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Erschienen in:
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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction

verfasst von : Slobodan Tomić

Erschienen in: Leadership, Institutions and Enforcement

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This book investigates the impact of organisational factors and leadership on the enforcement patterns of five anticorruption agencies (ACAs) from three Southeast European countries – Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia. The analysis covers the first decade of their transition reforms (from 2001 to 2012), which unfolded under EU oversight.

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Nächstes Kapitel Theory and Methods
Fußnoten
1
The official country name in the observed period was Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), but for the purposes of brevity the name Macedonia is used. This shall not imply any position as regards the dispute between FYRM and Greece regarding the name of the Greece’s northern region of Macedonia.
 
2
For instance, the Serbian dispute over the status of its southern province Kosovo & Metohija which declared independence in 2008, and the Macedonian-Greek dispute over the toponym ‘Macedonia’.
 
3
Croatia and Macedonia joined GRECO in 2000; Serbia in 2003. See: https://​www.​coe.​int/​en/​web/​greco/​evaluations
 
4
The literature uses interchangeably the terms ‘legal independence’, ‘statutory independence, ‘formal independence’ and ‘de-jure independence’ as synonyms for high structural insulation from government.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introduction
verfasst von
Slobodan Tomić
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Buch
Leadership, Institutions and Enforcement

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-97582-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-97583-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97583-2_1

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