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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

17. European Union Agencies

verfasst von : Michelle Everson, Ellen Vos

Erschienen in: The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the difficulties which EU agencies face within a Union in crisis. The institutional position of autonomous EU regulators has been challenged both in European law and within the coordination demands of a broader European crisis regime. At a deeper level, however, crisis has heightened underlying concerns about the appropriate place of autonomous governance institutions within the broader scheme of democratic politics and government. Similarly, mandate overload finds its counterpart in renewed calls for the enhanced legitimation of agency operation, a phenomenon which itself is claimed to undermine agency functionality. Autonomous agencies find themselves subjects of problems of accountability overload and of reputational risk. Finally, EU agencies are also implicated within a modern epistemological crisis which pitches a technocratic arm of administration against a rising tide of politics.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The European Commission

Nächstes Kapitel The European Central Bank

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Known as the European Financial Services Action Plan, and comprising, in particular, Commission Decisions, 2001/527/EC and 2001/528/EC (EU Securities Committee and Committee of European Securities Regulators); Commission Decision 2004/10/EC (Committee of European Banking Supervisors; Commission Decision 2004/9/EC (Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors).

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EP had rejected a proposed Institutional Agreement on a common operating framework for EU agencies COM (2005) 59 final creating a factual moratorium on their establishment by demanding that the Commission undertake further review of the operations of such bodies already operating at EU level; see ‘European Agencies—the Way Forward’, COM (2008) 159 final.

Joint Statement of the EP, the Council and the European Commission on decentralised agencies adopted on 19 July 2012; http://europa.eu/agencies/documents/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf, Accessed on 29 April 2016.

For the evolution of the US APA as a means to pluralize democracy, or allow for post-legislative challenge of agency acts, see Shapiro (1996).

See working arrangement on the airworthiness between EASA and the Interstate Aviation Committee, https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/intl_appro_IAC_EASA.pdf, Accessed on 29 April 2016.

In view of the Court’s liberal attitude towards the ‘borrowing’ of EU institutions by Member States when implementing an international agreement outside the EU legal framework. See De Witte and Beukers (2013).

The Lisbon Treaty has also imposed EU standards upon agencies with regard to internal security, financial measures and ECB independence, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, audits, fraud, and citizenship. Agencies are also made subject to the principle of transparency (including access to documents), personal data protection requirements and the own-language rights of individual citizens. They are also required to establish an open, efficient and independent administration.

Whilst having no constitutional basis for this, the founding regulation of the European trade mark regulation provided for the possibility to have decisions of OHIM’s board of appeal reviewed by the Court, see Article 65 of Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ 2009 L 78/1.

Article 263 TFEU permits that the founding regulation of agencies lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to them.

See the Court’s rulings in Case T-411/06, supra n. 72 and Case T-70/05 Evropaiki Dynamiki v. EMSA, ECLI:EU:T:2010:55. See Saurer (2010) and Alemanno and Mahieu (2008).

As Stewart (2005) has famously demonstrated, the US Administrative Procedures Act has also become a mechanism whereby legislative programmes may be challenged during the course of their implementation.

EP and Council Regulation 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, OJ 2012 L86/1.

Case C-270/12, para 104.

But not AG Jääskinen, who argued that the correct legal basis of this regulation should have been Article 352 TFEU. See Opinion AG Jääskinen in Case C-270/12, para 54.

Ibid.

See Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:743, para 44 and Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:279.

Case 270/12, supra n.XX, para 78.

‘A number of provisions in the FEU Treaty none the less presuppose that such a possibility exists.’ Case 270/12, paragraph 79.

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Cases 9/56 and 10/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957–1958] ECLI:EU:C:1958: 7.

Case 270/12, supra n. 68, e.g. paras 45 and 50.

Case 270/12, supra, para 45.

Case 270/12, supra, para 54.

See Case T-187/06, Schräder v CPVO [2008] ECLI:EU:T:2008: 511, para 59, and Case T-96/10, Rütgers Germany GmbH v. ECHA [2013], ECLI:EU:T:2013:109 for an alternative approach by the Court where necessary discretion is recognized.

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the EP and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

Article 6 SSM Regulation.

Article 5 SSM Regulation.

European Commission Memo (Brussels, 15 April 2014) Banking union: restoring financial stability in the Eurozone. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/banking-union/banking-union-memo_en.pdf.

COM (2012) 511.

Article 1 of the ESMA, EBA and EIOPA Regulations, see n. XX above.

In elaboration of framework Directives for European financial services markets. Mirroring old-style comitology procedures and in accordance with Article 290 TFEU, the EBA drafts BTS which are given legal force as Commission Implementing Acts.

Directive on markets in financial instruments, Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID 2) repealing Directive 2004/39/EC and the Regulation on markets in financial instruments (Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments).

Jean-Claude Trichet, then ECB Chair, 2010, 13th Conference of the ECB-CFC Research network; cited by Arnold et al. (2012: 3127).

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Titel: European Union Agencies
verfasst von: Michelle Everson
Ellen Vos
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-51790-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-51791-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51791-5_17

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