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Erschienen in:
2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Cryptanalysis of Simpira v2
verfasst von : Ivan Tjuawinata, Tao Huang, Hongjun Wu
Erschienen in: Information Security and Privacy
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Abstract
In Asiacrypt 2016, Simpira v2 was proposed as a family of efficient permutations. It combines the AES round function with the Generalized Feistel Scheme (GFS) to construct permutations with arbitrarily large size which is a multiple of 128-bit. In this paper, we study the security of Simpira-3, the 3-block instance of Simpira v2. By applying the truncated differential analysis, we construct 8-round and 9-round distinguishers for Simpira-3 with complexity 2 and \( 2^{22} \) respectively. Then, we apply the impossible differential analysis to construct a 9-round impossible differential. Using this impossible differential, we can launch 9- and 10-round partial key recovery attacks on Simpira-3-based block cipher. Lastly, we present a boomerang distinguisher for 10-round Simpira-3 with practical complexity \( 2^{23} \). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first cryptanalysis results on Simpira-3. Our analysis will not affect the security of Simpira.