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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Epistemological Limitations on Probabilistic Evidence Theory

verfasst von : Hanbing Gong

Erschienen in: Facts and Evidence

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

“The great systematizers of the common law” has gone. From then on, the field of evidence scholarship in common law was “moribund”. However, this situation changed when some new talents and their heuristic research minds were attracted to this field. At the end of 1960s, John Kaplan explored a ground-breaking aspect about statistical decision theory and the fact-finding process, which stimulated a possibility of heuristic use of mathematical models of inference. In the same year, a judgment which has far reaching influence was made, that is People v. Collins.

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Fußnoten
1
Lempert (1986: 439, 439–477).
 
2
John Kaplan (1968: 1065).
 
3
People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P. 2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
 
4
Finkelstein and Fairley (1970: 489), Tribe (1971: 1329).
 
5
Tribe (1971: 1329).
 
6
Finkelstein and Fairley (1970: 489).
 
7
Allen and Pardo (2007a: 107–140).
 
8
Finkelstein and Fairley (1970: 489).
 
9
Former President of Nanchang University.
 
10
Kolmogorov (1956: 1–10).
 
11
Shizhen (2015: 5).
 
12
Pardo (2013: 547–613).
 
13
See, for example, Kaplan (1968), Finkelstein and Fairley (1970), Lempert (1977).
 
14
Jonakait (1983: 369–421).
 
15
Tillers (2011: 167–173).
 
16
Stoljar (1981: 457–461).
 
17
Tversky and Kahneman (1982: 156–160).
 
18
Mccormick on Evidence (Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999): 277.
 
19
Achinstein (2001: 95–112).
 
20
Callen (1982).
 
21
Allen and Pardo (2007a: 107–140).
 
22
Pardo and Allen (2008: 223–268).
 
23
Tillers (2011: 167–173).
 
24
Thayer (1898: 264–268).
 
25
Kaplow (2012: 741–752).
 
26
Twining (2006: 60).
 
27
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
28
Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China.
 
29
Pardo (2013: 547–613).
 
30
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
31
Cohen (1994: 172–182).
 
32
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
33
Lempert (1977: 1021–1025).
 
34
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
35
Lempert (1977: 1021–1025). The two element formulas of probability from bayes’ Theorem (1) P(A&B) = P(A/B) · P(B); (2) P(A) = P(A&B) + P(A&not-B); Expressing these in terms changed from A's and B's to G's (guilt) and E's (new evidence), then it can be shown that (3) P(G|E) = P(E|G) · P(G) P(E|G) · P(G) + P(E|not-G) · P(not-G) If O(G) represents the “odds of G”, defined as P(G)/P(not-G), then it can be rewritten as (4) O(G|E) = P(E/G)/P(E|not-G) · O(G).
 
36
Lempert (1977: 1021–1025).
 
37
Lempert (1977: 1021–1025).
 
38
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
39
FED. R. EVID. 401 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
40
United States v. McVeigh, 1531 F. 3d 1166, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
 
41
Allen and Kuhns (2011: 131–135).
 
42
Allen and Kuhns (2011: 131–135).
 
43
See Pardo (2010: 136–139).
 
45
Pardo (2013: 547–613).
 
46
Zhang et al. (2013: 16).
 
47
Schum and Tillers (1991: 657).
 
48
Twining (2006: 76).
 
49
Fuller (2000: 353).
 
50
See Allen and Jehl (2003: 893, 897–904), Levmore (2001: 723, 724–733).
 
51
Pennington and Hastie (1991: 519).
 
52
Nicolson (1994: 738).
 
53
Twining (2006: 78–80).
 
54
Allen and Pardo (2007b: 307).
 
55
Goldman (1999: 24–26).
 
56
Twining (2006: 76–78).
 
57
Goldman (2000: 317–333).
 
58
Berends (2002: 177–179).
 
59
See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory Committee Notes.
 
60
FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee Notes.
 
61
Allen (1992: 800).
 
62
Criminal Procedure Law of China: Article 54.
 
63
Criminal Procedure Law of China: Article 54.
 
64
Fienberg (1989: 50–55).
 
65
Berends (2002: 177–179).
 
66
Goldman (1999: 145).
 
67
Allen and Leiter (2001: 1504).
 
68
Allen and Leiter (2001: 1504).
 
69
Twining (2006: 78–80).
 
70
Nicolson (1994: 726–744).
 
71
Crook (1991: 67–88).
 
72
Liption (2004: 55–70).
 
73
Liption (2004: 56).
 
74
Liption (2004: 55–70).
 
75
Park (1991: 849, 859–871).
 
76
See Pardo and Allen (2008: 224–225), Pardo (2013: 547–613).
 
77
Pardo (2013: 547–613).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Epistemological Limitations on Probabilistic Evidence Theory
verfasst von
Hanbing Gong
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9639-1_14

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