Empathy, mirror neurons and SYNC

Neither animals nor humans are selfish, writes a known primatologist De Waal (2009). Empathy is an ancient trait, as old as maternal care; mothering based on being sensitive to and anticipating the needs of developing offspring is more successful than less responsive types of care.

De Waal thus turns upside down the long-held notion of humans (and other animals) as competitive and supremely selfish, concerned only with their own survival and perhaps the survival of their offspring. Instead the author finds huge amounts of empathy, cooperation, and concern amongst species, tribes and other groups, and families.

It all starts with “emotional contagion,” which is a primitive form of true empathy. In essence, we are simply infected with others’ emotions or behavior. De Wald holds that cognitive empathy is a higher state that allows us to understand and actually feel the emotions of the others.

This capacity arose long ago with motor mimicry and emotional contagion, after which, evolution brought small modifications, until our ancestors not only felt what others felt but also understood what others might want or need. This enhanced their ability to survive and propagate.

We can definitely ingrain and enhance this capacity in small children. De Wall also (ibid) believes that empathy can be enhanced, as we do when we urge a child who is hogging all the toys to be more considerate of her playmates.

The Roots of Empathy program indicates that developing empathy as a means to prevent antisocial behaviors such as bullying and juvenile aggression also helps prevent later problems including dropouts, juvenile delinquency, and addiction.

The Parma experiments were confirmed in many other settings, e.g., researchers at UCLA found that cells in the human anterior cingulate, which normally fire when you poke the patient with a needle (“pain neurons”), will also fire when the patient watches another patient being poked (Ramachandran 2006). Other studies using different experimental methodologies and techniques have demonstrated in the human brain the existence of a mechanism directly mapping action perception and execution, defined as the Mirror Neuron System, MNS (Gallese 2003, 2009). It appeared that during mere action observation there is a strong activation of premotor and posterior parietal areas: the same regions that are activated when we move, are also activated when we observe the same motor acts executed by others. The MNS in humans is not only involved in imitation of simple movements, but also in imitation learning of complex skills, in the perception of communicative actions, and in the detection of action intentions (Gallese 2009). Similarly, it was shown that mirror neurons are involved in our capacity to share emotions and sensations with others (Gallese 2003, 2006, 2009; De Vignemont and Singer 2006).

Various findings suggest that multiple systems in the human’s brain may be endowed with neural mechanisms of mirroring for both the integration and differentiation of perceptual and motor aspects of actions performed by self and others (Mukamel et al. 2010; Keyserss and Gazzola 2010).

Moreover, mirror neurons are involved in human communication, amplifying cognition of the speech of others and enhancing the ability to communicate in an unknown language (Hasson et al. 2012; Stephens et al. 2010). This MN mechanism also enables the observer to understand the intention behind an observed motor act, in addition to the goal of it (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro 2008).

Recapping, mirror neurons underlie the empathizing processes—triggering the same brain activation patterns when subjects observe emotions in others as when they feel their own emotions. This explains how we feel the emotions of others as if they were our own (De Vignemont and Singer 2006).

According to this perspective, to perceive an action is equivalent to internally simulating it. This implicit, automatic, and unconscious process of embodied simulation enables the observer to use his/her own resources to penetrate the world of the other without explicitly theorizing about it. A process of implicit, pre-reflexive action simulation automatically establishes a direct implicit link between the other and the observer (Gallese 2003).⁵

The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Embodied simulation is understood as a basic functional mechanism by which our brain/body system models its contact with the world; it constitutes a crucial functioning mechanism in social cognition. Embodied simulation becomes a common underlying functional mechanism that enables one to feel the actions, intentions, feelings, and emotions of others, thus grounding our identification with and connectedness to others (Gallese 2008, 2009, 2011; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011).

We are implicitly aware of the encountered other’s similarity to us because we literally embody it. The very same neural base activated when our own actions are executed or emotions and sensations are subjectively experienced, is also activated when the same actions, emotions, and sensations are executed or experienced by others.

Metaphorically speaking, through brain mirroring, “the other” becomes “self”, as her or his action is represented in our MNS system just as if we had taken the same action. The sharp distinction, classically drawn between “I” and “she” or “he” at the level of acting and experiencing emotions, appears to be much more blurred at the level of the neural mechanisms mapping it. The gap between the two perspectives is bridged by the way intentional relations are functionally mapped at the neural-body level (Gallese 2011).

Dysfunctional simulation mechanisms may underlie the social and communicative deficits seen in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), which are largely characterized by deficits in imitation, pragmatic language, theory of mind, and empathy (Williams et al. 2001; Oberman and Ramachandran 2007; Oberman et al. 2005; Gallese 2003, 2006; Iacoboni and Dapretto 2006; Oberman and Ramachandran 2007).

The theory of mind was used to delineate a cognitive deficit underlying social impairment in childhood autism. It was documented that autistic children lack such a ‘theory,’ the implication of which would be that they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behavior (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Frith and Happé 1994; Tager-Flusberg 2007). Compared to control groups they alone failed to attribute beliefs to others,⁶ indicating that the dysfunction is independent of mental retardation and is specific to autism (Baron-Cohen et al. ibid). Findings suggest that most significant deficits of ASD children (as compared with mainstream representatives) is in performing tasks based on the theory of mind (Hamilton et al. 2007).

Along with the development of the neuroscience of MN came a common conviction that internal simulation mechanisms, such as the mirror neuron system, are necessary for normal development of recognition, imitation, empathy, and language, and especially—the theory of mind (Meltzoff 2011). It became evident that mirror neurons are performing precisely the same functions that are disrupted in autism (Gallese et al. 2004; Ramachandran and Oberman 2006; Ferrari and Rizzolatti 2014).

Research on motor functioning in ASD indicates that impairments to reaching and grasping emerge early in life and affect the planning and execution of motor programs (Sacrey et al. 2014). The functional properties of the mirror neuron system indicate that action understanding may be primarily based on the pivotal role of motor cognition that underpins one’s own capacity to act (Gallese et al. 2009; Rizzolatti and Fogassi 2014).

Autistic children also experience severe problems with their facial expressions of emotions and their understanding of the expressions of others. They do not show automatic mimicry of the facial expression of basic emotions, as revealed by the study of muscle electrical activity, shown in electromyography (EMG recordings). This explains the lack of empathic engagement displayed by autistic children and seems to stem from defective embodied simulation, likely regulated by the MNS (Gallese 2009).

Moreover, the autistic child’s observation of motor acts using the leg, hand and mouth usually activates relevant parts of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). However, the fMRI study revealed that there is also a significantly weaker activation in the IFG in children with autism as compared to typically developing children (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro 2010).

Other disorders were also found to be linked to the dysfunctions of MNS: the vulnerability of schizophrenia (Gallese 2003), depression (O’Connor et al. 2007), as well as other symptoms, e.g. echolalia (Williams et al. 2001).

Analyzing the aforementioned Roots of Empathy program and its longitudinal impact, we see that it’s possible to modify the MNS, though presumably not beyond a certain age, up to which the brain maintains its mirror neurons’ plasticity. Surpassing this age threshold would then lead to gradual freezing of the brain’s plasticity, leaving us with the form of mirror neurons made by that time. This age brink has yet to be studied and identified; An analysis of Mary Gordon’s Roots of Empathy program indicates that it falls somewhere between Kindergarten and third grade, though this conjecture needs to be verified. Further research may also determine what happens after this age milestone is surpassed: would there still be some way to modify the MNS, e.g., in the case of older autistic children?

The aforementioned empathy and embodied simulation indicate that something extraordinary happens between people when they communicate, and the lifeblood of this wonder seems to be the mirror neurons, driving the process of intentional attunement (Gallese 2008, 2009, 2011). Two brains attune and couple, synchronizing beyond and regardless of the content of communication.

Synchronization is understood here in a broader sense, as coordination of events to operate a system.⁷ Brown and Kocarev (2000) highlight that SYNC can be considered if the properties of two subsystems (parts of a larger interacting system) agree in time. In the context of brain coupling, SYNC may be defined as coordination of brains to operate in accord and in time. The embodied simulation may lead to a situation where two brains become tuned to each other.

This process is attributed to the emergence of complex behaviors that require the coordination of actions among individuals according to a shared set of rules. The neural processes in one brain are coupled to the neural processes in another brain via the transmission of signals through the environment. Two brains synchronize. This process of brain-to-brain coupling looks exactly like a wireless communication system in which two brains are coupled via the transmission of a physical signal (e.g., sound, pressure or chemical compound) through the shared physical environment (Hasson et al. 2012).

There are numerous joined behaviors such as mating, group cohesion, and predator avoidance, which depend on accurate production and perception of social signals. Development processes ultimately must result in coupling between the sensory systems of one individual with the signals produced by the motor system of another individual (Hasson et al. ibid).

Moreover, it was shown, that this neural networks-to-networks collaboration is shaped in a specific, synchronic form: Applying fMRI to record brain activity from both speakers and listeners during natural verbal communication documents that during successful communication, speakers’ and listeners’ brains exhibited joint, temporally coupled, response patterns. Additionally, more extensive speaker–listener neural couplings result in more successful communication. Interestingly, this coupling disappears when participants fail to communicate (Stephens et al. 2010).

During social interaction, both participants are modifying their own actions in response to the continuously changing actions of the partner. This continuous mutual adaptation results in interactional synchrony, to which both members contribute. The EEG-recording of communication documented phase synchronizations between two brains related to several oscillatory frequency bands in both partners’ brains’ right centroparietal scalp regions (Dumas et al. 2010).

This neuro-SYNC especially applies to aforementioned kinesthetic empathy interactions, as “mirror neurons sit adjacent to motor neurons” (Stern 2004, p. 79).

Neuro-SYNC is applied in practice several ways; four examples from various fields are now presented:

Empathy was heretofore characterized as an individual, person-to-person phenomenon. Is it justified to also consider empathy on a social level? Some authors do so (e.g., Segal 2007), positing that social empathy builds upon the classic examination of human behavior in the social environment, systems theory, and person-in-environment. However, this is seen from a social worker’s perspective, i.e., as an ability to understand people by perceiving or experiencing their life situations and, as a result, gaining insight into structural inequalities and disparities (Segal 2011).

The delineation of social empathy that is proposed here focuses not on individuals but on the relationship between them. In other words, it considers the network of bonds, ties and connections between subjects in a group or society and the potential embedded in those relationships. As such, it relates to “feeling into” and understanding the sometimes latent capacities of groups. Some people simply “feel into” groups or societies. They understand, often instinctually, the group’s potential, hidden agendas, or unacknowledged tensions, as well as its unspoken dreams and desires. They also feel well the reasons for stagnation—what makes the situation revert to a certain impassable equilibrium. ¹⁰ Studying the work of social entrepreneurs, Praszkier and Nowak (2012) posit that their specific knack (often instinctual and un-verbalized) is to “feel” the groups and societies they are working with. Analyzing this special aptitude the authors introduced and defined the phenomenon of social empathy as:

Group facilitators or social entrepreneurs—individuals who bring substantial and durable change—probably use their social empathy in order to release the groups’ or societies’ potential. They do that without lecturing, preaching, patronizing, or acting as experts. Instead, they simply catalyze the process they feel buzzing under the surface.

Taking a closer look at the group dynamics, one finds that many group facilitators use some recurrent group rituals, such as dancing (e.g., the students’ AIESEC organization routinely uses group dancing as an icebreaker). They assume that these rituals become a backbone of group synchronization, enabling smoother communication and cooperation.

Does synchrony really influence human behavior in groups? If we think, for example, about the many rituals with recurring elements used in group activities, we may presume that rituals involving synchronous activities produce some kind of positive emotions.

Consequently, the psychological boundaries between the self and the group weaken, and that motivates members to contribute to the collective good. This conjecture was verified in a series of research projects, which documented that acting in synchrony with others can increase cooperation by strengthening social attachment among group members (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). Moreover, those who are in synchrony with us are not only perceived to be more similar but also evoke more of our compassion and altruistic behavior than asynchronous individuals experiencing the same difficult conditions (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2011). Furthermore, “the positive emotional contagion group members experienced improved cooperation, decreased conflict, and increased perceived task performance.” (Barsade 2002, p. 644).