Skip to main content

2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Intended and Unintended Consequences of CEO and Top Management Team Compensation

verfasst von : Jason W. Ridge

Erschienen in: Corporate Governance

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Executive compensation has become a major issue in contemporary society, particularly with the lavish compensatory packages that today seem to be the standard rather than the rule. The aims of this chapter are to discuss different components of executive compensation and more importantly the impact that these components have on executive behavior and firm performance. The chapter begins by addressing both the theoretical and practical intentions of different aspects of both individual aspects of executive compensation packages and then from a more macro view, the intentions of behind inequality of the overall executive level compensation structure within the firm. Following this discussion, focus is turned to the more ominous unanticipated outcomes that have been demonstrated to be produced through different aspects of compensatory packages and structures. Generally, this chapter addresses both how individual executive compensation packages and firm level compensation structure achieve intended benefits (i.e., goal and risk alignment between shareholder and executive) while also eliciting unintended consequences (i.e., negative effects of risk taking, fraudulent reporting, earnings manipulation, inter-team conflict, decreased employee satisfaction, decreased firm performance).

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Baker, T., Collins, D., & Reitenga, A. (2003). Stock option compensation and earnings management incentives. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 18(4), 557–582. Baker, T., Collins, D., & Reitenga, A. (2003). Stock option compensation and earnings management incentives. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 18(4), 557–582.
Zurück zum Zitat Becker, B., & Huselid, M. (1992). The incentive effects of tournament compensation systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 336–350.CrossRef Becker, B., & Huselid, M. (1992). The incentive effects of tournament compensation systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 336–350.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Burns, N., & Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 35–67.CrossRef Burns, N., & Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 35–67.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chauvin, K. W., & Shenoy, C. (2001). Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(1), 53–76.CrossRef Chauvin, K. W., & Shenoy, C. (2001). Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(1), 53–76.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Coles, J. L., Hertzel, M., & Kalpathy, S. (2006). Earnings management around employee stock option reissues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1–2), 173–200.CrossRef Coles, J. L., Hertzel, M., & Kalpathy, S. (2006). Earnings management around employee stock option reissues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1–2), 173–200.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cowherd, D., & Levine, D. (1992). Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: An investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 302–320.CrossRef Cowherd, D., & Levine, D. (1992). Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: An investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(2), 302–320.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychological Review, 83(2), 85–113.CrossRef Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychological Review, 83(2), 85–113.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33(6), 1016.CrossRef Devers, C. E., Cannella, A. A., Reilly, G. P., & Yoder, M. E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33(6), 1016.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Devers, C., McNamara, G., Wiseman, R., & Arrfelt, M. (2008). Moving closer to the action: Examining compensation design effects on firm risk. Organization Science, 19(4), 548.CrossRef Devers, C., McNamara, G., Wiseman, R., & Arrfelt, M. (2008). Moving closer to the action: Examining compensation design effects on firm risk. Organization Science, 19(4), 548.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Dow, J., & Raposo, C. C. (2005). CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2701–2727.CrossRef Dow, J., & Raposo, C. C. (2005). CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2701–2727.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Henderson, A., & Fredrickson, J. (2001). Top management team coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: A competitive test of economic and behavioral views. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 96–117.CrossRef Henderson, A., & Fredrickson, J. (2001). Top management team coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: A competitive test of economic and behavioral views. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 96–117.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91.CrossRef Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329. Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329.
Zurück zum Zitat Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.CrossRef Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kräkel, M. (2000). Relative deprivation in rank-order tournaments. Labour Economics, 7(4), 385–407.CrossRef Kräkel, M. (2000). Relative deprivation in rank-order tournaments. Labour Economics, 7(4), 385–407.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lafond, R., & Roychowdhury, S. (2008). Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(1), 101–135.CrossRef Lafond, R., & Roychowdhury, S. (2008). Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(1), 101–135.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Larraza Kintana, M., Wiseman, R. M., Gomez Mejia, L. R., & Welbourne, T. M. (2007). Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model. Strategic Management Journal, 28(10), 1001–1019.CrossRef Larraza Kintana, M., Wiseman, R. M., Gomez Mejia, L. R., & Welbourne, T. M. (2007). Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model. Strategic Management Journal, 28(10), 1001–1019.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lazear, E. (1989). Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of political economy, 97(3), 561–580.CrossRef Lazear, E. (1989). Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of political economy, 97(3), 561–580.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lazear, E. (1991). Labor economics and the psychology of organizations. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 89–110.CrossRef Lazear, E. (1991). Labor economics and the psychology of organizations. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 89–110.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. The Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841.CrossRef Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. The Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lie, E. (2005). On the timing of CEO stock option awards. Management Science, 51, 802–812.CrossRef Lie, E. (2005). On the timing of CEO stock option awards. Management Science, 51, 802–812.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lin, B., & Lu, R. (2009). Managerial power, compensation gap and firm performance—evidence from Chinese public listed companies. Global Finance Journal, 20(2), 153–164.CrossRef Lin, B., & Lu, R. (2009). Managerial power, compensation gap and firm performance—evidence from Chinese public listed companies. Global Finance Journal, 20(2), 153–164.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mehran, H., Nogler, G. E., & Schwartz, K. B. (1998). CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy1. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(3), 319–349.CrossRef Mehran, H., Nogler, G. E., & Schwartz, K. B. (1998). CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy1. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(3), 319–349.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Melton, M., & Zorn, T. S. (2000). An empirical test of tournament theory: The senior PGA tour. Managerial Finance, 26(7), 16–32.CrossRef Melton, M., & Zorn, T. S. (2000). An empirical test of tournament theory: The senior PGA tour. Managerial Finance, 26(7), 16–32.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Merton, R. K. (1936). The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. American Sociological Review, 1(6), 894–904.CrossRef Merton, R. K. (1936). The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. American Sociological Review, 1(6), 894–904.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives* 1. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34(1–3), 283–309.CrossRef Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives* 1. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34(1–3), 283–309.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (2000). Taking stock: Equity based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership. The Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1367–1384.CrossRef Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (2000). Taking stock: Equity based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership. The Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1367–1384.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat O’Connor, J. P., Priem, R. L., Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. (2006). Do CEO stock options prevent or promote fraudulent financial reporting. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 483–500.CrossRef O’Connor, J. P., Priem, R. L., Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. (2006). Do CEO stock options prevent or promote fraudulent financial reporting. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 483–500.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 701–715. Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 701–715.
Zurück zum Zitat Sanders, G. (2001). Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. The Academy of Management Journal, 44(3), 477–492.CrossRef Sanders, G. (2001). Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. The Academy of Management Journal, 44(3), 477–492.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sanders, W., & Hambrick, D. (2007). Swinging for the fences: the effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. The Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), 50(5), 1055–1078. Sanders, W., & Hambrick, D. (2007). Swinging for the fences: the effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. The Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), 50(5), 1055–1078.
Zurück zum Zitat Siegel, P., & Hambrick, D. (2005). Pay disparities within top management groups: Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms. Organization Science, 16(3), 259.CrossRef Siegel, P., & Hambrick, D. (2005). Pay disparities within top management groups: Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms. Organization Science, 16(3), 259.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tian, H. L. (2004). Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(6), 1225–1245.CrossRef Tian, H. L. (2004). Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(6), 1225–1245.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Williams, M. A., & Rao, R. P. (2006). CEO stock options and equity risk incentives. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(1 & 2), 26–44.CrossRef Williams, M. A., & Rao, R. P. (2006). CEO stock options and equity risk incentives. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(1 & 2), 26–44.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Wright, P., Kroll, M., & Elenkov, D. (2002). Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation: the moderating role of monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 599–608.CrossRef Wright, P., Kroll, M., & Elenkov, D. (2002). Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation: the moderating role of monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 599–608.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Yermack, D. (1997). Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements. Journal of Finance, 52, 449–476.CrossRef Yermack, D. (1997). Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements. Journal of Finance, 52, 449–476.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Intended and Unintended Consequences of CEO and Top Management Team Compensation
verfasst von
Jason W. Ridge
Copyright-Jahr
2012
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_9

Premium Partner