2010 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
FADE: Secure Overlay Cloud Storage with File Assured Deletion
verfasst von : Yang Tang, Patrick P. C. Lee, John C. S. Lui, Radia Perlman
Erschienen in: Security and Privacy in Communication Networks
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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While we can now outsource data backup to third-party cloud storage services so as to reduce data management costs, security concerns arise in terms of ensuring the privacy and integrity of outsourced data. We design
FADE
, a practical, implementable, and readily deployable cloud storage system that focuses on protecting deleted data with policy-based
f
ile
a
ssured
de
letion. FADE is built upon standard cryptographic techniques, such that it encrypts outsourced data files to guarantee their privacy and integrity, and most importantly, assuredly deletes files to make them unrecoverable to anyone (including those who manage the cloud storage) upon revocations of file access policies. In particular, the design of FADE is geared toward the objective that it acts as an overlay system that works seamlessly atop today’s cloud storage services. To demonstrate this objective, we implement a working prototype of FADE atop Amazon S3, one of today’s cloud storage services, and empirically show that FADE provides policy-based file assured deletion with a minimal trade-off of performance overhead. Our work provides insights of how to incorporate value-added security features into current data outsourcing applications.