2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Hiding the Policy in Cryptographic Access Control
verfasst von : Sascha Müller, Stefan Katzenbeisser
Erschienen in: Security and Trust Management
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
Recently, cryptographic access control has received a lot of attention, mainly due to the availability of efficient
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)
schemes. ABE allows to get rid of a trusted reference monitor by enforcing access rules in a cryptographic way. However, ABE has a privacy problem: The access policies are sent in clear along with the ciphertexts. Further generalizing the idea of policy-hiding in cryptographic access control, we introduce
policy anonymity
where – similar to the well-understood concept of
k
-anonymity – the attacker can only see a large set of possible policies that might have been used to encrypt, but is not able to identify the one that was actually used. We show that using a concept from graph theory we can extend a known ABE construction to achieve the desired privacy property.