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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Human Rights Advocacy for an “International Society of Risk”

verfasst von : Ioannis K. Panoussis

Erschienen in: Legal Risks in EU Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The concept of risk in international human rights law is strictly connected to the idea of prevention. The problem is that international systems of protection are generally based on State responsibility for the violation of a human right guaranteed in the different conventions, which means that, in principle, prevention is not part of the attributions of international protecting bodies. Taking this into account, the development of the case-law of these organs is surprising. The concept of risk is actually present from the early beginning of the international procedures (even before examining the admissibility). The international bodies are facing questions related to risk and the obligation to prevent its realization at the stage of the precautionary or provisional measures. They are, at present, also examining the admissibility and the merits when dealing, for example, with the concept of “potential victim” or with the positive obligations to prevent violations of human rights. Issues such as asylum, counterterrorism, environment and others are the main areas of the development of this kind of case-law.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Legal Risks in the Relation Between National Constitutional Law and EU Law

Nächstes Kapitel Linguistic Equality and Language as a Legal Risk for Legislating in the European Union

Morgan and Evans (2002), p. 300; Nicolay (1996), p. 1.

For an interesting approach to the prevention of human rights and the division of powers between the States and the subcommittee, see Steinerte (2013), p. 132.

It is particularly interesting that the writers of these texts did not want to compete with the existing control mechanisms of the prevention systems on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights or the Convention of Nations against Torture, respectively. The goal was rather to enhance the complementarity of these mechanisms by giving the preventive bodies an investigative role and recommendations to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of a violation—they then play a warning role—then that controls them are part of a logic of responsibility.

This link between the concept of risk and the obligation to prevent is always noticeable when trying to analyse the State’s obligations. This overall theme is approached from very diverse angles in the book. See, e.g. Decaux and Touzé (2015), p. 230.

This issue is particularly highlighted by Professor Hélène Tigroudja in a recent study, which is relatively critical of the effectiveness of provisional measures as a means of prevention. See Tigroudja (2015), p. 141.

For a study of this issue in terms of human rights, see the work of Rieter (2010), p. 1200; Rieter (2012), p. 165.

Article 63§2 CADH provides specifically that “In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission”. In a shorter style, Article 27§2 of the Protocol establishing the African Court provides that “In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary.”

To take the European example, the emergence of the possibility of the Strasbourg Court to adopt interim measures is grounded in Article 39 of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the latter itself.

The absence of a conventional foundation casts doubts on the binding nature of the latter. The Strasbourg Court has decided to use its power of interpretation to establish the characteristic “normative” Interim Measures of its own. See e.g., App. No. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [2005] ECHR and the commentary of Frumer (2005), p. 799.

As noted by Professor Tigroudja in her study, the ACHR is very formalistic in establishing criteria while the ECHR takes a much less formal and more confidential approach despite the real importance of these measures. See Tigroudja (2015), pp. 145–146.

A degree of caution is needed in the analysis of this separate opinion. The dispute in question was an interstate dispute that Judge Cançado Trindade was called to overcome. Therefore, it was by no means a plea for the emergence of a subjective right for the individual. However, Judge Cançado Trindade recalled the appearance of a necessary independent legal regime, creating true obligations of prevention for upstream States of the substantive examination of the case. Applied to human rights, this reasoning can lead to the birth of a right to compensation in favour of the individual in case of non-compliance with this obligation by the State (see in particular paras. 69–76 of his dissenting opinion).

Case MC 382/10, Comunidades Indígenas da Bacia do Rio Xingu v. Brazil [2011] IACHR.

See, Hélène Tigroudja (2015), supra, pp.144–145.

See the presentation of Neumann Das Neves N., “Barrage de Belo Monte: le droit des indigènes suspendu à une mesure provisoire (Commission IADH, 1er avril 2011, Comunidades Indígenas da Bacia do Rio Xingu c. Brésil)”, available at:

http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/04/21/barrage-de-belo-monte-le-droit-des-indigenes-suspendu-a-une-mesure-provisoire-commission-iadh-1er-avril-2011-comunidades-indigenas-da-bacia-do-rio-xingu-c-bresil/.

Panoussis (2014), p. 17.

Cançado Trindade A. A., dissenting opinion in the order of the ICJ of 16 July 2013, Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area - Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), para. 73.

Dilma Rousseff, who originated the project, expressed strong criticism of the Commission. Brazil has taken a distance and openly challenged the legitimacy of the Commission to interfere in records management with a very important economic and social impact that has not been taken into account by the review body. We can estimate that changing the rules of the Commission is due largely to this case.

App. No. 19234/04, Bacila vs Romania [2010] ECtHR, paras. 70–72 at the occasion of which she says that “Certes, la Cour ne méconnaît pas l’intérêt que peuvent avoir les autorités internes à maintenir l’activité économique du plus grand employeur d’une ville déjà fragilisée par la fermeture d’autres industries.

Cependant, la Cour estime que cet intérêt ne saurait l’emporter sur le droit des personnes concernées à jouir d’un environnement équilibré et respectueux de la santé. L’existence de conséquences graves et avérées pour la santé de la requérante et des autres habitants de Copşa Mică, faisait peser sur l’État l’obligation positive d’adopter et de mettre en œuvre des mesures raisonnables et adéquates capables de protéger leur bien-être.

Compte tenu de ce qui précède – et malgré la marge d’appréciation reconnue à l’État défendeur – la Cour estime que celui-ci n’a pas su ménager un juste équilibre entre l’intérêt du bien-être économique de la ville de Copşa Mică – celui de préserver l’activité du principal employeur de la ville – et la jouissance effective par la requérante du droit au respect de son domicile et de sa vie privée et familiale”.

See in this brief commentary Lazarte (2013). The latter defines these concepts as follows:

–

La “gravité”: Impact sérieux qu’une action ou omission peut avoir sur le droit protégé ou sur l’effet éventuel d’une décision en suspens dans une affaire ou pétition face aux organes du système interaméricain;

–

L’“urgence”: Risque ou menace imminentes qui peuvent se concrétiser au point de rendre nécessaire une action préventive ou de protection en référé;

–

Le “dommage irréparable”: Atteinte aux droits qui, par sa nature même, n’est pas susceptible de réparation, de restauration ou d’indemnisation adéquate.

This is clear from Article 34 ECHR, which provides for the right of individual petition, conditioning the quality of a victim: “The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

Sudre (2000), p. 1359; Mowbray (2004), p. 239.

See to that effect, Panoussis (2007), pp. 427–461.

Panoussis (2007), pp. 427–461. When upstream of a violation, the duty of prevention is indeed in question. However, when one is downstream of a violation, that obligation essentially takes the form of a duty of investigation by State authorities.

On the notion of a potential victim in the litigation of human rights, see Cançado Trindade (1987), pp. 243–299, especially pp. 92, 271–2. According to Professor Tigroudja, the terms “potential victim”, “virtual” or “possible” are inappropriate. They ignore the positive obligations of the State. See, in this sense, Tigroudja (2001), pp. 32–40.

Tigroudja (2001), p. 39.

Sudre (2000), p. 1360.

We can cite as examples: App. No. 22414/93, Chahal v. UK, [1996] ECtHR and App. No. 37201/06, Saadi v. Italy, [2008] ECtHR.

Panoussis (2014), pp. 447–452.

App. No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, [2014] ECtHR.

This means that the danger must be predictable and sufficiently concrete. Moreover, the risk cannot be general, but individualized. In their dissenting opinion, Judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre and Jäderblom rightly insist on the fact that “The risk must be “real”, meaning that the danger must be foreseeable and sufficiently concrete”, and must demonstrate the existence of “a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3”.

App. No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, [2014] ECtHR, para. 102.

Ibid., para. 122.

It is quite evident, for example, in a recent case concerning extraordinary renditions. See to that effect, App no 39630/09, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2012] ECtHR. In paras. 151–152, one can read: “(…) In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (…).152. Furthermore, it is to be recalled that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (…)”.

In terms of evidence, see, e.g. App. Nos. 70073/10 and 44539/11, H. and B. v. the United Kingdom, [2014] ECtHR.

Warolin Duteil (2005), p. 333.

See below. Such was the case, for example, in the case of El-Masri cited above. See e.g. Panoussis (2013b), p. 5.

See e.g. App. No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland [2014] ECtHR.

According to the Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who “(…) fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it”.

The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with abundant litigation in connection with the procedures of Dublin II as evidenced by the Judgments of the M. S. S. v. Belgium and Greece of 21 January 2011 or Tarakhel v. Switzerland, supra. Each time, the authorities, which were preparing to remove a person from their territory, were to conduct a risk analysis in the country of return using all the evidence described above.

App. No. 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, [2012] ECtHR.

Panoussis (2013a, b), p. 11.

See in particular paras. 147–148 which state that “It is a matter for the State carrying out the return to ensure that the intermediary country offers sufficient guarantees to prevent the person concerned being removed to his country of origin without an assessment of the risks faced. The Court observes that that obligation is all the more important when, as in the instant case, the intermediary country is not a State Party to the Convention.

148. In the instant case, the Court’s task is not to rule on the violation of the Convention in the event of repatriation of the applicants, but to ascertain whether there were sufficient guarantees that the parties concerned would not be arbitrarily returned to their countries of origin, where they had an arguable claim that their repatriation would breach Article 3 of the Convention”.

Libya in this case had not even ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention.

App. No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland [2014] ECtHR. More specifically, it points to para. 99 of its Judgment that “With more specific reference to minors, the Court has established that it is important to bear in mind that the child’s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant. Children have specific needs that are related in particular to their age and lack of independence, but also to their asylum-seeker status. The Court has also observed that the Convention on the Rights of the Child encourages States to take the appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking to obtain refugee status enjoys protection and humanitarian assistance, whether the child is alone or accompanied by his or her parents.”

See Case MC 382/10, Comunidades Indígenas da Bacia do Rio Xingu v. Brazil [2011] IACHR.

App no 30765/08, Di Sarno and Others v. Italy [2012] ECtHR.

The Strasbourg Court does not distinguish in this matter between workers and residents thus expanding the number of individuals eligible to victim status under Article 8 ECHR and in particular under the protection of private life and home.

To qualify for victim status, it is always important to demonstrate the direct damage to individualize grievances. In this case, it appears that the magnitude of the crisis was in itself sufficient to satisfy this requirement, which led the judge to establish a kind of existence of the presumption of direct damage to the benefit of all the applicants. See to that effect paragraph 81 of the Judgment: “(…) les requérants dénoncent une situation affectant l’ensemble de la population de la Campanie, à savoir l’atteinte à l’environnement provoquée par le mauvais fonctionnement du système de collecte, de traitement et d’élimination des déchets mis en place par les autorités publiques. Toutefois, elle relève qu’il ressort des documents fournis par les parties que Somma Vesuviana a été frappée par la « crise des déchets (…) Dans ces conditions, la Cour estime que les dommages à l’environnement dénoncés par les requérants sont de nature à affecter directement leur propre bien-être. Partant, il y a lieu de rejeter l’exception du Gouvernement”. See Panoussis (2014), p. 17.

Panoussis (2014).

App. No. 30765/08, Di Sarno and Others v. Italy [2012] ECtHR, para. 110.

Regarding the first requirement, the European Court of Human Rights had occasion to state that the State authorities were required to neutralize activists spreading terror. See to that effect App. No. 22535/93, Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey [2012] ECtHR, para. 85. In the case it is specified that “the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual or individuals whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.” On the second, namely the right of everyone, including alleged terrorists, to benefit from the protection of the State, the obligation to prevent resulted from the positive obligations studied above. The only question that remains is that of the ownership of rights even for hostis humanis. On this point, see Hennebel and Tigroudja (2009), p. 65, pp. 90 et seq.

See, e.g., App. No. 22414/93, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, [1996], ECtHR. App. No. 37201/06, Saadi v. Italy [2008], ECtHR. App. No. 3455/05, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [2009] ECtHR. Case 619-03, Norin Catriman and Others v. Chile [2007] IACHR.

This is a stance adopted by several States, headed by the United States, as evidenced by the International Commission of Jurists in its 2009 report, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, pp. 17 et seq.

See in this sense Hennebel and Tigroudja (2009), p. 22.

App. No. 3455/05, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [2009] ECtHR and particularly para. 171 of its Judgment which says that “does not accept the Government’s argument that Article 5 § 1 permits a balance to be struck between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s interest in protecting its population from terrorist threat. This argument is inconsistent not only with the Court’s jurisprudence under sub-paragraph (f) but also with the principle that sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is compatible with the aims of Article 5. If detention does not fit within the confines of the sub-paragraphs as interpreted by the Court, it cannot be made to fit by an appeal to the need to balance the interests of the State against those of the detainee.”

App. No. 39630/09, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2012] ECtHR.

See in particular para. 192 of the Judgment. Note, moreover, that this right has been explicitly enshrined by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See Case C No. 70, Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, [2000] IACHR, paras. 201 et seq. See e.g. Tigroudja and Panoussis (2003), p. 275.

See in particular, paras. 151–152 of the Judgment.

See, on this specific point Panoussis (2011), pp. 197–218.

See App. No. 55721/07, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [2011] ECtHR and App. No. 27021/08, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [2011] ECtHR and the analysis proposed by Panoussis (2012), p. 647.

App. No. 29750/09, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [2014] ECtHR.

See in particular the dissenting opinion on this one aspect of the Judgment of the Judges Spano, Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva.

The reasoning of the Court in paragraph 104 is: “By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international humanitarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) of that provision should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The Court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime does not fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed by Article 5 of the Convention without the exercise of the power of derogation under Article 15 (see paragraph 97 above). It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers”.

See e.g. App. No. 21010/10, Brunet v. France [2014] ECtHR.

App. No. 3564/11, Eremia and Others v. the Republic of Moldova [2013] ECtHR.

Cançado Trindade AA (1987) Co-existence and co-ordination of international mechanisms of protection of human rights (at global and regional levels). During the Collection of the Hague Academy of International Law 202(XI)

Decaux E, Touzé S (eds) (2015) La prévention des violations des droits de l’Homme. Pedone (Publications de l’Institut international des droits de l’Homme), Paris

Frumer P (2005) Un arrêt définitif sur les mesures provisoires: la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme persiste et signe. Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’Homme 16:799

Hennebel L, Tigroudja H (2009) Le juge, le terroriste et l’État de droit in Juger le terrorisme dans l’État de droit. Bruxelles, Bruylant

Lazarte BR (2013) Une réforme du système interaméricain des droits de l’Homme dans un contexte périlleux. La revue des Droits de l’Homme, in Lettre “Actualités Droits-Libertés” du Credof

Morgan R, Evans M (2002) Combattre la torture en Europe - Le travail et les normes du Comité Européen pour la Prévention de la Torture. Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg

Mowbray AR (2004) The development of positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Hart Publishing, Oxford

Nicolay C (1996) Une nouvelle approche des droits de l’Homme: la Convention européenne pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. Revue pénitentiaire de droit pénal

Panoussis I (2007) L’obligation générale de protection des droits de l’Homme. RTDH 70:427–461

Panoussis I (2011) The control of European restrictions and derogations to human rights due to counter-terrorism measures. In: Hennebel L, Tigroudja H (eds) Balancing liberty and security: the human rights pendulum. Wolf Legal Publishers, The Netherlands

Panoussis I (2012) L’application extraterritoriale de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme en Irak. In: Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, no 91, p 647

Panoussis I (2013a) L’interception de migrants en haute mer et les risques associés à leur refoulement immédiat vers un Etat tiers (Cour EDH, Grande chambre, arrêt du 23 février 2012, Hirsi Jamaa et autres contre Italie). Chronique Droit et Risque, Les Petites Affiches 11:7

Panoussis I (2013b) La pratique des “restitutions extraordinaires”, comme moyen de prévention du risque terroriste, à l’épreuve de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Cour EDH, Grande Chambre, arrêt du 13 décembre 2012, El-Masri c/ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine). Chronique Droit et Risque, Les Petites Affiches 242:5

Panoussis I (2014) Waste management in the ECHR – an introduction. In: Panoussis I, Post H (eds) Waste management and European law. Eleven International Publishing, Den Haag/Netherlands

Rieter ER (2010) Preventing irreparable harm: provisional measures in international human rights adjudication. Intersentia, Antwerp

Rieter ER (2012) Provisional measures: binding and persuasive? Enabling human rights adjudicators to follow up on state disrespect. Neth Int Law Rev 59

Steinerte E (2013) The changing nature of relationship of the United Nations between the subcommittee for the prevention of torture and national preventive mechanisms in search for equilibrium. Neth Q Hum Rights 31:132

Sudre F (2000) Les ‘obligations positives’ dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l’Homme. In: Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne. Mélanges en l’honneur de Rolv Ryssdall, Karl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln

Tigroudja H (2001) Contributions à l’étude du statut de la victime en droit international des droits de l’homme, Thèse. DACT, Lille II

Tigroudja H (2015) L’(in)efficacité des mesures provisoires internationales en matière de prévention des violations des droits de l’homme. In: Decaux E, Touzé S (eds) La prévention des violations des droits de l’Homme. Pedone (Publications de l’Institut international des droits de l’homme), Paris

Tigroudja H, Panoussis I (2003) La Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme. Analyse de la jurisprudence consultative et contentieuse. Bruylant, Collection Droit et Justice, Bruxelles

Warolin Duteil L (2005) La Cour européenne des droits d l’homme aux prises avec la preuve de violations du droit à la vie ou de l’interdiction de la torture: entre théorie classique aménagée et innovation européenne. RTDH 62:333

Titel: Human Rights Advocacy for an “International Society of Risk”
verfasst von: Ioannis K. Panoussis
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Legal Risks in EU Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-28595-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-28596-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28596-2_3

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