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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

16. Hungary

verfasst von : József Péter Martin, Miklós Ligeti

Erschienen in: Lobbying in Europe

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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Abstract

Each country chapter of this volume provides an overview of the national lobbying industry, taking into consideration also institutional, historical and cultural variables, and placing the analysis of lobbying and public affairs into a wider picture. A short overview of the country’s political system is given, illustrating the institutional structure, the party system or the weight of particular political actors. In order to describe the features of the lobbying industry in the country, various pieces of information are considered, such as the regulatory framework (and relative ‘flaws’), the number of professionals working in the sector, the presence of specific educational pathways (master’s degrees or courses), the presence of professional associations and, if any, of deontological charters or self-disciplinary measures. Overall, an assessment on the degree of professionalisation and development of the industry is formulated, addressing also the perception of lobbyists by the public opinion and the influence of the EU supranational level on the national environment, imagining future scenarios and trends.

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Fußnoten
1
Fidesz is a right-wing party that belongs to the EU-wide European People’s Party. It has been using nationalist rhetoric, sometimes with an adamant anti-EU tone since 2010 without questioning the EU-membership of Hungary (Ilonszki and Lengyel 2014; Martin 2014).
 
2
For further analyses see the 21 September 2015 Joint Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review 25th Session of the UPR Working Group by Transparency International Hungary, Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption and K-Monitor Watchdog for Public funds:
 
3
This term for Hungary was used first by Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, in 2014, in one of his speeches in Romania when he stated that “the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state”. The full text of this speech, see: http://​budapestbeacon.​com/​public-policy/​full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/​10592.
 
4
However, the total number of infringement procedures against Hungary, although it has increased after 2010, its amount did not exceed until 2014 (Juhász 2014) and still has not transcended that of other EU member countries of the CEE region.
 
5
See case Baka v. Hungary. Application no. 20261/12, judgment (merits).
 
6
Hungary breached the requirements as enshrined in Directive 95/46/EC See: Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12.
 
7
See: Commission v. Hungary, C-286/12.
 
8
Under Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
 
9
For the related criticism of the Venice Commission, see: Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, CDL-AD(2013)012, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 17 June 2013, www.​venice.​coe.​int/​webforms/​documents/​?​pdf=​CDL-AD%282013%29012-e
 
10
A number of examples indicate the government’s intention to grant privileges to certain economic actors by legal means. The description of three emblematic examples of cronyism is to be found in Chapter IV.
 
11
CPI as a composite index scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be by the business community and experts. A detailed description of CPI’s methodology is available at Transparency International’s website: http://​www.​transparency.​org/​research/​cpi/​overview
 
12
The points for Hungary have not changed dramatically. What has worsened is the relative position with other countries. There was a methodological change in 2012 that makes it difficult to compare the nominal results before and after that.
 
13
The perceptions of Hungary’s anti-corruption performance also worsened in the European Union as a whole. The country used to be the Union’s 19th most corrupt jurisdiction out of 27 member countries in 2012. In 2013, Hungary’s rank sank to the 20th among 28 member states, where it remained in 2014 as well. In 2015, Hungary dropped to 22nd among EU members.
 
14
The other form of state capture is the corporate one where strong oligarchs take control of weak government.
 
15
See these cases further down in Chapter IV.
 
16
These findings result from the Economic Opinion Survey of World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report / Global Competitiveness Index 2015/2016, see: http://​www3.​weforum.​org/​docs/​gcr/​2015-2016/​Global_​Competitiveness_​Report_​2015-2016.​pdf. For a detailed description of the survey’s methodology, see: https://​reports.​weforum.​org/​global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/​appendix-methodology-and-computation-of-the-global-competitiveness-index-2015-2016/​
 
17
See the survey of the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce (‘DUIHK’): AHK-Konjunkturumfrage Mittelosteuropa (2014), available http://​www.​dsihk.​sk/​fileadmin/​ahk_​slowakei/​Dokumente/​Wirtschaft/​AHKKonjunkturumf​rage_​MOE_​2014.​pdf
 
18
The investment rate (gross fixed capital formation per GDP) declined from 23 per cent in 2010 to 19 per cent in 2012 which was then the lowest figure in the region. Since then it has slightly increased but mainly due to the large inflow form the EU’s cohesion funds. See: http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​eurostat/​tgm/​refreshTableActi​on.​do?​tab=​table&​plugin=​1&​pcode=​tec00011&​language=​en
 
19
Between 2006 and 2010, a stand-alone law on lobbying (Act XLIX of 2006 on Lobbying, ‘Lobbying Act’) provided a voluntary registration system for lobbyists, envisioned a common code of conduct, and prescribed reporting requirements for both lobbyists and executive decision-making bodies. In events of non-compliance, the Lobbying Act foresaw pecuniary sanctions, with a maximum fine of HUF 10 million (approx. EUR 33 thousand). Nonetheless, the Lobbying Act had a negligible impact on the transparency of lobbying (Burai and Hack 2011). This was mainly reasoned by the fact that it was technically easy to circumvent the regulation, because it had a jurisdiction only in regard to registered lobbyists, as a result of which anybody who omitted to register themselves were not impacted. There were only 600 registered lobbyists by September 2010 (OECD 2012).
 
20
Act CXXXI of 2010.
 
21
Priority or ‘fast-track’ legislative processes have in a number of occasions resulted in the adoption at breakneck speed of legislations that seriously curtail access to information on public spending. See, inter alia, Act XI of 2013 and Act CXXIX of 2015. For a detailed analysis of priority legislation see Szabó (2014).
 
22
Government MPs often propose drafts to comprehensively amend existing laws which are adopted with no prior public or expert consultations.
 
23
Government’s Decree No. 50 of 2013 on the Integrity Management of Public Administration and the Regulation of Accepting Lobbyists.
 
24
TI-Hungary tried to obtain lobbying contact information and lobbying reports submitted by public officials, but it turned out, that none of the public organs addressed by such requests collected these data, a reason why TI-Hungary concluded that the current scattered lobbying regulation fell into desuetude.
 
26
For PM Orbán, “we build not a welfare state but a work-based society”. See: http://​www.​fidesz.​hu/​hirek/​2012-10-19/​orban-nem-joleti-allam-hanem-munka-alapu-tarsadalom-epul-kepek/​
 
28
Act CXXXIV of 2012 on tobacco retailing.
 
29
The concept of the government was to decrease the smoking of the youth by restricting the number of tobacco shops and denying the entry of young people into them.
 
34
The United States Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 concluded that this was the “most high profile alleged corruption case during the year” in Hungary. See page 34 of the report on Hungary, available here: http://​www.​state.​gov/​documents/​organization/​220497.​pdf
 
35
World Health Organization’s global report on trends in prevalence of tobacco smoking 2015, page 150.
 
38
The tobacco kiosk case has provoked immense media interest. See Politics.hu, ‘Transparency International points to corruption in government takeover of tobacco business’, 13 April 2013, www.​politics.​hu/​20130429/​transparency-international-points-to-corruption-in-government-takeover-of-tobacco-business, [Downloaded: 2015.10.21.]; Politics.hu, ‘Court orders release of tobacco retail tender documents’, 12 May 2014, www.​politics.​hu/​20140512/​court-orders-release-of-tobacco-retail-tender-documents, [Downloaded: 2015.10.21.]; Global Voices Online (Netherlands), Hungary: government limits FOIA transparency law’, 8 May 2013. http://​advocacy.​globalvoicesonli​ne.​org/​2013/​05/​08/​hungary-government-limits-foia-transparency-law [Downloaded: 2015.10.21.]
 
39
Act CXXXV of 2013.
 
40
Government decree No. 48 of 2014.
 
43
This is the result of Transparency International Hungary’s Freedom of Information Requests.
 
44
This amount was determined by Transparency International Hungary by calculating the median value of subsidies in each of the four seasons and then using the average of the four to find out what an average soccer club receives each year.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Hungary
verfasst von
József Péter Martin
Miklós Ligeti
Copyright-Jahr
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55256-3_16