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2014 | Buch

Justice and Foreign Rule

On International Transitional Administration

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Can foreign rule be morally justified? Since the end of the First World War, international transitional administrations have replaced dysfunctional states to create the conditions for lasting peace and democracy. In response to extreme state failure, the author argues, this form of foreign rule is not only justified, but a requirement of justice.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
1. Introduction
Abstract
Can foreign rule ever be morally justified? At first glance, the answer to this question seems clear: Foreign rule violates the right to collective self-determination and, throughout history, has led to massive human rights violations. In Lincoln’s famous words, it is neither a government of the people, nor a government by the people. Can it nonetheless be a government for the people? Ever since the end of the First World War, liberal democracies have established international transitional administrations (ITAs) to replace dysfunctional state governments and to create the conditions for lasting peace and democracy. Recent prominent examples of this practice are Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq. Beyond numerous practical challenges, ITAs thus turn the seemingly outdated question of whether foreign rule can be morally justified into a question of pressing practical concern: Can ITAs ever be morally justified, although they are a form of foreign rule?
Daniel Jacob
2. Basic Human Interests
Abstract
The natural duty of justice describes a duty we all have towards each other, irrespective of any interactions or special relations. But how can we determine the content of this duty? What exactly is it that we all owe each other? As noted in section 1.2, Allen Buchanan conceives of the natural duty of justice as ‘the limited moral obligation to contribute to ensuring that all persons have access to just institutions, where this means primarily institutions that protect basic human rights’ (Buchanan 2004, 86). While this understanding of the natural duty of justice centers around basic human rights, Buchanan further emphasizes that what ultimately matters morally are not these rights, but the interests which they protect (Buchanan 2004, 127). Drawing on this understanding of the natural duty of justice, in this chapter I begin to specify the standard of minimal justice that informs this duty by developing a systematic account of basic human interests.
Daniel Jacob
3. Human Rights, Collective Self-Determination, and Legitimacy
Abstract
In the previous chapter I have argued that the idea of basic human interests can provide the core of a minimal theory of justice. In this chapter, I now specify the institutional implications of such a conception of minimal justice. Again, I take Buchanan’s account of minimal justice as he formulates it in his discussion of the natural duty of justice as my starting point. I do, however, adapt it in three ways.
Daniel Jacob
4. Responding to Extreme State Failure
Abstract
In the introduction to this book I asked whether ITAs can be morally justified, although they clearly constitute a form of foreign rule. I suggested to approach this question by relating it to the idea of a natural duty of justice and, hence, by asking whether ITAs can plausibly be conceived of as a means to fulfill the requirements of this duty.
Daniel Jacob
5. Restoring Minimally Just Conditions
Abstract
At the beginning of the previous chapter I suggested that an ITA can be a means to fulfill the requirements of the natural duty of justice if it fulfills the following three conditions:
  • c1: the establishment of an ITA is a response to a situation of extreme state failure, in which a state is systematically unable to protect its citizens’ security rights
  • c2: the goal of an ITA is to create minimally just conditions. To this end, it protects the local population’s security rights and ensures the (re-)construction of minimally just institutions. Once this goal is reached, ultimate authority must be transferred to the local government
  • c3: the ITA governs in a way that respects the local population’s human rights and basic principles of rule of law, that makes the ITA accountable to the local population, and that avoids humiliation
Daniel Jacob
6. Respecting the Requirements of Justice
Abstract
In the introduction to Chapter 4, I argued that in order to be morally justified as a means to fulfill the requirements of the natural duty of justice an ITA must fulfill three conditions:
  • c1: the establishment of an ITA is a response to a situation of extreme state failure, in which a state is systematically unable to protect its citizens’ security rights
  • c2: the goal of an ITA is to create minimally just conditions. To this end, it protects the local population’s security rights and ensures the (re-)construction of minimally just institutions. Once this goal is reached, ultimate authority must be transferred to the local government
  • c3: the ITA governs in a way that respects the local population’s human rights and basic principles of rule of law, that makes the ITA accountable to the local population, and that avoids humiliation
Daniel Jacob
7. Conclusion
Abstract
Can an ITA be a means to restore justice and thus truly be a government for the people? Or does the fact that by definition an ITA as a form of foreign rule is not a government of the people, nor by the people mean that it inherently constitutes a paternalistic violation of the right to collective self-determination?
Daniel Jacob
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Justice and Foreign Rule
verfasst von
Daniel Jacob
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Verlag
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Electronic ISBN
978-1-137-45257-3
Print ISBN
978-1-349-49745-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137452573

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