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Erschienen in:
Introduction: Why Ethics Matter in Taxation Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Libertarian Perspectives on the Ethics of Taxation

verfasst von : Walter E. Block, Christian Torsell

Erschienen in: Ethics and Taxation

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

We provide a survey of significant libertarian contributions to the discussion surrounding ethics and taxation. By significant contributions, we mean those which have exerted a strong influence both on libertarianism, popular and academic, and on political and ethical discourse more broadly. Our discussion centers on the work of three prominent libertarians: Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand, and Murray Rothbard. For each, we present his or her position concerning some ethical aspect of taxation and evaluate objections to it. Section 4.2 discusses Nozick’s analogy between taxation of labor from earnings and forced labor and applies his argument against the fairness principle to fairness-based justifications of such taxation. Section 4.3 focuses on Rand’s view that compulsory taxation as such is unjust and considers her proposed scheme of voluntarily-funded minimal government. We argue that she failed to convincingly argue for either the feasibility or desirability of the latter. Section 4.4 addresses Rothbard’s similar position concerning the injustice of taxation per se and defends his view against possible justifications of that institution.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Social Contract and Beyond: Sociability, Reciprocity and Tax Ethics
Nächstes Kapitel Head, Proportional, or Progressive Taxation: An Evaluation Based on Jewish and Christian Ethics
Fußnoten
1
Nozick acknowledges that his use of the ambiguous phrase “on a par with” suggests multiple interpretations. Do his arguments establish that taxation of earnings from labor is identical with forced labor? Or do they merely highlight similarities between the two to “show it is plausible and illuminating to view such taxation in the light of forced labor” (1974, 169)? Determining the precise nature of the parity between taxation of earnings from labor and forced labor established by his arguments would go far in determining their force. However, consistent with his treatment of similar interpretive difficulties, the author offers his reader material for consideration, but does not conclude which of these views is correct. To fully make such an interpretive determination lies outside the scope of the present essay; nor is it entirely clear that a definitive conclusion could be reached. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the challenges inherent in interpreting the arguments we consider. However, in our view, taxes on labor is far more akin to plain, old, ordinary, theft, rather than slavery.
 
2
The amount of penury would of course depend upon the point at which the tax kicks in.
 
3
This is not necessarily so. Perhaps this person satisfies his preferences by volunteering at an animal shelter, cleaning up highways, or performing some other socially valuable service.
 
4
That is, in any way which does not violate the rights of others.
 
5
Natural talents relevant to our discussion include any which allow their possessors to more easily develop skills property owners seeking hired labor are willing to pay for.
 
6
Buchanan (1983) advocated this very policy. For a critique, see Block (2012).
 
7
Feser (2000) offers an illuminating commentary on Cohen’s rejection of self-ownership in the latter’s argument against Nozickian libertarianism. He points out that Cohen, despite identifying as a Marxist of sorts, “is convinced that it is futile to attempt to show that taxation, despite appearances, does not amount to forced labor and therefore does not really conflict with self-ownership” (225).
 
8
For a critique of the public goods fallacy, see (Barnett and Block 2007; Block 1983a, b, c, 2000, 2003; Cowen 1988; De Jasay 1989; Holcombe 1997; Hoppe 1989; Hummel 1990; Osterfeld 1989; Pasour 1981; Rothbard 1997; Schmidtz 1991; Sechrest 2003, 2004a, b, 2007; Tinsley 1999).
Rothbard’s (1997, 178) reductio ad absurdum of the standard view on public goods is as follows: “A and B often benefit, it is held, if they can force C into doing something … [A]ny argument proclaiming the right and goodness of, say, three neighbors, who yearn to form a string quartet, forcing a fourth neighbor at bayonet point to learn and play the viola, is hardly deserving of sober comment.”.
 
9
“Appears to” is inserted to indicate our doubts in light of criticisms of Nozick’s characterization of the fairness principle discussed below.
 
10
Whether the obligation is assumed by the student or parents is immaterial to the present discussion.
 
11
There is also the point that, to the extent that the government is considered a thief, it would be justified not to “steal” services from it, but, to liberate them from this entity. On the former, see Spooner (1966[1870]). On the latter: (Block 1972, 2002a, b, c, 2004a, b, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, b, 2010, 2011a, b, c; Block and Arakaky 2008).
 
12
Her novels have not received much if any scholarly attention, either. Literary reviewers tend to be on the left, and they revile her and her works. However, they, particularly Atlas Shrugged (1957), have all been best sellers.
 
13
Chapter in Rand (1964).
 
14
She does, however, propose a government lottery as one possible method for government funding (135–136). This hypothetical solution prompts the difficult question of how government in a free society would fund the initial investment required of such an undertaking. It could not fund the production of lottery tickets, billboards announcing the lottery, etc. by imposing a compulsive tax on its citizens, nor could these expenses be covered by revenue from a previous lottery—this would require an infinite regress of lotteries. Rand’s neglecting this puzzling problem has no bearing on her general argument about the illegitimacy of coercive taxation.
 
15
Rand also suggested another voluntary means of financing the state: it could sell tags, or tickets, to those engaged in commercial activities. Then, in a case of a dispute, the government would serve as an intermediary, or judge. This, scheme, too, is problematic. First of all, contracting parties could ignore this service, leaving the state high and dry. Second, private parties could offer their competing services. Rand neglects to offer any reason why the government would outdo groups like the Better Business Bureau, or the American Arbitration Association, or private courts such as the Bet Din for Jews, or the ecclesiastical court for Catholics in terms of comparative advantage.
 
16
Strictly speaking, the law of demand states that, ceteris paribus, price and quantity vary inversely.
 
17
Further, it is difficult to reconcile her concern that violence not be initiated against innocents with the suppression of private security provision. Surely, firms in this industry would not necessarily violate the non-aggression principle.
 
18
His three alternatives melt down into two, but his three objections remain.
 
19
Others publications that share this perspective include (Block 2001; Chodorov 1962; DiLorenzo 2012; Rothbard 1977, 1978, 1981, 1998, 2007; Vance 2006, 2007).
 
20
We will not be summarizing Rothbard’s brilliant insights into this matter. Instead, we will move in a different direction, one that will, we hope, retain the spirit of his analysis.
 
21
This is done, usually, explicitly, with a signature on the dotted line. Sometimes it is only a verbal agreement, but this, too, is explicit, as in the case of virtually all contracts.
 
22
There were also non-voters, who either refused to participate, or, quite possibly, did not even know anything about these plebiscites. This is all too likely, given the lack of communication in the 18th century.
 
23
This is a redundancy.
 
24
If a commercial interaction is not unanimous, it is not part of the free market, strictly speaking.
 
25
That is to say, destructive to the intellectual coherence of this school of thought.
 
26
All sides, in the case of more complex contracts.
 
27
For a critique of public choice in general, and of this concept in particular, see DiLorenzo and Block (2017).
 
28
Either you are pregnant or you are not pregnant; either you are alive or dead; either you have two feet or you do not have two feet. Voluntariness and non-voluntariness are binary in this sense. Either your contract is unanimous, or it is not a voluntary contract. Of course, it cannot be denied, that in virtually all human affairs, there are indeed gray areas.
 
29
Rather, the very issue on the basis of which the archists (statists) have lost.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Libertarian Perspectives on the Ethics of Taxation
verfasst von
Walter E. Block
Christian Torsell
Copyright-Jahr
2020
Verlag
Springer Singapore
Buch
Ethics and Taxation

Print ISBN: 978-981-15-0088-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-15-0089-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2020

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0089-3_4