Kantianism and Virtue

For example, Bittner 2001 could not be further from Kantian thinking, in contrast to his exegetical works on Kant in the 1970s and 80s.

Ricken 2013, pp. 138–154, 188–192.

A newer work systematically defending this claim: Bambauer 2011.

Another interesting, yet even more controversially discussed position is the one in Grenberg 2005, who regards the concept of humility as a central part of Kant’s ethics.

“Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (G 4:421).

A distinction she did not make in earlier, more exegetical works like “Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” (CKE, 77–105).

Which is a rejection of the “One thought too many” objection discussed by Baron (2008, pp. 251–259). The fact that someone is my child, sibling or friend certainly is a source of special obligations. I would not be a ‘friend’ if I treated my friends like strangers. Doctors are responsible for their patients, parents for their children, preferably, etc. Regarding the wide duties of virtue it is often up to me to which person’s happiness I contribute to (first). My motive can simply be that I like someone (Baron 2008, pp. 253–255). Yet this scope is limited by duties of justice which are reflected in practical identities as well. Being a good teacher means to be committed to an equally just treatment of students regardless if someone happens to be a friend, family member etc.

The transition from valuing yourself to valuing everyone else needs an additional argument based on Wittgenstein’s private language argument: just like language and meaning always take place inside a shared linguistic space, the space of obligations, values and reasons is also occupied together (SoN 132–145).

CA 113–114. How bad action can still be counted as an “action” one is responsible for is also discussed at length in AII 159–176.

Foot 2001, p. 15. While Korsgaard only mentions Foot infrequently (and if so, critically; Korsgaard 2019), some underlying Aristotelian ideas are similar.

One could object that the soul of Plato’s tyrant also seems to be unified. He follows one single erotic, animalistic instinct holding him together and thus is “an absolute slave to a single dominating obsession” (CA 117). A possible answer is that rationality cannot be fully suppressed by humans, hence there will always be an inner conflict when trying to act like an animal. The tyrant is, at least at times, aware of his pitiful state and suffering from it, but then this kind of forced ‘unity’ is actually none.

Korsgaard does give an account of ‘provisionally universal’ willing which allows background conditions and thus counters most of the objections raised against the concept of universal maxims in Kant (SC 24–27; AII 121–123).

At this point I depart from Korsgaard’s interpretation of virtues as mere passive capacities (2019), They rather originate from or even come down to be practical identities. This ‘active’ interpretation is supported by the idea of adopting the two ‘ends of virtue’ in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.

See also Sherman (1997, pp. 125–126), who emphasises the need for the cultivation of emotions in Aristotle and Kant alike.