2007 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Security Analysis of Two Ultra-Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocols
verfasst von : Ticyan Li, Guilin Wang
Erschienen in: New Approaches for Security, Privacy and Trust in Complex Environments
Verlag: Springer US
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In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of two ultra-lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocols: LMAP and M
2
AP, which are recently proposed by Peris-Lopez
et al.
We identify two effective attacks, namely
Desynchronization attack
and
Fulldisclosure attack
, against their protocols. The former attack can break the synchronization between the RFID reader and the tag in a single protocol run so that they can not authenticate each other in any following protocol runs. The latter attack can disclose all the secret information stored on a tag by interrogating the tag multiple times. Thus it compromises the tag completely. Moreover, we point out the potential countermeasures to improve the security of above protocols.