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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. Experimental and Game Theoretical Analyses of the Unconditional Basic Income

verfasst von : Toshiji Kawagoe

Erschienen in: Empirical Research on an Unconditional Basic Income in Europe

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter we show the results of economic analyses of the Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). Moral hazard and adverse selection problems are addressed, which may arise under the UBI scheme. As for the moral hazard problem, the Negative Income Tax (NIT) and the UBI are compared in a laboratory experiment . In a setting where the NIT and the UBI are identical, we find that UBI increases labour supply significantly more than NIT. We also find that more individualistic and competitive people increase their labour supply even when the UBI is introduced. The conjecture that the UBI makes people lazier is rejected. As for the adverse selection problem, we apply a simple evolutionary game model in order to check whether the introduction of the UBI promotes freedom and self-maintenance of the people who have a weaker position in the household, such as women, children, people of advanced age, and people with disability. We show that there is an equilibrium where women are willing to marry in order to get a higher income for the household, even if such decisions keep them in their weaker positions.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Experimental Economics: A Test-Bed for the Unconditional Basic Income?

If a constant income is guaranteed conditional on participation in social activity as a citizen, it is called Participation Income (Atkinson, 1995a : 301–303, 1996 ; Delsen, 1995 : 270–274, 1997 ; Bowles & Gintis, 1998 ).

Usually a flat tax is proposed (see e.g. Atkinson, 1995b ). A progressive tax is proposed by Murphy and Nagel (2002) .

On the NIT/UBI and work effort, see e.g. Burtless (1986). On the effects of basic income on labour supply, see e.g. Yi (2017). On the impact of basic income on the propensity to work, see e.g. Gamel, Balsan, and Vero (2006) .

For social experiments of the NIT scheme, see Robins (1985) and Widerquist (2005).

It is the first peer-reviewed journal devoted to basic income and related issues of poverty relief and universal welfare.

Other papers in this issue are Widerquist (2006) and Virjo (2006).

See http://salon.horiemon.com/

Both the HIU Basic Income and Basic Income House are on-going projects; we cannot yet report their consequences.

For controlled field experiments of labour supply, see Gneezy and List (2006) .

Basic features of these models are the same as those used by Ozawa (2002) and Tondani (2009).

Pool bias due to the fact that only students participate is limited or non-existing. The results of laboratory experiments can be generalised to the field (Charness & Kuhn, 2011 ; Hebst & Mas, 2015 ; see also Füllbrunn, Delsen & Vyrastekova, Chap. 7).

Even if effort cost function is nonlinear, the relationship between labour effort and labour supply is proportional. Thus, it is reasonably assumed that subject’s effort level can be reflected in the number of correctly solved puzzles.

In practice, if we set the criterion for identification of a subject’s type as five of nine problems, it is sometimes the case that subjects are classified in multiple types. For reducing such possibility, we increased the criterion into six of nine problems.

Here we identify subjects as Altruistic when they are either Altruistic or Prosocial in the SVO measure, because their behaviours are similar.

Survey data for the Unites States show that altruism is a more important motivation for the appreciation of UBI than self-interest (see Füllbrunn, Delsen & Vyrastekova, Chap. 7).

These individualistic assumptions seem to be strong. However, our intention here is to show a possibility that the opposite result may arises: we will show that even under these assumptions, it is possible that women get married and bear children.

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Titel: Experimental and Game Theoretical Analyses of the Unconditional Basic Income
verfasst von: Toshiji Kawagoe
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Empirical Research on an Unconditional Basic Income in Europe
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-30043-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-30044-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30044-9_8

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