2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
EM Attack Is Non-invasive? - Design Methodology and Validity Verification of EM Attack Sensor
verfasst von : Naofumi Homma, Yu-ichi Hayashi, Noriyuki Miura, Daisuke Fujimoto, Daichi Tanaka, Makoto Nagata, Takafumi Aoki
Erschienen in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2014
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
This paper presents a standard-cell-based semi-automatic design methodology of a new conceptual countermeasure against electromagnetic (EM) analysis and fault-injection attacks. The countermeasure namely EM attack sensor utilizes LC oscillators which detect variations in the EM field around a cryptographic LSI caused by a micro probe brought near the LSI. A dual-coil sensor architecture with an LUT-programming-based digital calibration can prevent a variety of microprobe-based EM attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional countermeasures. All components of the sensor core are semiautomatically designed by standard EDA tools with a fully-digital standard cell library and hence minimum design cost. This sensor can be therefore scaled together with the cryptographic LSI to be protected. The sensor prototype is designed based on the proposed methodology together with a 128bit-key composite AES processor in 0.18
μ
m CMOS with overheads of only 2respectively. The validity against a variety of EM attack scenarios has been verified successfully.