2006 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Parallel and Concurrent Security of the HB and HB + Protocols
verfasst von : Jonathan Katz, Ji Sun Shin
Erschienen in: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
Juels andWeis (building on prior work of Hopper and Blum) propose and analyze two shared-key authentication protocols - HB and HB
+
- whose extremely low computational cost makes them attractive for low-cost devices such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. Security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of the “learning parity with noise” (LPN) problem: the HB protocol is proven secure against a passive (eavesdropping) adversary, while the HB
+
protocol is proven secure against active attacks.
Juels and Weis prove security of these protocols only for the case of
sequential
executions, and explicitly leave open the question of whether security holds also in the case of
parallel
or
concurrent
executions. In addition to guaranteeing security against a stronger class of adversaries, a positive answer to this question would allow the HB
+
protocol to be parallelized, thereby substantially reducing its round complexity.
Adapting a recent result by Regev, we answer the aforementioned question in the affirmative and prove security of the HB and HB+ protocols under parallel/concurrent executions. We also give what we believe to be substantially
simpler
security proofs for these protocols which are more
complete
in that they explicitly address the dependence of the soundness error on the number of iterations.