Skip to main content

2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Interventions by Governments

verfasst von : Sebastian Weißschnur

Erschienen in: The Proportionality of State Intervention

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The opening part of this chapter identifies and discusses the main methods that governments employ to intervene in markets: monetary and fiscal policies and intervention in banks. The role of the Principles of Proportionality and Subsidiarity in the manner that EU intervenes in markets is appraised prior to a review of the details of its intervention by application of the three principal methods. Monetary and fiscal policies are discussed in respect to the 17 Member States comprising the Eurozone, which were the EU’s major concern after the 2007–2008 crisis, and monetary policy impacting on all 27 Member States, which relies on European Central Bank (ECB) coordination with national central banks. Fiscal discipline was regarded as more important in Eurozone countries that were subjected to introduction of a range of standard interventions in an attempt to meet specific debt-level criteria imposed by EU.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Abdymomunov, A., & Kang, K. H. (2015). The Effects of Monetary Policy Regime Shifts on the Term Structure of Interest Rates. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 19(2), 183–207.CrossRef Abdymomunov, A., & Kang, K. H. (2015). The Effects of Monetary Policy Regime Shifts on the Term Structure of Interest Rates. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 19(2), 183–207.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Aikins, S. K. (2009). Political Economy of Government Intervention in the Free Market System. Administrative Theory and Praxis, 31(3), 403–408.CrossRef Aikins, S. K. (2009). Political Economy of Government Intervention in the Free Market System. Administrative Theory and Praxis, 31(3), 403–408.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Alexy, R. (2002). A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press. Alexy, R. (2002). A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Allen, C., Herbert, D., & Koopman, G. (2006). The European Commission’s New Industrial Policy. BIG Papers, 11(2), 135–143. Allen, C., Herbert, D., & Koopman, G. (2006). The European Commission’s New Industrial Policy. BIG Papers, 11(2), 135–143.
Zurück zum Zitat Bean, C. (1998). The Interaction of Aggregate-Demand Policies and Labour Market Reform. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 5(2), 353–382. Bean, C. (1998). The Interaction of Aggregate-Demand Policies and Labour Market Reform. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 5(2), 353–382.
Zurück zum Zitat Bekker, S., & Wilthagen, T. (2008, March/April). Flexicurity – a European Approach to Labour Market Policy. Intereconomics, pp. 68–111. Bekker, S., & Wilthagen, T. (2008, March/April). Flexicurity – a European Approach to Labour Market Policy. Intereconomics, pp. 68–111.
Zurück zum Zitat Blakely, J. (2019). How Economics Becomes Ideology: The Uses and Abuses of Rational Choice Theory. In P. Rona & L. Zsolnai (Eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics (pp. 37–52). Springer. Blakely, J. (2019). How Economics Becomes Ideology: The Uses and Abuses of Rational Choice Theory. In P. Rona & L. Zsolnai (Eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics (pp. 37–52). Springer.
Zurück zum Zitat Boettke, P. J., & Coyne, C. J. (2011). The Debt–Inflation Cycle and the Global Financial Crisis. Global Policy, 2(2), 184–189.CrossRef Boettke, P. J., & Coyne, C. J. (2011). The Debt–Inflation Cycle and the Global Financial Crisis. Global Policy, 2(2), 184–189.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bullard, J. (2012, March/April). Death of a Theory. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, pp. 83–104. Bullard, J. (2012, March/April). Death of a Theory. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, pp. 83–104.
Zurück zum Zitat Buti, M., Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Franco, D. (2003). Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment? (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3692). Buti, M., Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Franco, D. (2003). Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment? (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3692).
Zurück zum Zitat Cariboni, J., Joossens, E., & Uboldi, A. (2010). The Promptness of European Deposit Protection Schemes to Face Banking Failures. Journal of Banking Regulation, 11, 191–209.CrossRef Cariboni, J., Joossens, E., & Uboldi, A. (2010). The Promptness of European Deposit Protection Schemes to Face Banking Failures. Journal of Banking Regulation, 11, 191–209.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat De Grauwe, P. (2015, January 21). The Sad Consequences of the Fear of QE. The Economist. De Grauwe, P. (2015, January 21). The Sad Consequences of the Fear of QE. The Economist.
Zurück zum Zitat ECB. (2008, July). One Monetary Policy and Many Fiscal Policies: Ensuring a Smooth Functioning of EMU. ECB Monthly Bulletin, pp. 65–78. ECB. (2008, July). One Monetary Policy and Many Fiscal Policies: Ensuring a Smooth Functioning of EMU. ECB Monthly Bulletin, pp. 65–78.
Zurück zum Zitat Engelen, E., & Glasmacher, A. (2018). The Waiting Game: How Securitization Became the Solution for the Growth Problem of the Eurozone. Competition & Change, 22(2), 165–183.CrossRef Engelen, E., & Glasmacher, A. (2018). The Waiting Game: How Securitization Became the Solution for the Growth Problem of the Eurozone. Competition & Change, 22(2), 165–183.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat EU. (2010). EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Brussels. EU. (2010). EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat EU. (2011). Institutional Provisions. Brussels. EU. (2011). Institutional Provisions. Brussels.
Zurück zum Zitat Fawley, R. W., & Neely, C. J. (2013, January/February). Four Stories of Quantitative Easing. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. Fawley, R. W., & Neely, C. J. (2013, January/February). Four Stories of Quantitative Easing. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review.
Zurück zum Zitat Galinato, G. I., & Yoder, J. K. (2010). An Integrated Tax-Subsidy Policy for Carbon Emission Reduction. Resource and Energy Economics, 32(3), 310–326.CrossRef Galinato, G. I., & Yoder, J. K. (2010). An Integrated Tax-Subsidy Policy for Carbon Emission Reduction. Resource and Energy Economics, 32(3), 310–326.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gaul, J., & Jodar, S. (2006). Vertical Industrial Policy in the EU: An Empirical Analysis of Effectiveness of State Aid. EIB Papers, 11(2), 81–105. Gaul, J., & Jodar, S. (2006). Vertical Industrial Policy in the EU: An Empirical Analysis of Effectiveness of State Aid. EIB Papers, 11(2), 81–105.
Zurück zum Zitat Golbu, J. (1996). Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU Environmental Policy. Political Studies, XLIV, 686–703.CrossRef Golbu, J. (1996). Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU Environmental Policy. Political Studies, XLIV, 686–703.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Harbo, T. (2010). The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law. European Law Journal, 16(2), 158–185.CrossRef Harbo, T. (2010). The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law. European Law Journal, 16(2), 158–185.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hausken, K., & Ncube, M. (2013). Quantitative Easing and Its Impact in the US, Japan, the UK and Europe. Springer.CrossRef Hausken, K., & Ncube, M. (2013). Quantitative Easing and Its Impact in the US, Japan, the UK and Europe. Springer.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Herr, H. (2014). The European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort. Panoeconomicus, 1(S), 59–78. Herr, H. (2014). The European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort. Panoeconomicus, 1(S), 59–78.
Zurück zum Zitat HM Treasury. (2013). Review of the Monetary Policy Framework. H.M. Treasury. HM Treasury. (2013). Review of the Monetary Policy Framework. H.M. Treasury.
Zurück zum Zitat Hohberger, S., Priftis, R., & Vogel, L. (2018). The Macroeconomic Effects of Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model. Bank of Canada. Hohberger, S., Priftis, R., & Vogel, L. (2018). The Macroeconomic Effects of Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model. Bank of Canada.
Zurück zum Zitat Jonung, L., & Larch, M. (2006, July). Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case for Independent Forecasts. Economic Policy, pp. 491–534. Jonung, L., & Larch, M. (2006, July). Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case for Independent Forecasts. Economic Policy, pp. 491–534.
Zurück zum Zitat Joskow, P. L., & Rose, N. L. (1989). The Effects of Economic Regulation. In R. Schamalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 11, pp. 1449–1506). North Holland. Joskow, P. L., & Rose, N. L. (1989). The Effects of Economic Regulation. In R. Schamalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 11, pp. 1449–1506). North Holland.
Zurück zum Zitat Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., & Vegh, C. (2004). When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies (NBER Working Paper No. 10780). Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C., & Vegh, C. (2004). When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies (NBER Working Paper No. 10780).
Zurück zum Zitat Konoe, S. (2010). International Finance and Policy Cooperation: Before and After the 2007–2010 Financial Crisis (EUI Working Paper MWP 2010/24). Konoe, S. (2010). International Finance and Policy Cooperation: Before and After the 2007–2010 Financial Crisis (EUI Working Paper MWP 2010/24).
Zurück zum Zitat Lipsey, R., & Chrystal, A. (2015). Economics (13th ed.). Oxford University Press. Lipsey, R., & Chrystal, A. (2015). Economics (13th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Musgrave, R. A. (1987/88). US Fiscal Policy, Keynes and Keynesian Economics. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, X(2), 171–183. Musgrave, R. A. (1987/88). US Fiscal Policy, Keynes and Keynesian Economics. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, X(2), 171–183.
Zurück zum Zitat OECD. (2009). Competition in Financial Markets. OECD. OECD. (2009). Competition in Financial Markets. OECD.
Zurück zum Zitat Panico, C., & Purificato, F. (2013). Policy Coordination, Conflicting National Interests and the European Debt Crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37, 585–608.CrossRef Panico, C., & Purificato, F. (2013). Policy Coordination, Conflicting National Interests and the European Debt Crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37, 585–608.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Pelkmans, J. (2006, October). An EU Subsidiarity Test Is Indispensable. Intereconomics, pp. 249–254. Pelkmans, J. (2006, October). An EU Subsidiarity Test Is Indispensable. Intereconomics, pp. 249–254.
Zurück zum Zitat Pelkmans, J. (2012). The Economics of Single Market Regulation. Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, 25(12), 1–39. Pelkmans, J. (2012). The Economics of Single Market Regulation. Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, 25(12), 1–39.
Zurück zum Zitat Portuese, A. (2013). Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency. European Law Journal, 19(5), 612–635.CrossRef Portuese, A. (2013). Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency. European Law Journal, 19(5), 612–635.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Poterba, J. M. (1994). Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why? (NFER Working Paper No. 4916). Poterba, J. M. (1994). Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why? (NFER Working Paper No. 4916).
Zurück zum Zitat Poto, M. (2009). Principle of Proportionality in Comparative Perspective. German Law Journal, 8, 835–870.CrossRef Poto, M. (2009). Principle of Proportionality in Comparative Perspective. German Law Journal, 8, 835–870.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rudd, K. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis. The Monthly, 13(42), 14. Rudd, K. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis. The Monthly, 13(42), 14.
Zurück zum Zitat Sauter, W. (2013). Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? In C. Barnard, A. Albors-Llorenc, M. W. Gehring, & R. Schütze (Eds.), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2012–2013 (pp. 439–466). Hart Publishing. Sauter, W. (2013). Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? In C. Barnard, A. Albors-Llorenc, M. W. Gehring, & R. Schütze (Eds.), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2012–2013 (pp. 439–466). Hart Publishing.
Zurück zum Zitat Scaberd, A., & van Wijnbergen, S. J. G. (2014). Sovereign Default and the Stability of Inflation-Targeting Regimes. IMF Economic Review, 62(2), 1–28. Scaberd, A., & van Wijnbergen, S. J. G. (2014). Sovereign Default and the Stability of Inflation-Targeting Regimes. IMF Economic Review, 62(2), 1–28.
Zurück zum Zitat Sloman, J., Garrett, D., & Guest, J. (2018). Economics (10th ed.). Pearson. Sloman, J., Garrett, D., & Guest, J. (2018). Economics (10th ed.). Pearson.
Zurück zum Zitat Stichele, M. V. (2008). Financial Regulation in the European Union. World Economics, Environment & Development Association. Stichele, M. V. (2008). Financial Regulation in the European Union. World Economics, Environment & Development Association.
Zurück zum Zitat Stoain, A. (2013). Influences of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the Activity of the Public Administration. Social-Behavioural Sciences, 4(72), 383–482. Stoain, A. (2013). Influences of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the Activity of the Public Administration. Social-Behavioural Sciences, 4(72), 383–482.
Zurück zum Zitat Syrpis, P. (2004). In Defence of Subsidiarity. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24(2), 332–334.CrossRef Syrpis, P. (2004). In Defence of Subsidiarity. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24(2), 332–334.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tirole, J., & Rendell, S. (2017). Economics for the Common Good. Princeton University Press.CrossRef Tirole, J., & Rendell, S. (2017). Economics for the Common Good. Princeton University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat van Doren, P. (2000, May 1). Strangulation by Regulation. National Review, pp. 43–47. van Doren, P. (2000, May 1). Strangulation by Regulation. National Review, pp. 43–47.
Zurück zum Zitat Winston, C. (2006). Government Failure v Market Failure. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Winston, C. (2006). Government Failure v Market Failure. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
Zurück zum Zitat Wolf, C. (1993). Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives (2nd ed.). Rand Books. Wolf, C. (1993). Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives (2nd ed.). Rand Books.
Zurück zum Zitat Wolff, R. D., & Resick, S. A. (2012). Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian. MIT Press. Wolff, R. D., & Resick, S. A. (2012). Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian. MIT Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Zerbe, R. O., & Mc Curdy, H. E. (1999). The Failure of Market Failure. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 558–578.CrossRef Zerbe, R. O., & Mc Curdy, H. E. (1999). The Failure of Market Failure. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(2), 558–578.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Interventions by Governments
verfasst von
Sebastian Weißschnur
Copyright-Jahr
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75676-5_5

Premium Partner