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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Economic Analysis in Competition Law Enforcement in Russia: Empirical Evidence Based on Data of Judicial Reviews

verfasst von : Svetlana Avdasheva, Yannis Katsoulacos, Svetlana Golovanova, Dina Tsytsulina

Erschienen in: Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Russia is an example of a rapidly changing competition legislation and large-scale enforcement combined with an easy access to judicial review. Simple statistical analysis of the economic evidence applied to competition authority’s decisions and the judicial reviews shows the importance of the distinction between mandatory vs. optional tools of economic analysis, the mutual influence of economic analysis and enforcement targets, as well as strong path-dependence in economic analysis application. The slowdown in the use of economic analysis highlights the importance of special efforts to support incentives for analytical work by competition authorities. Encouraging of deeper economic analysis should overcome motivation on making decisions which are not challenged during judicial review. Otherwise, if a deeper economic analysis increases the likelihood of successful annulment of infringement decisions in courts this would discourage attempts of the authority to make additional efforts for its enhancement and improvement.

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Fußnoten
1
An important point to stress here is that the responsibilities of the Russian competition authority throughout the quarter century are extremely broad. FAS is responsible for control and supervision of the enforcement of large number of laws and regulations, including law ‘On protection of competition’ (2006) that covers enforcement against abuse of dominance (art. 10), anticompetitive agreements (art. 11) and concerted practice (art. 11.1), merger clearance, but also unfair competition, state aid and especially actions of state and municipal authorities, which restrict competition; anti-competitive actions of state authorities, and several other laws (law ‘On contracting in public procurement’, ‘On electricity sector’, ‘On natural monopolies’, ‘On advertising’, ‘On procurement of specific types of legal persons’, ‘On investments in strategic companies’ and recently (Autumn 2015) on a number of laws devoted to tariff regulation).
 
2
Russian courts are under reform that aims to merge the commercial court system (that is responsible among other things for resolving disputes with governmental bodies) and the regular court (courts of general jurisdiction) system. Commercial courts still handle the appeals of the decisions of antitrust authorities.
 
3
Normally appeals against the decision of a public authority can be subsequently considered by three courts: commercial court of the first instance, commercial appellate court and commercial cessation court. The highest (in the nearest past it was Supreme Commercial Court, and now this is Supreme Court) has discretion to handle or not to handle specific case for supervision. The Highest Court cannot revise the decision itself but it has an option to send it back to the court of the first instance.
 
4
Another possible limitation of our dataset is that we codify the data on economic evidence on the basis of the text of the court decision. If economic analysis is presented but parties in the litigation do not discuss it, the court has option not to include the relevant data in its decision. In other words we observe ‘the economic evidence discussed’ but not ‘total amount of economic evidence produced’. However we do not consider that this difference creates large errors, because competing parties in the process have strong incentives to reveal the strongest results in their favor and the weakest results in favor of their opponents.
 
5
The Russian law ‘On natural monopolies’ includes a list of activities with the relevant legal status.
 
6
Data of judge experience are not limited to the cases in LCAP database. They are reported by the data of commercial court decisions and capture overall experience of a particular judge.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Economic Analysis in Competition Law Enforcement in Russia: Empirical Evidence Based on Data of Judicial Reviews
verfasst von
Svetlana Avdasheva
Yannis Katsoulacos
Svetlana Golovanova
Dina Tsytsulina
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_11