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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Imposing Constitutionality: The 2009 Bundestag Election

verfasst von : Friedrich Pukelsheim

Erschienen in: Proportional Representation

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Electoral systems cater to constitutional demands and political goals, and to procedural rules and practical manageability. The diverse requirements are exemplified by the 2009 election of the German Bundestag. The Federal Election Law provides citizens with two votes: a first vote to elect a constituency representative by plurality, and a second vote to mirror the electorate’s division along party lines by proportionality. As Germany is a federation of sixteen states, the federal subdivision is also incorporated. The Bundestag electoral system illustrates the five electoral principles that underlie Europe’s electoral heritage: to elect the members of parliament by direct and universal suffrage in a free, equal, and secret ballot.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Exposing Methods: The 2014 European Parliament Elections

Nächstes Kapitel From Reals to Integers: Rounding Functions and Rounding Rules

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Titel: Imposing Constitutionality: The 2009 Bundestag Election
verfasst von: Friedrich Pukelsheim
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Proportional Representation
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-64706-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-64707-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_2