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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

32. Implementability of Social Choice Objectives

verfasst von : Takashi Hayashi

Erschienen in: Microeconomic Theory for the Social Sciences

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

If you are a “benevolent” policy maker, you would like to satisfy “people’s voice” as much as possible. However, the argument in the previous chapter shows that it is a non-obvious problem to aggregate “people’s voices” into “people’s voice.”

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Fußnoten
1
For example, when an individual cares only for own private consumption which is just a piece of entire allocation.
 
2
Note that this result does not hold as it stands when we drop the assumption of interior solution and smooth preference, since there are some technical issues around corner solutions.
 
Literatur
1.
Zurück zum Zitat Gibbard, Allan. “Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.” Econometrica (1973): 587–601. Gibbard, Allan. “Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.” Econometrica (1973): 587–601.
2.
Zurück zum Zitat Satterthwaite, Mark Allen. “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.” Journal of Economic Theory 10.2 (1975): 187–217. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen. “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.” Journal of Economic Theory 10.2 (1975): 187–217.
3.
Zurück zum Zitat Reny, Philip J. “Arrowfs theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach.” Economics Letters 70.1 (2001): 99–105. Reny, Philip J. “Arrowfs theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach.” Economics Letters 70.1 (2001): 99–105.
4.
Zurück zum Zitat Mas-Colell, Andrew ,Michael Whinston and Jerry Green. Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press (1995). Mas-Colell, Andrew ,Michael Whinston and Jerry Green. Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press (1995).
5.
Zurück zum Zitat Maskin, Eric. “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66.1 (1999): 23–38. Maskin, Eric. “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66.1 (1999): 23–38.
6.
Zurück zum Zitat Rafael Repullo, “A simple proof of Maskin’s theorem on Nash implementation,” Social Choice and Welfare 4 (1987): 39–41. Rafael Repullo, “A simple proof of Maskin’s theorem on Nash implementation,” Social Choice and Welfare 4 (1987): 39–41.
Metadaten
Titel
Implementability of Social Choice Objectives
verfasst von
Takashi Hayashi
Copyright-Jahr
2021
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3541-0_32

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