1996 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request Process
verfasst von : William Blumenthal
Erschienen in: The Economics of the Antitrust Process
Verlag: Springer US
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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The premerger notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 authorize the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice to issue Requests for Additional Information and Documentary Material — so-called Second Requests — to parties to a merger, acquisition, or similar transaction in connection with either agency’s investigation into a possible violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. When Congress enacted the statute, it envisioned a Second Request process that differs in fundamental respects from the practice that has emerged over the past twenty years. According to the legislative history, for example, Congress anticipated that Second Request responses would be compiled in one or two weeks and would consist of a few cartons of materials that had already been collected by the parties to the transaction in connection with their own premerger reviews. In reality, Second Requests have frequently proven to be markedly more burdensome. This paper identifies the principal reasons for the deviation. It also identifies some of the consequences.