2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Lightweight Block Ciphers Revisited: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round PRESENT and HIGHT
verfasst von : Onur Özen, Kerem Varıcı, Cihangir Tezcan, Çelebi Kocair
Erschienen in: Information Security and Privacy
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Design and analysis of lightweight block ciphers have become more popular due to the fact that the future use of block ciphers in ubiquitous devices is generally assumed to be extensive. In this respect, several lightweight block ciphers are designed, of which
Present
and
Hight
are two recently proposed ones by Bogdanov
et al.
and Hong
et al.
respectively. In this paper, we propose new attacks on
Present
and
Hight
. Firstly, we present the first related-key cryptanalysis of 128-bit keyed
Present
by introducing 17-round related-key rectangle attack with time complexity approximately 2
104
memory accesses. Moreover, we further analyze the resistance of
Hight
against impossible differential attacks by mounting new 26-round impossible differential and 31-round related-key impossible differential attacks where the former requires time complexity of 2
119.53
reduced round
Hight
evaluations and the latter is slightly better than exhaustive search.