nach oben

Erschienen in:

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions

verfasst von : Okke Schrijvers, Joseph Bonneau, Dan Boneh, Tim Roughgarden

Erschienen in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward functions in Bitcoin mining pools. Our model consists only of an unordered history of reported shares and gives participating miners the strategy choices of either reporting or delaying when they discover a share or full solution. We defined a precise condition for incentive compatibility to ensure miners strategy choices optimize the welfare of the pool as a whole. With this definition we show that proportional mining rewards are not incentive compatible in this model. We introduce and analyze a novel reward function which is incentive compatible in this model. Finally we show that the popular reward function pay-per-last-N-shares is also incentive compatible in a more general model.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel A Sensitivity-Adaptive -Uncertainty Model for Set-Valued Data

Nächstes Kapitel When Cryptocurrencies Mine Their Own Business

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

For an academic overview of Bitcoin we refer the reader to [2].

In Sect. 6 we consider a strictly more general informational model, which will be described there.

We adopt the convention that \(\mathbb {N}\) includes the number 0.

A simpler format such as only receiving information about which miner reported a full solution would only allow a replication of solo mining.

In this work we are only considering a pool which follows the default mining strategy and does not attempt to implement an deviant strategies to earn disproportionately more rewards than competing pools, such as temporary block withholding [8].

Another way of saying this is that a reward function which does not compel participants to report solutions immediately is not welfare maximizing, since the selfish behavior of individuals can hurt the total reward of the group.

While we do not consider fees in this paper, note that a pool operator would also want to optimize throughput if collects a fraction of the reward.

In Appendix B we show that the possibility of another miner reporting a solution does not materially change the characterization here and in Appendix C we extend this to include the possibility of another pool reporting a full solution.

This makes our results slightly less general in this setting than for the reduced information setting, where the miner could delay for any delay d.

Nakamoto, S.: Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Consulted 1(2012), 28 (2008)

Bonneau, J., Miller, A., Clark, J., Narayanan, A., Kroll, J.A., Felten, E.W.: Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. In: 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2015

Miller, A., Shi, E., Kosba, A., Katz, J.: Nonoutsourceable Scratch-Off Puzzles to Discourage Bitcoin Mining Coalitions (2014). (preprint)

Rosenfeld, M.: Analysis of Bitcoin pooled mining reward systems (2011). arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.4980

Eyal, I.: The miner’s dilemma. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2015)

Laszka, A., Johnson, B., Grossklags, J.: When bitcoin mining pools run dry. In: Brenner, M., Christin, N., Johnson, B., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2015. LNCS, vol. 8976, pp. 63–77. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48051-9_5 CrossRef

Johnson, B., Laszka, A., Grossklags, J., Vasek, M., Moore, T.: Game-theoretic analysis of DDoS attacks against bitcoin mining pools. In: Böhme, R., Brenner, M., Moore, T., Smith, M. (eds.) FC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8438, pp. 72–86. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44774-1_6

Eyal, I., Sirer, E.G.: Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. In: Financial Cryptography (2014)

Titel: Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions
verfasst von: Okke Schrijvers
Joseph Bonneau
Dan Boneh
Tim Roughgarden
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-54969-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-54970-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_28

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"