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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. ECB and FED Governors’ Speeches: A Topic Modeling Analysis (2007–2019)

verfasst von : Marika Carboni, Vincenzo Farina, Daniele A. Previati

Erschienen in: Banking and Beyond

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In the last years of the twentieth century central banks started strengthening their communication strategy, making it easier to analyze the evolution of central banks’ functions and role over time and space. In this chapter we employ a topic modeling approach to investigate the differences in the topics contained in European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve (FED) Governors’ speeches over the time period 2007–2019. We find that both ECB and FED speeches are strongly related to monetary policy, even if the largest number of FED Governors’ speeches is related to the promotion of financial stability, especially with respect to the time period 2008–2010. Additionally, in the United States, the topic of consumer protection is also detected.

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Fußnoten
1
The importance given to the consumer protection issue in the United States is also highlighted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the legislation signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2010 in response to the financial crisis.
 
2
See the following webpage: https://​www.​federalreserve.​gov/​faqs/​money_​12848.​htm (accessed May 2019).
 
4
We are still not able to collect all the speeches related to the year 2019.
 
6
See the following webpage: https://​www.​federalreserve.​gov/​aboutthefed/​pf.​htm (accessed May 2019).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
ECB and FED Governors’ Speeches: A Topic Modeling Analysis (2007–2019)
verfasst von
Marika Carboni
Vincenzo Farina
Daniele A. Previati
Copyright-Jahr
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45752-5_2