The Eclectic Paradigm

A major aim of this book on the eclectic paradigm is to enable scholars coming to the International Business (IB) field from a cognate discipline, perhaps for the first time, to be able to connect their own way of thinking about IB issues to a framework for IB analysis that is already well established in our field. It is also hoped that this collection of chapters originally published in the Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS), the leading journal in the IB field, will help to remind mainstream IB scholars of how the framework of the eclectic paradigm has emerged and developed, and of the contribution that JIBS has played in this development.

This paper first sets out the main features of the eclectic theory of international production and then seeks to evaluate its significance of ownership- and location-specific variables in explaining the industrial pattern and geographical distribution of the sales of U.S. affiliates in fourteen manufacturing industries in seven countries in 1970.

This article reviews some of the criticisms directed towards the eclectic paradigm of international production over the past decade, and restates its main tenets. The second part of the article considers a number of possible extensions of the paradigm and concludes by asserting that it remains “a robust general framework for explaining and analysing not only the economic rationale of economic production but many organisational and impact issues in relation to MNE activity as well.”

Political behavior by MNEs has usually been ignored, downplayed or passively treated in dominant economic models of the multinational enterprise. In order to remedy this lacuna, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm is expanded to integrate political dimensions in the analysis of ownership, internalization and location advantages.

This article discusses the implications of the advent of alliance capitalism for our theorizing about the determinants of MNE activity. In particular, it argues that, due to the increasing porosity of the boundaries of firms, countries and markets, the eclectic, or OLI, paradigm of international production needs to consider more explicitly the competitive advantages arising from the way firms organize their inter-firm transactions, the growing interdependencies of many intermediate product markets, and the widening of the portfolio of the assets of districts, regions and countries to embrace the external economies of interdependent activities.

Can Dunning’s OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalization) framework be used to predict the best performing international entry modes or merely the most commonly selected modes? Using data from German and Dutch firms investing in Central and Eastern Europe, we investigate the relationship between Dunning’s OLI variables, entry mode selection and managerial satisfaction with firm performance. We found empirical support for Dunning’s framework as both a descriptive and a normative model.

In recent years, as multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries have become more closely linked to international networks, their knowledge intensity has risen, and some of their R&D has gained a more creative role. Simultaneously, and often connectedly, many subsidiaries have acquired considerable strategic independence in all aspects of their operations, and therefore are able to exercise considerable intra-firm bargaining power to influence the distribution of the firm’s resources. In this context, we suggest that intra-MNC knowledge flows are a key determinant of subsidiary bargaining power. We argue that subsidiary managers can exploit such power to pursue their own ends. Such rent-seeking behavior is implicit in much of the literature on managerialism, but our analysis suggests that such behavior can now occur in headquarters–subsidiary and subsidiary–subsidiary relations. Thus subsidiary strategic independence, designed to enhance the competitiveness of outputs (market knowledge) and inputs (asset-seeking and learning), can be corroded when the pursuit of subsidiary objectives encourages rent-seeking. Empirical analysis of a sample of high-technology subsidiaries in the UK provides strong support for the theory. We examine several avenues whereby the incentives of units within the MNC can be aligned.

This paper examines the co-evolution of MNE activities and institutions external and internal to the firm. We develop a theoretical framework for this analysis that draws on the more recent writings of Douglass North on institutions as a response to complex forms of uncertainty associated with the rise in global economic interconnectedness, and of Richard Nelson on the co-evolution of technology and institutions. We link historical changes in the character of MNE activities to changes in the institutional environment, and highlight the scope for firm-level creativity and institutional entrepreneurship that may lead to co-evolution with the environment. We argue that the main drivers for institutional entrepreneurship are now found in the increasing autonomy of MNE subsidiaries. Thus MNE agency derives from more decentralized forms of experimentation in international corporate networks, which competence-creating nodes of new initiatives can co-evolve with local institutions. Unlike most other streams of related literature, our approach connects patterns of institutional change in wider business systems with more micro processes of variety generation and experimentation within and across individual firms. This form of co-evolutionary analysis is increasingly important to understanding the interrelationships between MNE activities and public policy.

This paper develops a dynamic capabilities-based theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE). It first reviews scholarship on the MNE, with a focus on what has come to be known as “internalization” theory. One prong of this theory develops contractual/transaction cost-informed governance perspectives; and another develops technology transfer and capabilities perspectives. In this paper, it is suggested that the latter has been somewhat neglected. However, if fully integrated as part of a more complete approach, it can buttress transaction cost/governance issues and expand the range of phenomena that can be explained. In this more integrated framework, dynamic capabilities coupled with good strategy are seen as necessary to sustain superior enterprise performance, especially in fast-moving global environments. Entrepreneurial management and transformational leadership are incorporated into a capabilities theory of the MNE. The framework is then used to explain how strategy and dynamic capabilities together determine firm-level sustained competitive advantage in global environments. It is sug-gested that this framework complements contract-based perspectives on the MNE and can help integrate international management and international business perspectives.