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Formal Methods in System Design

21.11.2022

Introducing robust reachability

verfasst von: Guillaume Girol, Benjamin Farinier, Sébastien Bardin

Erschienen in: Formal Methods in System Design

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Abstract

We introduce a new property called robust reachability which refines the standard notion of reachability in order to take replicability into account. A bug is robustly reachable if a controlled input can make it so the bug is reached whatever the value of uncontrolled input. Robust reachability is better suited than standard reachability in many realistic situations related to security (e.g., criticality assessment or bug prioritization) or software engineering (e.g., replicable test suites and flakiness). We propose a formal treatment of the concept, and we revisit existing symbolic bug finding methods through this new lens. Remarkably, robust reachability allows differentiating bounded model checking from symbolic execution while they have the same deductive power in the standard case. Finally, we propose the first symbolic verifier dedicated to robust reachability: we use it for criticality assessment of 5 existing vulnerabilities, and compare it with standard symbolic execution.

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Fußnoten
2
We need to handle the case where the considered trace t is not in O, but one of its prefix is – which indeed satisfies reachability. Yet, in the cases where O is upward-closed (i.@e.@, closed by extension of trace) or \({\texttt {GetPaths}}(k)\) returns all path prefixes (and not only maximal paths), \({{\,\textrm{mon}\,}}_\pi ^O\) simply needs to express that \(t \in O\).
 
3
Without a null byte, but we ignore this detail for the sake of simplicity.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introducing robust reachability
verfasst von
Guillaume Girol
Benjamin Farinier
Sébastien Bardin
Publikationsdatum
21.11.2022
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Formal Methods in System Design
Print ISSN: 0925-9856
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8102
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10703-022-00402-x

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