proposals, while only 1/20 of proposals are labour-related.

Tongming bu tongjia 同命不同价, see Gong (2005).

Interview of officials in County C CLPCSC (21 March 2009).

Interview of Officials in Committee of Deputy of Zhejiang PLPCSC (7 March 2009).

A principal-agent perspective can also be explanatory for the law/policy implementation examination here (Ginsburg and Chen 2009).

Governments’ attitude towards a series of strikes led by workers from Foxconn and Honda in mid of 2010 is a good illustration here.

Adam MacDonald demonstrates that the Party “appears to have no desire to relinquish its political monopoly”.

Also, instances of “bought elections” within the People’s Congress system as part of the anti-corruption campaign were also revealed. See for example, in Hengyang Nearly 570 Legislators in Hunan City Caught in Election Scandal, http://​english.​caixin.​com/​2013-12-30/​100623505.​html.

Glad to know the Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (《社会团体登记管理条例》); Regulations on Foundation Administration (《基金会管理条例》); and Provisional Regulations for the Registration Administration of People-Run non-Enterprise Units (《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》) are all currently under revisions, but revising to what direction is yet to know, and what matters essentially are implementations of these laws. See further, interview with Mr. Liguo Li (李立国), Wen and Ling (2011).