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It is a pleasant task to welcome the appearance of the American edition of Professor Willy Kraus' valuable work on the economic and social development of the People's Republic of China, first published in German in 1979. The book has been updated in the light of the events that have occurred since the original publication and incorporates the latest statistical information made available by the Chinese authorities with unaccus­ tomed liberality. The American edition, like its German predecessor, is a monumental achievement of scholarship, attractively presented. In its comprehensiveness, insight, professionalism and wisdom it ranks among the best studies of the subject. It will add to the knowledge of the specialist, and help the interested layman find his way through the complexities of contemporary China's socioeconomic system. Professor Kraus' work is a most timely and welcome addition to a better and more thorough understanding of an absorbing and important subject. June 1982 Jan S. Prybyla Professor of Economics The Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania Preface This book deals with China's development policies. It is based on the original German edition (1979), "Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und sozialer Wandel in der Volksrepublik China," but is not merely a translation of the German original. The rapid changes in Chinese policy within the last two years, together with a sudden deluge of official data on economic and social developments in the People's Republic of China, have called for a basic and comprehensive revision of text and statistics.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Introduction

Abstract
At present we are witnessing a gigantic process of political, economic, and social development launched after ages of stagnation by a nation of nearly a billion inhabitants. One of the major factors that prepared the ground for radical change in China was its collision with the West. While China had never been absorbed into the various European colonial empires, its situation as a “semi-colony” became increasingly obvious to everyone following the Opium War. Foreign powers extorted a series of “unequal” treaties, concessions, and exterritorial rights from the Chinese government. In addition to this, and in plain discrimination against all Chinese, various supervisory powers over purely Chinese institutions such as the postal service had to be granted to foreigners. All this could not but help offending Chinese patriotic sentiments. In the end, the long years of war against Japan as well as the civil wars had so shaken China’s stability that a totally new beginning in all spheres of life became necessary.
Willy Kraus

Chapter One. Concepts of Development in the Chinese Communist Party Prior to the Founding of the People’s Republic of China. Realization in the Reconstruction Phase, 1949–1952

Abstract
On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People’s Republic of China. Three decades after his conversion to Marxism he had at last gained control over China. Mao’s rise had been fought not only by opponents of the Communist Party but also by orthodox Marxists. More or less at the same time as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (successor to the founder and chairman of the bourgeois Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT), Sun Yat-sen) was conducting his “supression campaigns against the Mao Tse-tung bandits,” Li Li-san and Wang Ming, who in the early 1930s were the main leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were attacking Mao as a “right opportunist” and as having a “conservative peasant consciousness.”1
Willy Kraus

Chapter Two. Adoption of the Soviet Developmental Model. The Period of the First Chinese Five-Year Plan, 1953–1957

Abstract
On December 24, 1952, the Chinese prime minister, Chou En-lai, announced the commencement of the first 5-year plan.1 The plan itself, which had been worked on since 1951, was only finished in February 1955 “after being repeatedly supplemented and revised” and presented to and passed by the second plenum of the First National People’s Congress in July 1955.2 While it was admitted that “a relatively complete series of individual plans had been worked out and passed on to subordinate levels for realization”3 as early as 1953, the first 5-year plan was, until its promulgation in 1955, more a generalized program than a detailed plan.
Willy Kraus

Chapter Three. The Policy of the Three Red Banners. The Second Five-Year Plan, 1958–1962, and the Consolidation Phase, 1963–1965

Abstract
Fourteen months after Li Fu-ch’un’s detailed Report on the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the People’s Republic of China, 1953–1957, Prime Minister Chou En-lai announced on September 16, 1956, at the Eighth Party Congress of the CCP, the second 5-year plan. The suggested plan, which was passed by the Party congress on September 27, 1956, was with respect to structure and priorities quite similar to the first 5-year plan and its capital-intensive industrial buildup. The influence of the Soviet development pattern remained. The construction performance of the “great Soviet Union,” whose aid continued to form the base for China’s development, was specifically praised. The Party Congress authorized the State Council to set up a provisional plan without delay. It was demanded specifically that all quantitative targets be determined according to a solid basis. The socialist enthusiasm of the masses should of course not be ignored, but all negative conditions and difficulties that could turn up should also be considered. Rash and adventurist tendencies had to be fought as well as tendencies to depart from concrete reality; it was wrong to overlook possible alternatives or to disregard the planned and well-proportioned development in the different economic sectors.1
Willy Kraus

Chapter Four. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Development Policy during the Period of the Third Five-Year Plan, 1966–1970

Abstract
The third 5-year plan period was only to be started after the reverses suffered by the Chinese economy in the crisis years 1959–1961 had been largely overcome. As is now known, the third 5-year plan which was to comprise the years 1966 to 1970 had only been worked out as a rough outline. Sharp disputes had already broken out during its formulation over basic concept; a compromise solution was probably found shortly before the beginning of the plan period that seemed acceptable to both the protagonists of the strategy of the Great Leap and the advocates of a continuation of the strategy followed up until then.
Willy Kraus

Chapter Five. Between Pragmatism and Maoist Visions of the Future. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1971–1975

Abstract
As usual, no plan figures were announced for the fourth plan period, which was to begin early in 1971. Based on reports from the provinces, it could only be surmised that a general economic growth rate of 7.5% per annum had been planned. The 5-year plan stood again under the well-known slogan of “agriculture as the base and industry as the leading factor” and was also referred to as the “plan of a new great leap forward” as had been the previous plan. Plan fulfillment and overfulfillment were to be guided by the motto: “In industry, learn from Taching; in agriculture, learn from Tachai; the whole nation should learn from the People’s Liberation Army.”1
Willy Kraus

Chapter Six. The Great Leap into the Industrial Age

Abstract
Mao Tse-tung died on September 9, 1976. With his death, and that of Chou En-lai nine months earlier, ended an epoch in China’s development policy which had lasted more than 25 years. Basic tasks of reconstruction and development had been started, concepts of development policy specifically tailored to meet China’s needs were drafted, in part abandoned again, and the array of economic and social instruments accordingly formed or adjusted. Mao had placed the stamp of his character on this epoch, despite all opposition, even when this opposition had occasionally been powerful enough to control events.
Willy Kraus

Backmatter

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