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Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2021

19.10.2020

In the land of OZ: designating opportunity zones

verfasst von: James Alm, Trey Dronyk-Trosper, Sean Larkin

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2021

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Abstract

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 allowed governors of the fifty states to designate low-income areas as a “Qualified Opportunity Zone” (QOZ), which entitled the investors in these QOZs to significant tax incentives. As a result, each governor’s designation of QOZs provided an opportunity for the governor to introduce investments in low-income communities that would, in principle, increase economic opportunities in these areas. At the same time, each governor’s decision also provided an opportunity for the governor to reward political allies, to buy voter support, and to help business interests. Which of these many factors influenced the designation of QOZs? In this paper we estimate the impact of economic and political variables on the governors’ decisions to choose which areas among all eligible areas would receive QOZ status and which would not. We find that the QOZ selection process overall seems to have been relatively technocratic, with many of the strongest factors that determine QOZ designation being indicators of economic distress such as higher rates of unemployment, welfare receipt, or lower median income, all of which are consistent with the presumed goals of QOZs. Even so, we also find that political factors are significant in QOZ designation, with Democratic representation being negatively associated with QOZ nomination and with political representation by a local politician of the same party as the governor being positively associated with QOZ nomination. Of some note, we also find that areas with higher college attainment are favored.

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Fußnoten
1
The various government regulations for OZs include, among others: “Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds”, available online at https://​www.​federalregister.​gov/​documents/​2018/​10/​29/​2018-23382/​investing-in-qualified-opportunity-funds; “Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds”, available online at: www.​federalregister.​gov/​documents/​2019/​05/​01/​2019-08075/​investing-in-qualified-opportunity-funds; “Treasury, IRS issue proposed regulations on new Opportunity Zone tax incentive”, available online at https://​www.​irs.​gov/​newsroom/​treasury-irs-issue-proposed-regulations-on-new-opportunity-zone-tax-incentive; and “Special Rules for Capital Gains Invested in Opportunity Zones”, available online at https://​www.​irs.​gov/​pub/​irs-drop/​rr-18-29.​pdf. See also Novogradac (2018), Eastman and Kaeding (2019), Nitti (2019), Tankersley (2019), and Tax Policy Center (2019) for useful information.
 
2
See “A Trump Tax Break To Help The Poor Went To a Rich GOP Donor’s Superyacht Marina”, available online at https://​www.​propublica.​org/​article/​superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunity-zone-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor. See also “Symbol of’80 s Greed Stands to Profit from Trump Tax Break for Poor Areas”, available online at https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2019/​10/​26/​business/​michael-milken-trump-opportunity-zones.​html.
 
3
See “Fixing America’s Forgotten Places–Opportunity Zones, created by Trump’s tax law, are meant to help the heartland thrive and make the country more equal, but can they pull it off?”, available online at https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​ideas/​archive/​2018/​07/​how-do-we-help-this-place/​565862/​.
 
4
See: “The Problem with Opportunity Zones”, available online at https://​www.​citylab.​com/​equity/​2018/​05/​the-problem-with-opportunity-zones/​560510/​; “How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich”, available online at https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2019/​08/​31/​business/​tax-opportunity-zones.​html; “Trump Tax Break That Benefited the Rich Is Being Investigated”, available online at https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2020/​01/​15/​business/​trump-opportunity-zone-investigation.​html; and “Developers Rushing to Opportunity Zones for Tax Break, But Is It Helping Louisiana's Low-Income Areas?”, available online at www.​theadvocate.​com/​new_​orleans/​news/​business/​article_​0ddb2d22-2576-11e9-bde9837b83173a57​.​html.
 
5
See the episode of the HBO series Billions entitled “Opportunity Zone”, in which the character Bobby Axelrod (or Axe) wants to invest in an OZ in the Yonkers neighborhood in which he grew up.
 
7
See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Neumark and Simpson (2014) and Duranton and Venables (2018) for recent and comprehensive surveys of this literature.
 
8
An important recent exception is Frank et al. (2020), who examine the political processes associated with QOZ selection.
 
9
Theodos and Meixel (2018) also examine QOZ selection, although their analysis of QOZ selection relies mainly on simple comparisons of the mean characteristics of OZs that are selected versus those not are designated for QOZ selection. See also Theodos and Meixell (2018), who apply similar methods to the specific case of California.
 
10
Note that for 51 QOZs nominated late in the process, the 2012–2016 ACS data was used.
 
11
Note that there are more recent ACS data from the 2012–2016 survey. We use the ACS data from the 2011–2015 survey because these are the data that were available at the time of QOZ designation by the governors of the states.
 
12
For example, see “Opportunity Zones Knock Where They’re Needed Least”, available online at https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​opportunity-zones-knock-where-theyre-needed-least-11568412633. See also Gelfond and Looney (2018). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
 
13
For a comprehensive recent survey of the empirical literature on the impact of economic and political variables on a wide range of outcomes, see Potrafke (2018); for an earlier but still useful survey, see Besley and Case (2003). See especially empirical papers on the role of economic and political variables in state government policy decisions, including Alt et al. (2002), Chang, Kim, and Ying (2009), Alm and Rogers (2011), Fredriksson, Wang, and Warren (2013), Pickering and Rockey (2013), Joshi (2015), Beland and Oloomi (2017), and Hill and Jones (2017).
 
14
See also Papke (1994) for a similar result on gentrification.
 
15
All estimation results are available upon request.
 
16
Papke (1994) and Rosenthal (2007) discuss this channel in more detail. See also Layser (2019) for a recent analysis that emphasizes legal issues.
 
17
See Alm et al. (2020) for estimation results on this issue. See also Chen et al. (2019) and Theodos et al. (2020), who find that opportunity zones have had little impact on housing prices and other desired outcomes, at least to date.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
In the land of OZ: designating opportunity zones
verfasst von
James Alm
Trey Dronyk-Trosper
Sean Larkin
Publikationsdatum
19.10.2020
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2021
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00848-9

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