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2002 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Undermining an Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System Using Common Exploits

verfasst von : Kymie M. C. Tan, Kevin S. Killourhy, Roy A. Maxion

Erschienen in: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Over the past decade many anomaly-detection techniques have been proposed and/or deployed to provide early warnings of cyber-attacks, particularly of those attacks involving masqueraders and novel methods. To date, however, there appears to be no study which has identified a systematic method that could be used by an attacker to undermine an anomaly-based intrusion detection system. This paper shows how an adversary can craft an offensive mechanism that renders an anomaly-based intrusion detector blind to the presence of on-going, common attacks. It presents a method that identifies the weaknesses of an anomaly-based intrusion detector, and shows how an attacker can manipulate common attacks to exploit those weaknesses. The paper explores the implications of this threat, and suggests possible improvements for existing and future anomaly-based intrusion detection systems.

Metadaten
Titel
Undermining an Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System Using Common Exploits
verfasst von
Kymie M. C. Tan
Kevin S. Killourhy
Roy A. Maxion
Copyright-Jahr
2002
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36084-0_4

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