Weitere Artikel dieser Ausgabe durch Wischen aufrufen
The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00658-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
How do political parties divide coalition payoffs in multiparty governments? Perhaps the most striking answer to this question is Gamson’s Law, which suggests a strong fairness norm in the allocation of office payoffs among coalition partners. Building upon recent advancements in portfolio allocation research, we extend this approach in three important ways. First, we study fairness with regard to the allocation of policy (rather than office) payoffs. Second, we introduce measures to assess the fairness of the division of policy payoffs following two norms: envy-freeness and equitability. Third, we explore why some allocations of ministerial portfolios deviate from fairness norms. Based on an original data set of party preferences for individual portfolios in Western and Central Eastern Europe, we find substantial variation in the fairness of policy payoffs across cabinets. Moreover, coalitions are more likely to arrive at envy-free and equitable bargaining outcomes if (1) these fair allocations are based on an allocation of cabinet positions that is proportional to party size and if (2) the bargaining power is distributed evenly among government parties. The results suggest that fairness is not a universal norm for portfolio allocation in multiparty governments, but in fact depends on the cabinet parties’ bargaining positions.
Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu diesem Inhalt zu erhalten
Sie möchten Zugang zu diesem Inhalt erhalten? Dann informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:
Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 67 kb)11127_2019_658_MOESM1_ESM.docx
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., Strauss, A. B., & Ting, M. M. (2005). Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 550–563. CrossRef
Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P. (2011). Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 50(4), 441–478. CrossRef
Bäck, H., Dumont, P., & Saalfeld, T. (2017). Portfolio allocation and cabinet survival in parliamentary democracies. Paper presented at the 2017 Annual MPSA Conference, Chicago.
Bergman, T., Ilonszki, G., & Müller, W. C. (Eds.). (Forthcoming). Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brams, S. J., & Kaplan, T. R. (2004). Dividing the indivisible—Procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(2), 143–173. CrossRef
Brams, S. J., & Taylor, A. D. (1999). The win-win solution: guaranteeing fair shares to everybody. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Browne, E. C., & Feste, K. A. (1975). Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence from European Party Governments, 1945–1970. American Behavioral Scientist, 18(4), 530–556. CrossRef
Browne, E. C., & Franklin, M. N. (1973). Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review, 67(2), 453–469. CrossRef
Browne, E. C., & Frendreis, J. P. (1980). Allocating coalition payoffs by conventional norm: an assessment of the evidence from cabinet coalition situations. American Journal of Political Science, 24(4), 753–768. CrossRef
Budge, I. (1987). The internal analysis of election programmes. In I. Budge, D. Robertson, & D. Hearl (Eds.), Ideology, strategy and party change: Spatial analyses of post-war of election programmes in 19 democracies (pp. 15–38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
Budge, I., & Farlie, D. J. (1983). Explaining and predicting elections: Issue effects and party strategies in twenty-three democracies. London: Allen and Unwin.
Budge, I., & Keman, H. (1990). Parties and democracy: Coalition formation and government functioning in twenty states. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carroll, R., & Cox, G. W. (2007). The logic of Gamson’s Law: Pre-election coalitions and portfolio allocations. American Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 300–313. CrossRef
Carrubba, C. J., & Volden, C. (2000). Coalitional politics and logrolling in legislative institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 261–277. CrossRef
Cutler, J., de Marchi, S., Gallop, M., Hollenbach, F. M., Laver, M., & Orlowski, M. (2016). Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multiparty systems. British Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 31–43. CrossRef
de Marchi, S., & Laver, M. (2019). Government formation as logrolling in high-dimensional issue spaces. Journal of Politics (Forthcoming).
Döring, H., & Hellström, J. (2013). Who gets into government? Coalition formation in European democracies. West European Politics, 36(4), 683–703. CrossRef
Druckman, J. N., & Roberts, A. (2005). Context and coalition-bargaining: Comparing portfolio allocation in eastern and Western Europe. Party Politics, 11(5), 535–555. CrossRef
Druckman, J. N., & Roberts, A. (2008). Measuring portfolio salience in Eastern European parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 47(1), 101–134.
Druckman, J. N., & Warwick, P. V. (2005). The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 17–42. CrossRef
Dunleavy, P., & Bastow, S. (2001). Modelling coalitions that cannot coalesce: A critique of the Laver-Shepsle approach. West European Politics, 24(1), 1–26. CrossRef
Ecker, A., Meyer, T. M., & Müller, W. C. (2015). The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach. European Journal of Political Research, 54(4), 802–818. CrossRef
Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). The politics of patronage and coalition: How parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises. Political Studies, 62(2), 398–417. CrossRef
Falcó-Gimeno, A. (2014). The use of control mechanisms in coalition governments: The role of preference tangentiality and repeated interactions. Party Politics, 20(3), 341–356. CrossRef
Falcó-Gimeno, A., & Indridason, I. H. (2013). Uncertainty, complexity, and Gamson’s Law: Comparing coalition formation in Western Europe. West European Politics, 36(1), 221–247. CrossRef
Gamson, W. A. (1961). A theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Review, 26(3), 373–382. CrossRef
Golder, S. N. (2006). The logic of pre-electoral coalition formation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Heller, W. B. (2002). Regional parties and national politics in Europe: Spain’s estado de las autonomias, 1993 to 2000. Comparative Political Studies, 35(6), 657–685. CrossRef
Klingemann, H. D., Hofferbert, R. I., & Budge, I. (1994). Parties, policies, and democracy. Boulder: Westview Press.
Krauss, S., & Klüver, H. (2019). Cabinet formation and coalition governance: The effect of portfolio allocation on coalition agreements. Unpublished manuscript.
Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). ‘Effective’ number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27. CrossRef
Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1990). Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1996). Making and breaking governments: cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
Lupia, A., & Strøm, K. (1995). Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections. American Political Science Review, 89(3), 648–665. CrossRef
Lupia, A., & Strøm, K. (2008). Bargaining, transaction costs, and coalition governance. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe (pp. 51–83). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, L.W. (2016). The allocation of ministries in multiparty governments. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798703. Accessed on 05 March 2019.
Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2001). Government formation in parliamentary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 33–50. CrossRef
Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2004). Policing the bargain: Coalition government and parliamentary scrutiny. American Journal of Political Science, 48(1), 13–27. CrossRef
Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2005). Coalition policymaking and legislative review. American Political Science Review, 99(1), 93–106. CrossRef
Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2018). Coalition bargaining before an audience. Working Paper.
Mershon, C. (2001). Contending models of portfolio allocation and office payoffs to party factions: Italy, 1963–79. American Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 277–293. CrossRef
Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (Eds.). (1999). Policy, office, or votes?: How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (Eds.). (2000). Coalition governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Schermann, K., & Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). Coalition Policy-Making under Constraints: Examining the Role of Preferences and Institutions. West European Politics, 37(3), 564–583. CrossRef
Strøm, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 565–598. CrossRef
Tavits, M. (2008). The role of parties’ past behavior in coalition formation. American Political Science Review, 102(4), 495–507. CrossRef
Thomson, R. (2001). The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election pledges on socio-economic policy in the Netherlands, 1986–1998. European Journal of Political Research, 40(2), 171–197.
Thomson, R., Royed, T., Naurin, E., Artés, J., Costello, R., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., et al. (2017). The fulfillment of parties’ election pledges: A comparative study on the impact of power sharing. American Journal of Political Science, 61(3), 527–542. CrossRef
Verzichelli, L. (2008). Portfolio Allocation. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe (pp. 237–268). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., & Weßels, B. (2017). The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2017b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
Warwick, P. V., & Druckman, J. N. (2001). Portfolio salience and the proportionality of payoffs in coalition governments. British Journal of Political Science, 31(4), 627–649. CrossRef
Warwick, P. V., & Druckman, J. N. (2006). The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45(4), 635–665. CrossRef
- Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments
Thomas M. Meyer
- Springer US
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
Neuer Inhalt/© Stellmach, Neuer Inhalt/© Maturus, Pluta Logo/© Pluta