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Erschienen in:
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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Lindahl and Equilibrium

verfasst von : Anne van den Nouweland

Erschienen in: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that there is a discrepancy between the ideas expressed by Lindahl in 1919 and the current-day definition of Lindahl equilibrium. It describes how the ideas expressed by Lindahl developed into the equilibrium concept for public good economies that now carries Lindahl’s name. The paper also touches on a seemingly forgotten equilibrium concept for public good economies known as ratio equilibrium, and explains that from an axiomatic perspective this equilibrium concept is a better fit with the ideas expressed by Lindahl.

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Vorheriges Kapitel An Extraordinary Maximizing Utilitarianism
Nächstes Kapitel An Interview with Nick Baigent
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Fußnoten
1
In some cases the signs “ and ” also appear in the quotes themselves.
 
2
I am highlighting this feature because we will see in Example 2 that personalized prices can be problematic when marginal costs are not constant.
 
3
I will discuss Milleron [14] in Sect. 4.
 
4
I will discuss Johansen [7] in Sect. 4.
 
5
See, for example, Silvestre [22].
 
6
To be precise, to the translation thereof in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Eds. R. Musgrave and A. Peacock, 1958.
 
7
In this re-production I have left out a few markers that Lindahl uses in a part of his subsequent discussion that I am not covering.
 
8
This is evidenced by the discussion of Novick [17] and Enke [3] in Sect. 4. Lindahl expresses that he is indebted to Knut Wicksell for the algebraic illustration.
 
9
One matter that I have to deal with is that in the earlier literature references to others’ work are not always explicit and when they are explicit, the references are generally listed in full in the text or in a footnote. In what follows below, I acknowledge references as precisely as I can and when a full reference is available, I acknowledge it in a modern-day format. This has changed the way these references appear in the quotes from older papers.
 
10
Samuelson uses the point E and the curve \(C^{{\prime}}D^{{\prime}}\), which represents an indifference curve for one of the consumers, for this derivation.
 
11
Referring to Lindahl [11], Samuelson states (Footnote 8) that he has “not had access to this important work”.
 
12
Actually, he has the year wrong in his own reference – in footnote 1 on page 74 he says 1938 – but this is clearly a typo.
 
13
I have left several lines out that are unnecessary for my purposes.
 
14
Foley [5] references an “unpublished manuscript” by Samuelson without a date. However, this manuscript has the same title as Samuelson [21] as referenced in Malinvaud [12].
 
15
Kaneko [9] casually refers to Foley [5] for validation of this result.
 
Literatur
1.
Bowen H (1943) The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Q J Econ 58(1):27–48CrossRef
2.
3.
Enke S (1955) More on the misuse of mathematics in economics: a rejoinder. Rev Econ Stat 37(2):131–133CrossRef
4.
Foley D (1967) Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econ Essays 7(1):45–98
5.
Foley D (1970) Lindahl’s solution and the core of an economy with public goods. Econometrica 38(1):66–72CrossRef
6.
Ito Y, Kaneko M (1981) Linearization of cost functions in public goods economies. Econ Stud Q 32(3):237–246
7.
Johansen L (1963) Some notes on the Lindahl theory of determination of public expenditures. Int Econ Rev 4(3):346–358CrossRef
8.
Johansen L (1965) Public economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam
9.
Kaneko M (1977) The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy. J Econ Theory 16:123–136CrossRef
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Kreps D (2013) Microeconomic foundations I: choice and competitive markets. Princeton University Press, Princeton
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Lindahl E (1919) Just taxation - a positive solution. Translated from German (Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund 1919, Part I, Chap. 4, pp 85–98: Positive Lösung.”) by E. Henderson. In: Musgrave R, Peacock A (eds) Classics in the theory of public finance (1958). Macmillan, London
12.
Malivaud E (1971) A planning approach to the public good problem. Swed J Econ 73(1):96–112CrossRef
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Mas-Colell A, Whinston M, Green J (1995) Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, New York
14.
Milleron J-C (1972) Theory of value with public goods: a survey article. J Econ Theory 5:419–477CrossRef
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Musgrave R (1939) The voluntary exchange theory of public economy. Q J Econ 53(2):213–237CrossRef
16.
Musgrave R (1959) The theory of public finance: a study in public economy. McGraw-Hill, New York
17.
Novick D (1954) Mathematics: logic, quantity, and method. Rev Econ Stat 36(4):357–358CrossRef
18.
Oakland W (1987) Theory of public goods. In: Auerbach A, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook of public economics, vol II, Chap. 9 North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 485–535
19.
Samuelson P (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev Econ Stat 36(4):387–389CrossRef
20.
Samuelson P (1955) Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. Rev Econ Stat 37(4):350–356CrossRef
21.
Samuelson P (1969) Pure theory of public expenditure and taxation. In: Margolis J, Guitton H (eds) Public economics: an analysis of public production and consumption and their relations to the private sector. Proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association, Chap. 5 Macmillan, London, pp 98–123
22.
Silvestre J (2003) Wicksell, Lindahl and the theory of public goods. Scand J Econ 105(4):527–553CrossRef
23.
van den Nouweland A, Tijs S, Wooders M (2002) Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies. Soc Choice Welf 19:627–636CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Lindahl and Equilibrium
verfasst von
Anne van den Nouweland
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch
Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-46438-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-46439-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_18

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