nach oben

Erschienen in:

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Foucault’s Biopolitics and Its Relevance to Modern Social Science

verfasst von : William Allan

Erschienen in: The Last Empires

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This chapter draws from a well-established Foucauldian literature and emphasizes the applicability of his thinking to governance issues emerging acutely in the twenty-first century. It draws particularly on his ‘archaeology’ of the nature of social truth and ‘genealogical’ analyses of interactions among disciplines as key elements of his biopolitical approach to understanding social progress. All forms of organized society, from ancient times, he argues, have had to achieve a balance between ideas and power that involves (i) the evolution of state sovereignty; (ii) sovereign surveillance and control of social institutions; and (iii) free expression by individuals to state power. Thus, ideas of truth must engage with power and across social disciplines, and ‘truth’ in this sense is a social construct which is authenticated by social acceptance of practices and balances in the period under review; but social truth, like scientific explanation, is always open to question and change as understanding develops. Foucault’s concept of an ‘episteme’, which describes the fusion of ideas and power into practice, provides a deeper understanding of how ideas and power interact in society than narrower, but somewhat comparable, concepts of memes and paradigms provide. His engagement and eventual rejection of neoliberal ideas emerging post-WWII are discussed briefly. Much of Foucault’s overall approach is consistent with modern trends towards multidisciplinary convergence of social sciences; his framework provides a valuable guide to applying modern social sciences and disciplines to twenty-first century governance problems at all levels of society.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Nächstes Kapitel Historical and Economic Roots of Neoliberalism

See http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Margaret_Thatcher emphasizing, first, the need for government to rely on individuals and families and, second, that entitlements must be earned by fulfilling obligations.

Particularly Toward a Genealogy of Morals; see Foucault/Rabinow (1997), Vol. 2, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, pp. 369–389.

This terminology is unsatisfactory but commonly used as a summary of a variety of differences in philosophical approaches. Anthony Kenny (2007) comprehensively covers the history of Western philosophy from classical times to the near present, but primarily from a ‘British’ perspective—and omits any mention of Foucault. There are many schisms within and between ‘British’ and ‘continental’ schools of philosophy; differences between them are sometimes characterized (misleadingly) as ‘words’ (French) versus ‘things’ (British). Karl Popper, an Austrian (and good friend of Friedrich Hayek), was one of the leading exponents of a rigorous empirical approach to explanation and testing of predictions in social science. Ernest Gellner (a Czech-born Briton) was furiously dismissive of what he termed ‘linguistic philosophy’, though his book Words and Things (first published in 1959), primarily directed against Wittgenstein, predated Foucault’s major writings (and Foucault’s Les Mots et les Choses [1966; translated as The Order of Things]). David Deutsch (2011), who cited Gellner favourably in his bibliography, has taken a similar dismissive approach to ‘linguistic’ philosophy in his Chap. 12 A Physicist’s History of Bad Philosophy.

See Schrift (2006), particularly Chaps. 4 and 5.

This book is neither a piece of Foucauldian scholarship nor of professional philosophy. Nonetheless, no professionals, in particular, anyone in Karl Popper-influenced economics, can avoid engagement with key aspects of philosophy. From this perspective, I consider that in many respects Foucault bridges many long-standing philosophical schisms: he approached the sciences of man in a way that should satisfy the empiricists’ need for testable (refutable or improvable) hypotheses (or Deutsch’s simpler ‘explanations’), but these hypotheses raise many complex questions of institutional relationships that go beyond normal scientific discipline or ‘structuralist’ boundaries. Somewhat late in the development of his ideas he recognized linkages between his approach and that of the Frankfurt School led by Horkheimer and Adorno, who argued that philosophy should be in a position to lead the social sciences by applying Kantian principles of reason (see Foucault’s interview responses to his relationship with the Kantian approach of the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas in Foucault/Rabinow 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 440–42). Mitchell Dean (1999a) compares the Kantian approaches of Habermas in particular to that of Foucault, largely in favour of the latter, but without emphasizing the essentially empirical nature of Foucault’s approach. Foucault did claim to fit in the critical tradition of Kant (Foucault/Rabinow 1997, Vol. 2, p. 459), but much of his work is richly empirical.

Broad aspects of Foucault’s development of ideas are summarized in Schrift (2006), who traces the evolution of twentieth century Anglo-French philosophy and its major contributors in the context of French academic culture. Rabinow’s thematic compilation of Foucault’s essential writings (Foucault/Rabinow 1997) helps reveal their interconnections and linkages to central topics of philosophy and provides a comprehensive survey of the scope and importance of his writing. The essays in Burchell et al. (1991) also give a good overview of the relevance of Foucault’s approach to the development of government and its linkages to knowledge, truth and power.

Most modern social sciences adopt an essentially structural approach to their discipline, assuming that theories within their domain of social science, generally expressed through simplified models amenable to mathematical manipulation and prediction, can explain broad shifts in society with limited reference to other variables and disciplines; Marxian dialectic, derived from Hegel, was based on an even greater overreach of theory, based on a hypothesized dialectical process of social change (dismissed by Popper as ‘historicism’), albeit augmented by important observations on social injustice and industrial power relations. While in The Order of Things Foucault’s approach can be characterized as still structuralist, his work became progressively oriented to interactions among disciplines and the relationship between ideas, power and the establishment of truth as the central issue of government of self and others.

The Archaeology of Knowledge (first published in 1969 and translated in 1972), provides an early overview of his methodology that developed ideas introduced in his Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (first published in 1961 and translated in1965) and The Order of Things (first published in 1966 and translated in 1970). These ideas were further developed and applied in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (first published in 1975).

His lectures at the Collège de France, which commenced in 1971 and ended just before his death in 1984, cover much of his development of genealogy themes. Each lecture series consisted of a series of weekly lectures over two months at the beginning of each year.

Foucault uses the term ‘autochthonous’ (autochtone) in the Archaeology, which carries the meaning of ‘improvement from within’, tackling Nietzschean questions of individual and social free will. As we discuss in Part III, it also poses the catch-22 type dilemma that transformation needs to be initiated—or at least taken up forcefully—by those that are currently setting the rules. The rulers need to be open to persuasion; the ruled need empowerment and parrhesia.

Foucault compares his approach in the Archaeology to his earlier The Order of Things, where he says his “attention was concentrated on the networks of concepts and their rules of formation” in his earlier analysis of the development of concepts in the general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth. His writing became progressively more and more concerned with the discursive dynamics of knowledge development and absorption by society rather than simply with the history of ideas.

Foucault explained his archaeology and epistemological approach at length in response to the Paris Epistemological Circle question of how it related to the notion of epistemological rupture or periodic discontinuities in development of scientific ideas (see Foucault/Rabinow (1997), Vol. 2, pp. 297–233). The question itself may better have been better directed at Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions, which was concerned with development of ideas rather than social knowledge in Foucault’s sense (see discussion below); Foucault was quite plainly not concerned merely with the history of scientific ideas and their discontinuities but rather with how scientific and quasi- or pre-science disciplines interacted and became engaged in social practice at different points of time.

Foucault’s explanations at both archaeological and genealogical levels were founded on an immense range of literary and philosophical texts as well as detailed analysis of administrative and legal documents from relevant entities and administrative records. His methodology was constantly developing, but from the beginning went well beyond the limitations of previous narrow social science and philosophical analyses. In his Prison Talk interview (1980, Chap. 2), he emphasized the importance of detailed monographs and studies of prisons and the virtues of apparently banal detail to build a picture, not of progress, but of what had happened. He also emphasized the need to ‘use’ other writings (with reference to a question on Nietzsche) “…to deform it, to make it groan and protest”; whether commentators thought he was being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche was of no interest. The summary statement of the relationship between power, ideas and truth is given in his interview in Foucault 1980 (Chap. 6, p. 133). A more complete overview of his writing on these topics is given in Foucault/Rabinow (1997) Vol. 3 Power (which also includes the Truth and Power interview and includes Foucault’s 2 Tanner lectures under the title ‘Omnes et Singulatum’ pp. 298–325). A number of scholars have placed particular emphasis on Foucault’s introduction of the idea of biopolitics (see Kelly 2010 and Lemke 2011); my interpretation agrees with the importance of his introduction of biopolitical ideas to his work but places more emphasis on his eventual rejection of an economic foundation for biopolitics as well as his development of the episteme concept.

‘Knowledge’ in Foucault’s sense is not merely a set of ideas detached from their social context. He illustrates the utility of the approach by reference to the emergence of a psychiatric discipline (first described in his Madness and Civilization but developed further in the Archaeology). The discipline emerged as a result of a “whole set of relations between hospitalization, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, [and] the norms of industrial behaviour and bourgeois morality” (p. 197). The discursive formation of the psychiatric discipline extends well beyond the discipline of medical psychiatry; as well as its medical aspects it involved administrative regulations, philosophical texts and projects linked to assistance to the poor. Science, he argues, is localized in a field of knowledge and plays a role in it, but that role depends critically on the other influences, which vary over time. Medical knowledge in the classical period played a relatively minor role, but psychopathology in the nineteenth century became much more important. “[A]rchaeological analysis must show positively how a science functions in the element of knowledge” (p. 204).

Some Foucauldian scholars (Dean [1999a] and Lemke [2011]) have interpreted Foucault’s episteme more narrowly and tied his work more closely to a program of governmentality closely linked to neoliberal objectives. Dean, for instance, focused on the “episteme of government…forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality…employed in practices of governing” (p. 31). I believe the case for much broader philosophical objectives, non-programmatic and definitely not tied to neoliberalism, is extremely strong taken over the entire scope of his work.

See Deutsch’s Introduction, where he argues that progress depends on progressive improvement in explanations “not only in scientific understanding, but also in technology, political institutions, moral values, art, and every aspect of human welfare”. Though, as noted below, Deutsch, in his chapter on Bad Philosophy, displayed some antagonism to ‘linguistic’ approaches to philosophy, which, though directed mainly against Wittgenstein, could be construed as critical of continental philosophy more generally, including Foucault’s.

Foucault’s epistemes are centrally concerned with the process of developing social truth and defining the role the social sciences play in the discursive process, whereas Kuhn focused on the social process of validation of scientific truth (which incidentally led to a [in my view, overblown] disagreement with Karl Popper on truth affirmation rather than Popperian refutation). Neither Kuhn nor Foucault was arguing that the truth is merely a social construction; both, however, argued that determination of truth involves dialogue among stakeholders. The scientific community, however, interpreted Kuhn’s work as a threat to scientific work and its funding, leading to what has been called ‘the Science Wars’. (Sardar [2000] gives an overview of this debate.)

These points are drawn from Dawkins (2006), Blackmore (1999), including Dawkins’ foreword, and Deutsch (2011).

See Deutsch (2011) Chap. 15, The Evolution of Culture.

Krugman (2007) describes in some detail the way political strategists in the US use the media and ply phrases and words that are coded for ideologically sympathetic groups, but blandly patriotic or religious to the general public, as the rise of dog whistle politics. This alliance between sections of the traditional media and neoliberal/neoconservative politicians has created growing power for both.

With the growth of social media the term meme has come to represent any message that goes viral on the Internet, a property that has become attractive both to those that wish to influence public opinion, such as advertising agencies and politicians, and those that wish to protect the public from such manipulation (for instance, the Adbusters movement, which has a mixed reputation, as discussed in Wikipedia). The article The Virologist (The New Yorker, January 5, 2015, by Andrew Marantz) reveals how this phenomenon can be and has been used entrepreneurially and how replicability leads to public acceptance. Meme replicability and public acceptance, however, do not demonstrate social truth in either factual veracity or moral rightness of the meme.

Foucault (1997) argued that two ‘heterogeneous’ discourses dominated social behaviour from the seventeenth through to the nineteenth century: “[O]nce disciplinary constraints had to both function as mechanisms of domination and be concealed to the extent that they were in the mode in which power was actually exercised, the theory of sovereignty had to find expression in the juridical apparatus and had to be reactivated or complemented by judicial codes” (p. 37). He concluded that “we should be looking for a new right that is both anti-disciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty” (p. 40).

In Abnormal, he observes that the model of exclusion derived from the treatment of lepers was subsequently largely replaced by a ‘reactivated’ model, that of inclusion and control of plague victims. See also Madness and Civilization, Chap. 9, The Birth of the Asylum. Andrew Scull, in his encyclopaedic Madness in Civilization (2015), is critical of several aspects of Foucault’s work in this area, suggesting among other things that he overstated the extent of mistreatment of lepers and the insane. However, his concluding statement that “[madness] remains a fundamental puzzle, a reproach to reason, inescapably part and parcel of civilization itself” (p. 411), is very consistent with Foucault’s central philosophical intention in exploring these issues.

Foucault often referred to classical or literary formulations of biopolitical conflict. He used the anarchical Ubu Roi to illustrate the lack of connection between the juridical system and modern medical science. Other literary game formulations such as Heller’s Catch 22 and Orwell’s 1984 offer appropriate metaphors for recent times.

See Foucault 1977 (Discipline and Punish, Panopticism pp. 218–228) which argues that panoptic disciplines (i) aim to ensure the regulation of people at lowest economic and political cost; (ii) constitute an ‘infra-law’ that guides people into hierarchies; and (iii) apply similar principles across all social institutional arrangements. But this development is incompatible with juridical procedures based on sovereign right. He argues (Foucault 1997, Society Must Be Defended, Lecture of 14th January 1976) that “the techniques of discipline and discourses born of discipline are invading [sovereign] right and … normalizing procedures are increasingly colonizing the procedures of the law” (pp. 38–39).

These concepts are usefully described in https://worldwideweber2014.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/the-panopticon/ which also refers to the broader term omniopticon, surveillance of the many by the many, which seems most apt to our modern media experience. Gary Shteyngart’s novel Super Sad True Love Story (2010) updates Orwell’s dystopian view of a panoptic society ruled by Big Brother and newspeak to the era of modern media, where smartphones have morphed into äppäräts that let everybody know everything about all of their linked ‘friends’, and careful language and books are rendered superfluous. The Economist (Dec. 17, 2016) applied this vision to China’s social credit policy—no doubt appropriate, though the implications of our social communications networks, their management and who controls them should be global concerns, and national policies on these matters considered on future UN agenda (see Chap. 7).

See Assange (2015) and WikiLeaks website https://wikileaks.org/About.html, “As the media organisation has grown and developed, WikiLeaks has been developing and improving a harm minimisation procedure. We do not censor our news, but from time to time we may remove or significantly delay the publication of some identifying details from original documents to protect life and limb of innocent people.”

In his 1982 Vermont lecture The Political Technology of Individuals (Foucault/Rabinow [1997, pp. 401–417]), he describes the evolution of policing in France and Germany, indicating that these practices were allied to the disciplinary mechanisms of the time; order as distinct from law. He concluded that “[t]he conciliation between law and order, which has been the dream of those [utopians of the beginning of the seventeenth century…and…administrators of the eighteenth], must remain a dream” (p. 417). This appears to be consistent with his conclusion of ‘illogicality.’ Perhaps, however, some further investigations of the factors preventing such a union could have been fruitful in revealing a more complete analysis of the sovereignty/disciplinary ‘episteme’?

Diminishing aristocratic sovereignty in Europe and its New World dominions eventually led to the promise that everyone would become able to exercise their rights as citizens because the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the bourgeoisie within the state had become established. European peoples after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire were caught in prolonged struggles within the coalition of the Frankish nobility (the second estate) and the (initially) Catholic Church (or first estate). Effective policing and regulation along panoptic principles largely kept the bourgeoisie (third estate) as well as the proletariat under control, but ultimately struggles within the second estate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to severe curtailment of central sovereign powers and thus more direct power in the hands of the merchant class, much less so the proletariat.

See Foucault (1997), Lecture of 21 January 1976 pp. 58–61. See also discussion of his treatment of race in Lemke (2011) pp. 40–44, and Kelly (2010); both tend to focus on the limited scope of Foucault’s analysis in relation to modern concerns with racism. My interpretation is that Foucault had no intention of addressing such issues, but, rather less ambitiously, he highlighted unavoidable features of biology and personal, family and tribe loyalties that made power conflicts within and between groups unavoidable. This perspective links directly to his concerns with biopower and biopolitics, but his treatment of the nexus of racism, biopower and biopolitics remained very incomplete and falls far short of Kelly’s suggestion that “Foucault defines biopolitics/biopower as a technology of power…” (p. 3). Biopolitics has been identified only as a set of problems that must be addressed within the overall problem of governing self and others, not as a new social truth. Lemke (Chaps. 4 and 5) critically reviews approaches by Agamben, and Hardt and Negri, who aim to build alternative models of biopolitics without addressing the fundamental issues that remain to be resolved within the original Foucauldian framework.

On the genesis of the conflict between the two competing forces from post-Roman times, see particularly his lecture of 28 January 1976 from Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France (1975–76). His Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France (1977–78) developed the ideas of population as the basis of state power, provided it is framed by a regulatory apparatus; the growth of statistical analysis from the eighteenth century onwards gave powerful tools for control to the state. His The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France (1978–79), and The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France (1982–1983) give his most developed ideas of the task of moving beyond sovereignty and panoptic control to a self-governing society seeking to establish social truth.

Ferguson (2006) says of this period: “The war in the East was the war the Germans won” (p. 144). He also adds that the depression played a part but was not itself a major factor in rising fascist sentiments in Germany. “Only in Germany [however] was fascism both revolutionary and totalitarian in deed as well as in word. Only in Germany did dictatorship ultimately lead to industrialized genocide” (p. 232).

Jürgen Tampke (2017) has argued strongly that the Versailles Peace Treaty was much less onerous than many—most notably, Keynes—argued. His critical review of Keynes’ influence on international policy through his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (pp. 203–214) includes a note (31, p. 297) citing Elizabeth Wiskemann, who had met Keynes at a gathering in London after the German Election, on 29 March 1936, and said, “‘I do wish you had not written that book’. In reply, he said simply and gently, ‘So do I’.”

Including Francis Fukuyama’s and Samuel Huntington’s works on likely developments post-Cold War. I would argue that both the language of the analysis (‘clash of civilizations’ and ‘end of history’) and the assumption that liberal democracy is a fully developed product works against the usefulness of this line of investigation. Damagingly, it continues to lend intellectual weight to nationalist and anti-government ideology. Major articles on the ‘clash’, many of which appeared in Foreign Affairs over several years, have been included in The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate 20th Anniversary Edition, Foreign Affairs (2013) (e-book The Clash at 20). Richard Betts’ review of the contributions of Fukuyama, Huntington, and John J. Mearsheimer to the debate (Conflict or Cooperation? Three Visions Revisited) concluded that “simple visions, however powerful, do not hold up as reliable predictors of particular developments. Visions are vital for clarifying thinking about the forces that drive international relations….but they cannot account for many specifics in the actual complexity of political life” (p. 194).

Discourse rather than revolutionary change is the central objective in Foucault’s writing. Foucault had in practice a sympathetic but ill-defined attitude towards contemporary revolution. He was supportive of the student movements in France in May 1968, but was at that time outside France and involved in the more aggressive student revolts in Tunisia (see Foucault/Rabinow 1997, Vol. 3, pp. 278–282). Scullion (1995) was extremely critical of his original praise of the Iranian Islamic Revolution against the oppressive Pahlavi regime, but favourably considered his Le Monde article of May 1979, Useless to Revolt, in response to the Iranian revolution (see Foucault/Rabinow 2000, Vol. 3, pp. 449–453). She concedes that in this “swan song of his Iranian adventure, the sincerity of Foucault’s effort to combat tyranny and, more commendably, to engage a different kind of dialogue between East and West that might lead to greater respect for the otherness of its Oriental interlocutor, is very much in evidence” (p. 36). But she concludes by arguing strongly against his involvement in the first place.

Becker, who is best known for his development of the concept of human capital, gave a clear exposition of his ideas on application of economic rationality to non-commercial activity in his 1992 Nobel lecture. His ideas have been very influential in neoliberal thinking. Education has been regarded as being a good private investment and therefore something that individuals can sensibly borrow in expectation of good future returns. These concepts were taken up by government and by education providers, but with the long-term effect of making education more expensive and more easily available to the rich. The case made in this book, mainly in relation to environmental costs, is consistent with the view that the external effects of education on society are beneficial and that creation of this form of human capital should be encouraged by both government and private education providers (with a subsidy paid to the latter for this external benefit). Likewise, his ideas of rationality and responsiveness to economic incentives by criminals likely helped tough-on-crime approaches by government, but the reality is that criminals have little compunction against using intimidation and corruption as effective ways to make money and see high taxes as an opportunity for profit, through breaking the law.

Dieter Plehwe (2009) describes the wide-ranging nature of debate among the eminent members of the MPS, but makes it clear that political application of these ideas differed widely among countries and was influenced strongly by national and global events. The MPS provided a platform for exchange of ideas and perhaps provided a model for development of modern think tanks. It continues to operate (see https://www.montpelerin.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Short-History-of-MPS-2014.pdf).

As Keane (2009), Sen (2009) and others make clear, the origins of democracy preceded the Athenian version, and Keane, as discussed in Chap. 7, indicates, modern democracy is far from a completed governance model.

Arthur Herman (2013) provides a very readable guide to the many ways in which the philosophical traditions established by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and others of that era were developed, used, lost and regained over the past two and a half millennia. He does, however, associate Nietzsche with ‘the end of reason’, which seriously misrepresents modern philosophical developments.

See Foucault (2008) pp. 45–52 (lecture of 8 February, First Hour).

Ibid. p. 62 (lecture of 8 February, Second Hour).

Blackmore, Susan. 1999. The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. 1991. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dawkins, Richard. 2006. The God Delusion. London: Bantam Press.

Dean, Mitchell. 1999a. Normalizing Democracy: Foucault and Habermas on Democracy, Liberalism, and Law, Chapter 6. In Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue Between Genealogy and Critical Theory, ed. Samantha Ashendon and David Owen. London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

———. 1999b. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE.

Deutsch, David. 2011. The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World. London: Penguin.

Dobson, Jerome E., and Peter E. Fisher. 2007. The Panopticon’s Changing Geography. The Geographical Review 97 (3): 307–323.CrossRef

Ferguson, Niall. 2006. The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin Group USA, Hudson Street.

Foucault, Michel. 1966. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. Tavistock 1970. London/New York: Routledge Classics.

———. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. A. Sheridan. London: Penguin Books 1991.

———. 1980. Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Vintage.

———. 1997. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France (1975–76). English ed. Arnold I. Davidson; Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador

Foucault, Michel/Paul Rabinow. 1997–2000. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Paul Rabinow, Series Editor: Vol. 1, Ethics Subjectivity and Truth, (1997), Paul Rabinow, Editor: Vol. 2, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, (1998), James D. Faubion, Editor: Vol. 3 Power, (2000), James D. Faubion, Editor. New York: New Press.

Foucault, Michel. 2003. Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France (1974–75). Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France (1978–79). Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan.

Henshall, Nicholas. 2010. The Zenith of European Monarchy and Its Elites: The Politics of Culture, 1650–1750. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef

Herman, Arthur. 2013. The Cave and the Light: Plato Versus Aristotle, and the Struggle for the Soul of Western Civilization. New York: Random House.

Keane, John. 2009. The Life and Death of Democracy. New York/London: W.W. Norton.

Kelly, Mark. 2010. International Biopolitics: Foucault, Globalisation and Imperialism. Theoria 57 (123): 1–26.CrossRef

Kenny, Anthony. 2007. Philosophy in the Modern World: A New History of Western Philosophy. Vol. 4. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Krugman, Paul. 2007. The Conscience of a Liberal: Reclaiming America from the Right. London: Allen Lane/Penguin.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lemke, Thomas. 2011. Bio-politics: An Advanced Introduction. New York/London: New York University Press.

Plehwe, Dieter. 2009. Introduction. In The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehw, 1–42 (http://uberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mt-pelerin.pdf).

Sardar, Ziauddin. 2000. Thomas Kuhn and the Science Wars. London: Icon Books.

Schrift, Alan D. 2006. Twentieth Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers. Blackwell Publishing.

Scull, Andrew. 2015. Madness in Civilization: A Cultural History of Insanity, from the Bible to Freud, from the Madhouse to Modern Medicine. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef

Scullion, Rosemarie. 1995. Michel Foucault the Orientalist: On Revolutionary Iran and the “Spirit of Islam”. South Central Review 12 (2): 16–40.CrossRef

Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of HUP.

Shteyngart, Gary. 2010. Super Sad True Love Story. New York: Random House.

Tampke, Jürgen. 2017. A Perfidious Distortion of History: The Versailles Peace Treaty and the Success of the Nazis. Melbourne/London: Scribe.

Titel: Foucault’s Biopolitics and Its Relevance to Modern Social Science
verfasst von: William Allan
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Last Empires
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59959-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-59960-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59960-1_1

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner