1. How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq

De Tray describes high-level military enthusiasm, which produced no lasting effect, for expanding a development program, the People’s Development Fund. The program aimed to strengthen ties between the Afghan people and their government, a prime objective of counterinsurgency strategy, by shifting accountability for development projects to Afghan provincial and district governments from the international coalition led by the United States. De Tray had developed and piloted the program with the 173rd Airborne Division in two provinces of Afghanistan in 2009–2010. In a briefing, David Petraeus, then commander of the US Central Command, and John F. Campbell, commander of forces in the region of Afghanistan where the pilot took place, both urged that the program spread. But that did not happen. De Tray also describes his recruitment to the team, its civilian and military makeup, its meetings both inside the Green Zone in Baghdad and throughout the country, and its recommendations. The team’s first recommendation was that the coalition encourage the Iraq government to take ownership of the development program, overcome political obstacles to progress, and create pathways for advisors in government institutions.