Side Channel Analysis of Practical Pairing Implementations: Which Path Is More Secure?

We present an investigation into the security of three practical pairing algorithms; the Tate, truncated Eta (

η

T

) and Ate pairing, in terms of side channel vulnerability. These three algorithms have recently shown to be efficiently computable on the resource constrained smart card, however no in depth side channel analysis of these specific pairing implementations has yet appeared in the literature. We assess these algorithms based on two main avenues of attack since the secret parameter input to the pairing can potentially be entered in two possible positions, i.e.

e

(

P

,

Q

) or

e

(

Q

,

P

) where

P

is public and

Q

is private. We analyse the core operations fundamental to pairings and propose how they can be attacked in a computationally efficient way. Building on this we show how each implementation may potentially succumb to a side channel attack and demonstrate how one path is more susceptible than the other in Tate and Ate. For those who wish to deploy pairing based systems we make a simple suggestion to improve resistance to side channel attacks.